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RÉSUMÉ
Le but de ce travail est analyser la notion d’induction, comprise comme la classe des inférences
rationnelles qui ne préservent pas la vérité au sens de la logique non monotone telle que pratiquée
en théorie de l’Intelligence Artificielle (TA) dans les vingt-cinq dernières années. En concentrant
nos efforts sur le problème de la description de l’indctction, nous voulons clarifier la notion
d’induction (au sens de Carnap) à l’aide d’une approche purement descriptive et par conséquent
exempte des problèmes liés à la justification de l’induction. La notion capitale de plausibilité est
comprise ici à la lumière de la notion camapienne de probabilité pragmatique. En fournissant une
analyse formelle et purement descriptive de la notion d’induction, nous avons l’intention aussi de
clarifier la notion ordinaire de plausibilité. Une des principales caractéristiques de ce rapport entre
induction et plausibilité concerne les deux approches fondamentales qu’on peut adopter pour traiter
les contradictions qui surgissent invariablement dans le traitement des inférences inductives. Ces
approches sceptiques et crédules de l’induction, comme nous les avons appelées, impliquent deux
concepts différents de plausibilité qui touchent directement aux ressources formelles de la logique
de l’IA, la logique paraconsistante et la logiqtie paracomplète: alors que la plausibilité sceptique
est une notion paracomplète, la plausibilité crédule est une notion paraconsistante. À l’encontre des
approches formelles développées en logique philosophique, l’aspect purement descriptif est à
l’avant-scène dans la plupart des logiques non monotones. Nous choisissons deux de ces
formalismes — la logique du défaut de Reiter et le formalisme paraconsistante de Pequeno — et
nous les élaborons de façon à obtenir un système capable d’exécuter la tâche qu’une logique
inductive purement descriptive est supposée remplir. Pour compléter notre travail formel, nous
développons aussi une logiqtie modale paranormale (c.-à-d., simultanément paracomplète et
paraconsistante) pour représenter nos deux notions de plausibilité en logique non monotone. De
cette façon, notre travail est aussi une contribution à la logique modale. Pour montrer l’applicabilité
de notre système, nous présentons une formalisation du raisonnement abductif et hypothético
déductif appliqué au problème de la confirmation des hypothèses en philosophie des sciences.
MOTS CLÉS: logique philosophique, logique paraconsistente, logique paracomplete, logique
modale paranormale, logique nonmonotone, logique deJauÏt, logique inductive, probabilité
pragmatique, modèle hypothético-déductif, ambiguïté inductive.
iv
ABSTRACT
The purpose of this work is to analyze the notion of induction, conceived as the ciass of rational
non-truth preserving inferences, from the point of view ofthe nonmonotonic logicat tradition raised
inside the field ofArtificial Intelligence (AI) in the iast twenty-five years. By centering our efforts
around what has been calied the problem of description of induction, we intend to explicate (in
Camap’s sense) the notion of induction through a purely descriptive and consequentlyjustificatory
ftee approach to induction. 0f fundament importance for this enterprise is the notion 0f plausibility,
here understood as the same as Camap’s notion of pragmatical probability. By providing a
representationai formai analysis ofthe notion of induction, we aiso aim to explicate something akin
to the ordinary notion of piausibility. One of the main features of this relationship between
induction and plausibiiity concems the two most basic approaches one can take when dealing with
the contradictions that are sure to arise from the use of inductive inferences. These skeptical and
credulous approaches to induction, as we have named them, give rise to two different plausibility
notions which bear important relations to a domain of formai logic closeiy connected with AI, the
field of paraconsistent and paracomplete iogic: while the skeptical piausibility is a paracomplete
notion, the credulous pÏausibility is a paraconsistent one. At the basis of our formai work is the
resuit that in opposition to the formai approaches deveioped in phulosophy, the justificatoiy-ftee
aspect we are looking for is already present in most nonmonotonic logics. We pick two ofthese
formalisms — Reiter’s default iogic and Pequeno’s paraconsistent default Iogics
— and extend them
in such a way as to obtain a system abie to perform the task a descriptive Iogic of induction is
supposed to perform. To complete our format work, we aiso develop a so-caiied paranormal (i.e.,
simultaneously paracomplete and paraconsistent) modal logic to represent the two notions of
plausibility and act in conjunction with the mentioned nonmonotonic logic. In this way, our work is
also a contribution to the field of modal logic. In order to show the appiicability of our system. we
present a formalization of the so-caiied abductive reasoning and hypothetico-deductive reasoning
apptied to the probiem of confirmation ofhypotheses in phiiosophy of science.
KEY tVORDS: philosophical iogic, paraconsistent logic, paracompiete iogic, paranormal modal
logic, nonmonotonic logic, default logic, inductive logic, pragrnaticai probabiiity, hypothetico
deductivism, inductive ambiguity.
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CHAPTER Ï
INTRODUCTION
This work is primordially concerned with what in the recent philosophical literature bas been
named constructivist conceptual analysis or concept explication. It consists basicatty in tlying ta
explicate or clarify a vague, imprecise notion (called the explicanduin), which may belong ta
eveiyday language or ta a previous stage in the development of scientific or philosophical
language, by replacing it with a clearer, more precise notion (called the explicatum) formulated in a
systematic context. In our case there tvill be tvo explicanda: the notion of induction and the notion
ofplausibility.
This practice ofconceptual clarification is, of course, not new. There have been, in the history
of Western philosophy, considerable efforts ta analyze concepts in the fonnulation of problems,
and historical research shows many cases where these efforts have been of great importance ta
eventtial achievements. What is rather new is the awareness that the clarification or analysis of
concepts is an indispensable step in the process of tackling philosophical problems. As a
consequence of that, rnany philosophers have spent much of their efforts trying ta clarify the
concepts which they were dealing with and, which is certainly far more remarkable, laying down
what we may cail theories of concept explication, that is ta say, attempts ta explicate what the task
of concept explication is.
Concerning the different ways this task of explicating a concept may be undertaken, at Ieast
three different theoretical positions can be distinguished1: the essentialistic position (Husserl),
which defends that many important concepts may seem at first sight rather vague but yet they have
a clear meaning, although it is very difficuit ta grasp that meaning; the cidaptivistic position
(Wittgenstein, Ryle and Austin), which says that concepts usually have precise rules of usage, and
therefore a clear “meaning in use,” although it is flot easy to make the rules explicit; and the one we
are concerned with here, the constructivistic position, which defends that most concepts do nat
have a clear meaning, but they can get one (or more) if our attempts at creating such clear meaning
are successful. So therefore the necessity, in the constrtictivistic case, of having a notion defined in
a reasonably precise way (the expÏicatu,n) whose meaning can be easily grasped and which will
itself be the solution for the problem of clarifying the explicandtan.
Kuipers (197$).
Exampies of such constnictivistic conceptual analysis are flot hard to find in the philosophical
literature. Most philosophers agree that Church’s proposai to replace the vague term “effectively
calculable flmction” by the mathematically exact term “general recursive flinction” provides an
especially clear example of tins sort of concept explication2. Other examples usually given are the
biologists’ replacement of the ordinary-language term “fish” by the scientific term “piscis”3,
Tarski’s definjtjon of “tme”4 and the Wiener-Kuratowski reconstruction of the term “ordered
pair”5.
Conceming the several theories of (constructivistic) concept explication proposed by
philosophers, surely the most influential of ail has been the one proposed by Rudolf Camap in the
first chapter of bis “Logical foundations of Probability.”6 According to Camap, the very first step
we must take before explicating n concept is to make at least practically clear what is meant as the
expÏicandttm. If the expticandttm belongs, for example, to a previous stage in the development of
scientific or philosophical language, then we should make clear that what we are tiying to explicate
is such and such term used in such and such way by such and such theorists. Besides tins, in order
to be an adequate explicatttm, a particular notion must satisfy four basic criteria: it has to be as
precise and as simple as possible, it has to be useful in the sense that it gives rise to the formulation
oftheories and the solution ofproblems, and it has to be similar to expticandurn.
Besides the vagueness and lack of generality, criteria of explicatum adequacy such as Camap’s
are far from being consensual. for instance, a consequence of Camap’s fourth condition is that the
final explicatum may have properties winch we do not recognize in the expÏicandum. In fact,
Camap goes as far as claiming that “close similarity is not requfred, and considerable differences
are permitted.”7 Tins seems to be also the position of W. V. Quine and Hans Reichenbach in their
theories of concept explication8. On the other hand, Nelson Goodman and Alfred Tarski, for
example, place considerable emphasis on the similarity in meaning of the reconstructed and
unreconstructed concepts9. For instance, when speaking about bis formai analysis of the notion of
tmth, Tarski says that “the desired definition does flot aim to specifr the meaning of a familiar
word used to denote a novel notion; on the contrary, it aims to catch hold of the actual meaning of
an old notion”.’°
2 Hanna (196$).
Camap (1962).
‘ Ibid and Tarski (1944).
Quine (1960).
6 Camap (1962).
Ibid, p. 7.
$ Quine (1960) and Reichenbach (1938). See Hanna (1968).
Goodman (1965) and Tarski (1944). Sec Hanna (196$).
‘° Tarski (1944), p. 53.
As far as we are concemed, due to space reasons (and aiso to our skepticism about the
tenability of such sort of “explication of explication” theory), we will not take the trouble of
developing a theory of concept explication. Rather, we will take for granted the “concept
explication clarification” given by the several theories of concept explication in general and
Camap’s in particular as well as by the many attempts to constructively analyze concepts made by
theoreticians and lay down our solution for the concept explication problems we are concemed
about here”. If however knowing the class of concept explication attempts which our expÏicata
belong to helps, the solutions for our concept explication problems fall under what is commonly
known as philosophical togic. More specifically, by reducing our explicanda to certain types of
sentences, we will develop logical systems which intemally incorporate these sentences and
consequently explicate tbrough some of thefr intemal features (such as the logical form of the
sentences in question and the axioms and semantic mies reiated to them) our explicanda.
As an example of such sort of concept explication, consider traditionai modal logic, winch is
commonly presented in textbooks as the iogic of necessity and possibility. By providing a logical
analysis of sentences of the type “a is necessary” (Ehx) and “Œ is possible” (Œ) modal logic in
general and systems like T, S4 and S5 in particular can be quite fairly taken as formalizations ofthe
notions of necessity and possibility. In fact, as exemplified by the work of many theoreticians, the
basic framework of modal logic has been shown to be an extremely fmitful way of analyzing
concepts winch, akin to the notions of necessity and possibility, can be embedded in modal
sentences. By interpreting cc as “a morally ought to 5e the case,” for exampie, modal logic D was
originally proposed as a formalization of the notion of obiigatoriness or moral necessity (D stands
for “deontic”)12. By giving a temporal interpretation of and c and adding one more pair of such
temporal modalities, philosophers have analyzed past and future sentences and created the so
called temporal modal logic’3. By including symbols to represent agents, some theoreticians have
proposed modal logical systems intended to deal with the notions of knowiedge and belief (aEla
will mean something like “agent a knowns «)14 as well as with the notion of agentive action (aDŒ
will mean something like “agent a acts in sucS a way as to make cc true”)15. f inally, by making use
of the semantic structure used by these iogics of action (the so-cailed structure of ramified time’6)
and combining temporal and alethic modalities, philosophers were able represent the notion of
Only in the last chapter we will examine te what extent our expiicatct satisfy Camap’s requirements
12 Sec Gammut (1991).
‘ Sec Burgess (1984) and Gabbay et al (1995).
11 Sec Gahhay et al (1995).
‘Che11as (1992) and Belnap & Perloff(1988). Sec aise Silvestre (1998).
16 Thomason (1970).
-t
historical necessity or inevitability’7. And even if some of these theoreticians have neyer made use
of the term “explication” in their writings, it is clear that thefr systems in some very important
sense were intended to clarify the concepts they were concemed with’8.
The mention of such modal logic explicata is particularly important because the explicatum we
will give to one of our explicanda, the notion of plausibility, belongs to the class of logics known
as modal logic. Akin to the examples we have just described, by interpreting modal sentences of
the form a? as “n is plausible”9 and making use of what we shah cal! the pturality approach to
plausibiÏity, we vi1l introduce modal logical systems that can be said to explicate the notion of
plausibility. It should be said however that there is an important difference between this modal
logic of plausibility and the known modal logical systems. Due to the key concept we vill analyze
here, i.e. induction, the plausibility notion we will be primarily concemed with will be what we can
cali inductive plausibitity. When taken in connection with the two most basic ways one can look at
the inconsistencies that are sure to arise from the use of inductive inferences2° — the skeptical and
credulous approaches to induction
—, this inductive plausibility cnn be shown to be in fact not one,
but two notions: what we cal! skeptical plausibility and credtdotts plausibility. These two
plausibility notions will correspond in our system to a pair of dual modalities. Now, a conclusion
that arises aCter a littie analysis of these notions is that while the skeptical plausibility is a
paracomplete notion, the credulous plausibility is aparaconsistent one21. This makes our system to
be closely connected with the recent and growing domain of forma! logic concemed with logics
that are both paraconsistent and paracomplete: the so-cafled paranormal logic22. Thus vie have
named the logical system tbrough which we intend to explicate the notion(s) of plausibility
paranormal modal logic23.
This paranormal modal logic is what we shah! eau a general explicatum of our plausibility
explicandum. Due to its being not a single but a class of logical systems (akin to the class of normal
modal logics), it sets the most basic features any expticatum of the notion of plausibility following
See Thomason (1984) and Vanderveken (1998).
0f course the possible-world style semantics of these logics plays a very crucial role in this clarification
endeavour.
19 As generally done in non-alethic modal logics, we shail flot use the traditional square and diamond
symbols to represent the notion of plausibility. Rather, we shall use the symbols ! and ? according to a post
fixed notation
20 This is the so-called problem of inductive inconsistencies, which lias been cached tlie attention of both
philosophers and Artificial Intelligence theorists. Sec for instance Hempel (1960), Coffa (1974), Israel
(1980), Perlis (1987) and Pequeno (1990).
21 The terms “paraconsistent” and “paracomplete” have been so far used almost exclusively in connection
with logical systems or components oflogical systems. Sec Arruda (1980) and Loparic & da Costa (1984).
In Chapter 3 we shah tiy w clarit’ this “concepftial” use cf the terms “p2aconsistent” and “paracomplete”.
22 Paranormal logics have been swdied for example in connection with problems cf knowledge representatïon
in Artificial Intelligence. Sec Rescher & Brandom (1980), Buchsbaum & Pequeno (1993) and Béziau (2001).
5the plurality approach to plausibility should possess. What we shah eau the specfic plausibihity
expticatztnz witl be a particutar paranormal modal logic containing in addition to a pair of
modahities representing the notions of skeptical and credulous plausibility, a pair of modalities
intended to represent the notions of certainty and episternological possibiÏity. The necessity of
considering these two notions is due to the fact that one of the distinguishing features of
plausibility, namety its uncertain, refutable character, can be satisfactorily represented inside a
monotonie framework only when it is associated with a notion which embodies the opposite
feature: certainty or irrefutability.
The other explicanda, the notion of induction, will be analyzed through a logical system which
faits into the class of nonmonotonic formalism known in Artificial Intelligence (AI) circles as
default logic4. This is another particuiarity of our explication endeavor. Even though the
similarities between sorne probleins faced in AI practice and sorne ciassical ones deait with within
philosophical investigation have been pointed by some theoreticians25, the effective contribution of
ideas, methods and techniques from Alto philosophy and vice-versa is stili something hard to be
seen. By attacking the classical philosophicat problem of concept explication through a format
model based on existing formahisms motivated by reasoning needs in Artificial Intelligence, we
present what we believe to be a bridge between these two areas of knowledge that, in addition to its
own interest, can also serve as an example and an illustration ofa whole lot of connections we hope
to corne over26.
Our strategy tvihl be basically to extend two defauit systems, Reiters default logic and
Pequeno’s paraconsistent default logic, in such a way as to allow the full representation ofwhat we
cali inductive implication sentences, i.e., sentences of the form “Œ inductively implies 13 uniess (p.”
From the most basic tevel, these sentences are nothing more than a new interpretation ofReiter’s
default ruies. Instead ofreading default
et: —p
f3
as “if et is the case and it is consistent to assume
—p, then conclude 13,” we take it as meaning “et
inductively implies f3 unless (p.” This is represented in our formalism by u 13 (p. The relation
between inductive implications and plausible statements is that the taller generally appears as
consequent of the former. This is in accordance with the commonly held view that one of the
23 It should be noted that, as far as we known, this paranormal modal logic is a unique contribution of ours to
the field of format logic.
24 See Reiter (1980) and Poole (1994).
25 See for example Potlock (1988), Kyburg (1994), Tan (1991), ford et aI.(1995) and Tan (1997).
6distinguishing features of induction is that rather than rendering its conclusion certain, it just make
them plausible, probable, acceptable, etc. formally this is achieved by allowing platisibiiity modal
formulae to appear in the consequent of inductive implications (in symbols: a - 3? cp.) Thus we
see the import of having a pÏausibility explicandum for the proper explication of the notion of
induction. We aiso allow the representation of what we can cal! calcztÏus of inductive implication,
i.e., a set of logicat principles supposedly governing the tise of inductive implications. As we shah
see, this is a necessary component of the logic of induction that cannot be built inside the basic
framework provided by nonmonotonic logics27.
Our system’s belonging to the class of default logics becomes especiaily relevant when we
consider the sort of analysis ofthe notion of induction we want to develop here. Taken as a class of
inferences, induction has two main features: a negative and a positive. While on the one hand the
elements of this class are non truth-preserving inferences whose conclusions are uncertain and
refutable, on the other hand they must ernbody some sort of rationality, allowing us to distinguish
them from fallacies, which are also non truth-preserving but completely nonsense. Therefore, in the
task of analyzing induction philosophers have distinguished two different approaches: one that tries
to account for or justify the positive, rationat side of inductive inferences, and one which ignores
the necessity of such justification and tries simply to describe non truth-preserving patterns of
inference traditionally taken as embodying some sort of rationality. Whiie the former sort of
analysis bas been shown to be extremely problematic and, according to some, even untenable28, the
latter, which is the one we vill foliotv here, has not yet been satisfactorily made (much of which
because of the inability of phiiosophers to keep distance from justificatory issues29.) Now, since
their very genesis nonmonotonic formalisms in general and default logics in particular have
centered exciusively on the task of representing inductive inferences without any concern at ail
about the probiem ofjustifying them. Therefore, by basing otir explication endeavors on such sort
of forrnalism, we believe our approach is much more likely to succeed in the task of developing a
purely descriptive account of induction than the available philosophical theories of induction30.
The structure ofthe thesis is as follows. In Chapter 2 and 3 we try to make practically clear the
notions which we intend to explain here. At the same time that by surveying the pertinent literature
we try to find the relations that may exist between our explicanda and the different accounts
philosophers have given of the notions of induction and plausibility, by laying down something
26 Some of our efforts in this direction have already appeared in print, See Silvestre & Pequeno (2003) and
Silvestre & Pequeno (2004)
27 Reiter’s default logic allowsjust the representation ofwhat we can calt basic inductive implications, that is,
formulae ofthe form a ‘- f3 cp such that a, f3 and ( are ail ordinary forrnulae.
28 See Salmon (1966), chapter II, for instance.
29 See Glennan (1994) and Fiteisen (2004), for example.
7akin to a philosophy of induction and plausibility we set in a systematic way the main features of
the concepts we shah try to explicate. Tins is donc in Chapter 2. In Chapter 3 we finish tins pre
explication elucidation, focusing primordially on the notion ofplausibility. By investigating the 50-
cahled inductive ambiguities, we introduce what we shah take as the philosophical basis of our
notion ofplausibility, the plurality approach to plausibility, as wehl as the two plausibihity concepts
implied by il: the skeptical and credulous notions of plausibility. In Chapter 4 we switch from the
conceptual problem of induction and plausibility to the way we may try to fomially solve it,
analyzing some approaches both in the philosophy of science and Artificial Intelligence. It will be
in that chapter that we shah investigate to what extent nonmonotonic logics can be useful in
accomplishing the task of developing a purely descriptive account of induction. In Chapter 5 we
effectively begin our explicative endeavor, laying down whai. we have cahled the general
expÏicatztrn of the notion of plausibility: paranormal modal logic. In Chapter 6 we introduce our
general expticatum of the notion of induction. Afier presenting our specific plausibility explicattim,
we use it to introduce several logics of induction and plausibility built inside our general induction
explicatum and winch can be taken as specific expÏicata of the notion of induction. By using one of
these logical systems, we show how some quite famous models of confirmation found in the
literature of philosophy of science (including the so-called hypothetico-deductive model) can be
represented inside our formahism. finally in Chapter 7 we lay down some conclusive remarks about
what we have achieved in the preceding chapters.
Sec Chïpter 4.
CHAPTER 2
ON INDUCTION AND PLAUSIBILITY
In this Chapter, we will tly to clarify the basic problem we want to solve here: the explication of
the notions of induction and plausibility. We start by canying out a brief historicai analysis of the
several meanings which philosophers have attributed to the term “induction.” From that, we corne
to the notion of induction we intend to formally explicate — induction as ampliative or non-truth
preserving inferences. Ail that wili 5e done in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2 we talk about the most
influential school of induction of the twentieth centuiy
— Carnap’s logical school — and the role the
notion of probability has played in it. Finally, in Section 2.3 we identify the second notion we aim
to explicate
— the notion of plausibiiity
— with a specific probability concept deait with by logical
probabilists: the so-calied pragmatical notion of probability. It will aiso be in tins section that we
will start laying down the philosophy of induction and plausibility that we vi11 try to formally
systematize in subsequent chapters.
2.1 From Inductive Generalization to Ampliative Inferences
The most traditional use of the terrn “induction” is that winch equates induction with what today is
known as inductive generalization, or inference from the particular to the general. Taking a widely
used exampie, if we observe, let us say, 100 ravens and notice that ail of them are black, we may
generalize that and conclude that ail ravens are black. Tins act of inferring a general statement from
particular instances is the first important feature of tins traditional meaning of induction. The other
is the pttrpose associated with tins kind of reasoning. Induction in this sense is conceived as a way
of discovering or generating hypotheses, iaws or principies; or, broadly speaking, as a sort of Iogic
of discovery.
This use of “induction” has been taken first by Aristotle (at ieast was him who first used a
specific technical terrn
— epagôgê
— to refer to tins inferential process1), to whom scientific
knowledge is obtained by demonstration from indernonstrable first principles, and knowledge of
these first principies is in tum obtained by induction. It is important to remark that, to Aristotie and
The tenn ‘induction” corncs from Cicero, who introduced the word inducto as an exact equivalent for
epag3g.
9many others afier him, the generalization resultant from an induction is not necessariiy of an
empirical character. In the words of J. R. Miiton2:
Among the truths which Aristotie describes as being reached by induction [...] What we do not
find are what we are accustomed to think of as empirical generalisations. Aristotie uses the
word epagôgé and its derivatives over fifty times in bis various writings, and the only example
of a proposition derived by epagôgé which could reasonably be described as an empirical
generalization is the discussion example of ail bileless animais being long-lived which appears
in FriorAnalytics, 11.23.
Another important conception of induction is the so-called singitÏarpredictiee induction, or the
non-demonstrative inference from the particular to the particular. Taking again our raven example,
rather than concluding that ail ravens are black, in a singular predictive induction we would
conclude that the next raven to be observed wiIi also be black. Historicaily, it seems that tins sense
of induction has coexisted with the inductive generalization conception. Diogenes Laertius, for
example, distinguished two types of inductive inferences: from particuiars to particulars and from
particulars to universais.3 Despite the obvious differences between tins meaning and the first one,
singular predictive induction can be very fairly taken as a particular case of inductive
generalization. We wiil cail tins conception of induction understood as inductive generalization
andlor singular predictive induction the cÏassicaÏ conception of induction.
From the time of Aristotle’s successors down to the beginning of the seventeenth century, tins
picture of induction remained as the dominant one. The shifi to what we cali the modem
conception of induction took place in 1620 with Francis Bacon’s Novum Organum. While in tins
new sense induction remained chiefly conceived as generalization from particulars and as a method
of discovery, it started to be taken (as explicitly suggested by Bacon) as the cinef method (of
discoveiy) of the newly bom natural sciences. Accordingly, ail aspects of inductive reasoning, in
special its conclusions, were taken as being empiricat in essence. In tins way, we arrive at the
modem idea (stiil in vogue today) according to which ail science starts from observation and then
slowly and cautiously proceeds to theories, winch consist basicaily of generahzations of such
observations.
Another very important part of Bacon’s pinlosophy of science is that he considered pure
inductive generalization as a “puerile thing,” incapableper se of generating any kind ofknowiedge.
In order to generate authentic scientific knowIedge, it bas to be suppiemented with some additional
method, in Bacon’s case a rnethod of exclusion intended to obtain the right conclusion. As lie puts
li4:
2 Milton (1987), p. 53.
There is stili a third te that corresponds to a kind of redttctio ctcÏ absurdiim. Mihon (1987) p. 54.
Bacon (1620), p. 249.
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O But the greatest change I introduce is in the form itseif of induction and the judgment madethereby. For the induction of which the iogicians speak, wbich proceeds by simple
enumeration, is a puerile thing; concludes at hazard [...] Now what the sciences stand in need
of is a form of induction which shah analyze experience and take it to pieces, and by the
process of exclusion and rejection lead to an inevitable conclusion.
John Stuart Mdi, with bis methods of agreement, difference, etc, rdso made use ofthe same sort of
heuristic principle5.
Tins heuristic aspect of the modem conception of induction, along with its emphasis on the
empiricai character of premises and conclusions, is what mostly distinguishes it from the ciassicai
conception. However, as mentioned in a previous paragraph, they stihi share some very
fundamentai features. first of ail, induction in both senses is primariiy conceived as a method of
discovery (5e it ofparticulars or of general principles). In other words, the role of induction in the
scientific enterprise is to produce new pieces of scientific knowledge. Another similarity is that
both the ciassicai and the modem conceptions can be ciassified as striicturatisi conceptions of
induction, that is to say, the classification of a given reasoning as inductive is based primarily on
the analysis of its syntactical structure (whether they go from particulars to generai, whether it
makes use of such and such heuristic principie, etc.)
There is stiil a third common trait between the classical and modem conceptions that, unlike
the first two, seems to be a much more essential feature of induction. We are taiking about the
trivial fact that a conclusion got from an inductive generalization or from a singular predictive
induction may 5e faise even though their premises are truc. In other words, induction either in the
classicai sense or in the modem sense is a non tntth-preserving type of reasoning. The main point
of course is that the conclusions of inductive generalizations (with or without some heuristic
method of conclusion choice) and singular predictive induction contain information that is flot
contained in the premises. That I have observed 10.000 blaci: ravens says nothing about the
features of the next raven I am going to observe or about ail ravens. In these cases, the conclusions
go beyond what is stated in the premises; they increase our knowiedge. And it is exactly this
ampliative character of induction what makes it non truth-preserving and also so interesting6.
Now, if the distinguishing “iogical” feature of induction is that it is ampliative and
consequently non tmth-preserving, apart from structural or functional differences, we may say that
induction is “logically” indistinguishable from other types of reasoning, such as abduction, winch
are ampliative too. Tins viewpoint lcd some philosophers to extend the meaning of “induction” as
to make other ampliative types of reasoning fahi under its label. Charles Pierce, for instance,
identifies three types of induction: crude induction, quantitative induction and qualitative induction,
MIII (1896).
6 It’s noteworthy to point out that this feawre is the onlv one which involves only logical notions.
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where only the first one corresponds to what we have called inductive generalization.7 If we go on
with this meaning extension, we viÏl get to the point of taking induction in a very broad sense and
identifying it with the cÏass of alt ampliative or non trttth-preserving inferences. That is what we
cali the conternporaly conception ofindttction. Right away we see that this new conception places
induction in sharp contrast to deduction: considering that deduction is truth-preserving and
consequentiy non-ampliative, inductive will then mean non-deductive, and deductive non-
inductive.
This conception of induction is the one we fmd in most standard textbooks on logic and
induction8. It has been taken by most contemporary philosophers of science and, since the
beginning of the twentieth century, profoundly influenced the phi iosophical analysis of induction.
For instance, during the 1940’s and 1970’s a flourishing field of research vas completely dedicated
to the task of developing a so-cailed togic ofindttction, conceived in this sense. People like John
Keynes, Rudolf Camap, Cari Hempel, W. Johnson, Richard Jeffrey and Wesley Salmon, just to
mention some of the most preeminent, ahhough taking different approaches in their efforts to
provide a system of induction, ail agreed on the basic point of what we are calling the
contemporary conception of induction.
Now, this contemporary notion of induction embodies very significant changes in relation to
the earlier conceptions. Maybe one of the most important is that for the first time induction was
expiicitiy seen as a kind of inference or argument, in contrast to a type of reasoning. b make the
difference clear, reasoning is a complex structure that, among other things, may contain arguments,
defmitions, conclusion choice procedures, etc. In its tum, inference is the very comerstone of
reasoning. In the traditional sense, an inference or argument9 is a logicai relation between a set of
propositions and a proposition — the first called premises and the second conclusion — according to
which, by its very logical nature, the first entails the second. Now, if there is such thing as
inductive inference, it should be, due to its very nature, somehow susceptible to a logical analysis.
More specifically, by abandoning a simply structurai definition and adopting a “logicai” one, this
contemporaiy conception of induction placed induction on the same level as deduction and opened
the possibility that a logic of induction aldn to deductive iogic can be developed. As one might
expect, these changes brought into scene both those who believe in the existence of such class of
inferences and want to deveiop a iogic of induction, as well as those who deny its existence and
consequently the possibility of such sort oflogic’°.
7Pefrce (193 1), pp. 756-59.
Such as Copi & Cohen (2001), Hurley (2003), Layman (2002) and Hacking (2000), for instance.
Even thou2h the terni “argument” mav be taken as something similar to “reasoning.” we will use it here in
the customarv wav, as a synonymous of inference.
‘° Sec Fritz (1960), Sellars (1969) and Machina (1984).
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Another significant change entaiÏed by the contemporaly conception of induction is concemed
with the alleged purpose of induction. According to the classical and modem conceptions,
induction was chiefly conceived as a method of discovery. This was not just a policy on the use of
inductive inferences; rather, it was part of the very notion of induction. In its tum, induction as
conceived by contemporary philosophers rejected this and any other sort of practical purpose.
Despite the historical reasons involved, tins was a direct consequeixce of taking induction as a sort
of argument. If there is some purpose to be fulflhled in the performance of inductive inferences1’
there must be necessarily reference to procedures foreign to the inferential relation itself
Therefore, despite being possibly connected with each other, the purpose in question cannot be
taken (with the risk of nullifying the logical conception) as part of the notion of induction.
So, tins contemporary conception of induction is forced, by its own definition, to give up flot
only the discovery purpose aspect present in the two others conceptions, but actually any other kind
of purpose. Induction per se is considered to be a purely logical notion. However it may be, this
dissociation of induction from the logic of discovery aspect is, as a matter of fact, strongly
connected with the great unpopularity that such une of research passed to have among philosophers
of science in the twentieth century. It became a consensus to take the way scientific theories are
generated simply as outside the scope of the logical analysis of science. As one of the most
important critics of tins sort of philosophical analysis, Karl Popper, wrote: “The initial stage, the
act of conceiving or inventing a theory, seems to me neither to cail for logical analysis not to be
susceptible of it [...] there is no such thing as a logical method of having new ideas, or a Iogical
reconstmction ofthis process.”2 13
But if induction is not any more conceived as a logic of scientific discov&y, what then is its
role in the scientffic enterprise? In order to answer tins question, we have first to notice that an
inference (be il deductive or flot) from a to f3, let us say, may be read in two different ways: “f3 is
obtained from, (somehow) contained in or implied by u.” and “the truth of u. warrants, supports,
justify or confirms the tmth of f3.” While the first way involves a picture where we take a particular
u. and from it obtain f3, the second one involves taking a particular pair of sentences u. and f3 and
showing that they are inferentialÏy connected with each other. Tins latter reading is particularly
useful to distinguish (according to our conternporary sense) induction from deduction: winle in a
deductive inference the premises give full support to the conclusions, in an inductive one the
support given is just partial.
Il Such as the determination ofwhich hypotheses can be inductively inferred from a given set ofevidences.12 Popper (1959). pp. 31 and 32.
I) Even though we may say that in nowadavs philosophy of science this meaning of induction as a logic 0f
discoverv is practically ouI of use, in some domains ofArtiticial Intelligence it remains as fresh as in Bacon’s
time. Sec Michalski et al (1983).
13
Now, if we thinic of the premises cf our inductive inferences as being the observed data and the
conclusion as the theory or hypothesis, then the first reading will be obviously related to the
process of scientific discovety. However, if we decide to pick the second one and take a particular
pair of observed data and hypothesis, then a different process will corne up. Now our concem will
not lie the generation of hypotheses (for they are already there) but their assessment. Then, to say
that a hypothesis and a body of data are inductively reiated to each other is to say that the second
gives some kind of support (let us cali it evidential support) to the first. Since the support is flot
complete but just partial, we caimot say that the observational data, now called evidences,
demonstrate or prove the hypothesis: they just render them plausible or acceptable. Se the place cf
induction in science is shifled from the context ofdiscove.’y te the context ofjustflcation: induction
is net about how we conceive or create scientific theories, but how they are confwmed by empirical
evidences. In fact, te mest contemporary philosophers cf science, the philosophical investigation cf
induction is centered around the problem cf confirmation cf theories’4.
One should net however misunderstand tins and think our conclusion that induction in tins
contemporary sense is purpose-free te be wrcng. 0f course that if we apply induction te the
problem of confirming thecries we will have te act according te a specific purpese. But the
inductive relation that suppesedly exist between hypothesis h and evidence e is afready there,
independently of someone even dreaming about making sure that e really confirms h. In contrast te
the ancient and modem conceptions of induction, the conternporaiy conception of induction is
completely apart from the role it plays in the scientific enterprise.
One very important thing we have net mentioned yet concems the following question: if
induction is the class cf ail ampliative inferences, then hew about fallacies? Are they aise te be
included in the class cf inductive arguments or treated separately? Trivially the first alternative is
unacceptable: accepting fallacies as a type cf inductive argument is simply te give up the
soundness we expect te be present in any inductive argument. Then we are left with twc options: te
distinguish between geod and bad induction or te redefine the notion cf induction; in both cases as
te take fallacies into consideration. Independently cf the path we choose, the basic problem is the
same: hew te distinguish induction (or good induction) from fallacies. Surely the most imrnediate
answer would be te invoke the notion cf rationality and say that what distinguishes induction (or
good induction) from fallacies is that winle the first cne is in srne sense a reasonable, rational
11 Since almost ail theories cf induction rnentioned in tins text are concemed with the problem of
confirmation cf hypotheses and theories, references viii be given throuch die whole texi. for an interesting
anthologv ofpapers on confirmation ofiheories sec Curd & Cover (1998), chaps. 4 and 5.
inference, the steps from premises to conclusion in a faHacy are unwarranted. Wesley Salmon, for
instance, says the following’5:
If, however, there is any kind of inference whose premises, although not necessitating the
conclusions, do lend it weight, support it, or make it probable, then such inferences possess a
certain kind of ÏogicaÏ rectitude. It is flot deductively vaÏid, but it is important anyway.
Inferences possessing it are correct inductive inferences.
So, this alleged “logical rectitude” is what distinguishes (good) inductive inferences from fallacies.
But of course if we just say this we are flot saying too much. What precisely is this logical
rectitude? What warrants us to classify the inferences that possess it as rational? As one rnight
suspect, this is the famous probÏem ofjustfication of induction, also known as Hume’s problem of
induction: “How to justify the rationality of inductive arguments?”
The basic difficulty with the problem ofjustification of induction seems to be thatjustifying or
showing the rationality of an argument is, we feu, tantamount to showing its logical character.
Since from a strict point of view there is no logical connection between the premises and
conclusion of an inductive inference, we have then a problem that threatens the very foundations of
the contemporary conception of induction. In fact, since Aristotle’s times, the problem ofjustifying
the reasonableness of non-deductive arguments has been one of the main sources of suspiciousness
against induction. Later on, afier Hume’s famous critics’6 and the recognition of its importance for
the scientific method, the justification of induction has occupied a vety crucial place in the
philosophy of science. Bertrand Russeil, for example, has provided a desperate description of the
consequences ofHume’s conclusion for the theory of science17:
It is important to discover whether there is any answer to Hume [...] If flot, there is no
intellectual difference between sanity and insanity. The lunatic who believes that he is a
poached egg is to 5e condemned solely on the ground that he is in minority [...] every attempt
to arrive at general scientific laws from particular observation is fallacious [...]
Incidentally, since the publication of Hume’s A Treatise ofHuman Nature in 1739 up to now, no
satisfactory solution to this problem was proposed. Many philosophers go as far as claiming that it
wiIl neyer be: they declare it to 5e an insoluble problem.18
As we have mentioned, even though this problern affects ail three conceptions of induction, the
effect it has upon each one is not the same. While it may be epistemologically important for the
first two conceptions to fmd a rational justification for the kind of reasoning they are concemed
with, the resuit of such quest does flot affect in a decisive way the way they are usine to the word
15 Salmon (1966), P. 8. The italics are mine.
16 Hume (1739).
Russell (1946), p. 646. Clearly Russeil is using here the modem conception of induction.
For an exposition of the kinds of attemrts made te solve the prob’:m of justification of induction sec
Salrnon (1966), chapter II.
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“induction.” In the case of the contemporary notion the situation is a tittie different. As we have
seen, in order to properly characterize the class of inductive inferences we have to, besides giving a
negative criterion (which is of course the argument’s being non truth-preserving), also give a
positive criterion capable to distinguish inductive arguments from other arguments which also
satisfy the negative criterion (read fallacies.) And independentiy of our appeaÏing or not to the
notions of logicai rectitude or rationality’9, to give such positive criterion amounts to solving
Hume’s problem.
This simple but at the same time subtle connection between induction and the problem of
justification is at the root of the controversy regarding the existence of inductive arguments and the
tenability of the project of building a logic of induction. from a philosophical point of view, the
whole thing has to do with the very way we are trying to define the class of inductive inferences,
that is to say, intensionally. Since we want to give a general criterion to say whether or flot a given
inference is inductive, we will have inevitabty to deal with the problem ofjusticying why such and
such inference is in fact inductive. And since one of the distinguishing features of induction will
inevitably be the property of reasonableness or rationality (even if under another label), our
criterion vilI have to give an answer to the question of why such and such inference is rational.
Because of that, we say that this contemporary conception of induction is or embodies a sort of
intensional orjustflcatory approach to induction.
Given alt this, it is reasonable to wonder if there is flot some other way of defining induction
which does flot require such sort ofjustification endeavor. To start with, independently of finding a
necessary and sufficient criterion of inductiveness, there is alway’s a ctass of ampliative inferences
that, in a particular period oftime, is used in a certain category ofpractical situations and accepted
as sound by a certain cornmunity of people. So, one possible alternative is to define inductive
inferences as this set ofaccepted ampliative arguments. That is of course an extensional definition.
And if we stili want to refer to the notion of rationaiity, we can take it as a sort of pragmaticat
notion: rationat is what people ofa certain community in a particular period oftime consider as so.
We wilI caït this approach to the conternporary meaning of induction the extensionaÏ or
pragmatical approach to induction.
One may object that this account is unacceptably subjective and leaves room for arbitrariness to
corne into the characterization ofwhat we cati rational. That is flot quite so. Since we are making
reference to a consensus shared by a community, this approach must rather be classified as inter
subjective, and it is as arbitrary as, let us say, the acceptance of the principle of causality or the
existence of the externat world. Anyway, if we decide to follow this path, our basic probtem
19 Which would be quite difficuit to do without going astray from the path the philosophicat investigation of
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regarding the task of defining the class of inductive inferences will be reduced to the problem of
describing the accepted pattems of inductive inference, or, in other words, the so-called problem of
description of induction20.
It is interesting to observe that according ta some philosophers who do flot believe in the
existence of a (logical) distinction between deductive and inductive arguments, those who believe
in it have established such distinction flot on logical grounds, but on pragmatic and epistemic ones.
Kenton Machina, for instance, says: “As remarkable as it may seem, common attempts ta make the
primary distinction between inductive and deductive arguments have tumed out ta generate a
pragmatic or epistemic distinction, not a logical one.”21 Later on he adds: “Perhaps, then, the
following suggestion will meet with some acceptance: Recognize that the general purpose, ail
embracing distinction between deductive and inductive argument belongs ta epistemology and
rhetoric, flot logic.”22
This somehow corroborates what we have stated above: ta intensionally define inductive
inferences is tantamount ta solving Hume’s problem. Since so far tins probiem bas recognizably
not been solved, it is expected that the attempts ta define induction according ta this approach have
flot been successful either. Therefore, if we think Hume’s problem is insoluble or just do not want
to go through it, the only approach we are lefi with is one winch avoids these justificatory staffs by
adopting an extensional or pragmatical approach ta induction.
2.2 Logical Probability and Pragmatical Probability
Now, if we identify induction with the class of ah (rational) ampliative arguments, what can we say
about the conclusion of such inferences in the case where the premises are truc? Tins question is
pertinent because if we take induction as a kind of inference we will expect ta infer something from
the truthftilness of the premises. We know that in a deductive argument, if the premises are true the
conclusion will also be sa. However, by definition, even when its premises are true it is possible for
an inductive inference to have a false conclusion. Therefore, tmth does flot follow from truth in this
sort of inference. But then what can we conclude about the hypothesis of an inductive inference
when its evidences or premises are truc? Before answering this question, we tvill have ta talk about
a very important aspect of contemporary philosophy of induction without winch any presentation
of the subject would be incomplete: the concept ofprobabitity.
induction has historicallv followed
‘o
.
- fora short discussion on the inductive problems ofjustification and descnption sec Lipton (1991), Chapter
21 Machina (1984), p. 577.
2 Ibid. p. 578.
If there is something consensual about induction in the philosophical literature is its connection
with probability. To most contemporary authors, the philosophy of induction is essentially the same
as the philosophy of probability. Even though this association of induction with probability is not
new, it was only in the twentieth century that philosophers explicitiy took the philosophical
analysis of induction as being for ail intents and purposes the same as the investigation of the
concept of probability. In the preface to the first edition of bis Logical Foitndations ofProbability,
Rudoif Camap expresses this view in a very explicit way: “The theory here presented is
characterized by the following basic principies: (1) ail inductive reasoning, in a wide sense of
nondeductive or nondemonstrative reasoning, is reasoning in terms ofprobability [•••]23
It will be useful to name this probability concept applied to (or identified with) induction
inductive probabititv. This is necessary because wbile inductive has almost invariably been taken
as probable, the inverse does not hold. The twentieth century saw a remarkable proliferation of
different ways of saying what probability is23. And many of these so-called interpretations of
probability are not concemed at ail with induction, in any sense of the word. This is manifestly
tme, for example, for Karl Popper’s propensity interpretation of probability. For other
interpretations, the situation is not that straightfonvard. For example, while many adherents of the
relative frequency interpretation daim their theories to be dealing primarily with induction, others
defend the thesis that what the frequency theories explicate is a concept intrinsically distinguished
from inductive probability25.
There is nonetheless one school of probability that bas explicitly and beyond any controversy
taken probability as the key concept in the philosophical investigation of induction. It is the so
called logicat schoot ofprobability. This school has basically taken induction according to what we
have named the contemporary conception of induction. In fact, it was in great part due to the efforts
of some of its advocates, notably John Keynes and Rudoif Camap, that tins contemporary
conception of induction got a definitive, precise shape and was established as the leading one
among philosophers. Even though Keynes set down most of the basic principles of the logical
school and, according to Camap, was the first to see probability as inherently relative to a given
evidence and consequently meaning something like our inductive probability26, it was Camap who
further eÏaborated such principles, cleared up rnany misconceptions, and gave the main steps
towards the chief enterprise ofthe logical school: the constmctionofa formai logic of induction.
1 Camap (1962), p. y. Itahcs in the original.
Fora description ofthe several interpretations ofprobabihty sec Weatherford (19S2), Cohen (1989a), chap.
II. Salmon (1966), Chap. V and H6jek (2002).
Sec Camap (1962). Sairnon (1966), chap. VII arid Nagel (1955). pp. 62-66.
6 Carnap (1962), p. 31.
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further elaborated such principies, cleared up many misconceptions, and gave the main steps
towards the chief enterprise ofthe logical school: the construction of a formai logic of induction.
from the point of view of the systematization of principies, Carnap’s masterpiece, LogicaÏ
Fottndations of Frobabilily, of 1950, represented the great turning point in the contemporaiy
conception of induction. There for the first time, a concise and comprehensive attempt to build a
formai system of inductive iogic along with a philosophical analysis of both concepts ofprobability
and induction vas presented. Carnap’s project started in the 1940s27 and vas further deveioped by
Carnap himself and others such as John Kemeny, Richard Jeffrey and Jaakko Hintikka28 between
the 1950s and 1970s. Others such as Cari Hempel29, even though not directly working on Carnap’s
systems, have followed the same approach in their treatment of induction. Before Carnap, others
sucb as John Keynes (as we have already mentioned), Harold Jeffreys and B. Koopman have given
the same inductive treatment to probability. And before, in the eighteenth century, names like
James Bernoulli, Thomas Bayes and Pierre Simon de Laplace were ail. according to H. Jeffreys and
others, in some sense or another concerned with “the foundations of common sense or inductive
inference.”3°
But how precisely does this concept of probabiiity fit into induction? To any person with a
littie inclination to phulosophical thinking the answer vilI be straightforward. If we reason in terms
ofcertainty and necessity, we may say that a deductive inference is that in which the truth-relation
between premises and conclusion is a certain or necessaiy one: the truthfulness of the conclusion
necessarily follows from the truthfulness of the premises. On the other hand, since in an inductive
inference the conclusion may be false even when the premises are true, this truth-relation is tiot
certain, but just probable: in the case the premises are true, it is just probable, rather than
necessary, that the conclusion is also true. If we follow this approach, we vil1 say that inductive
inference is the same as probable inference; and the sort of conclusion prodticed by it in the case
where the premises are certain is of a probabilistic nature.
However simple this reasoning may appear to be, we should be careful not to overlook the fact
that il involves two different and independent positions concerning probability and induction.
While the first one makes reference to a relation between two propositions, the other talks about the
status of one of these propositions when the other is known to be true. To make sure that there is
really a difference, consider a language where we have certain and probable statements. It is quite
reasonable to suppose that if h is certain, h is probable. By making use of this inferential schema
we wiH have conclusions marked with a probability modal operator obtained through an inference
27 Camap (1945a) (1945b) (1946) (1947).
28 Camap (1952) (1971) (1980), Kenemy (1955), Jeffrey (1957), Hintikka (1966).
29 Hempel (1943) (1945).
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(E gives inductive support to h, but nevertheless hs truthfulness lias nothing to do with e’s
probability. In this case, what is of interest here is an inductive or probable relation concerning the
truthfulness of two propositions, which may have nothing to do with other qualities propositions
may have. We will cail these two positions, respectively, the status approach to inductive
probability and the relation approach to inductive probability.
Tins first, relational way of understanding inductive probability vas the one taken by Camap’s
logical school. In addition to conceiving induction in relation to probability, Camap explicitly
identified it as a logical relation of evidentiat support between two propositions, one named
hypothesis and the other evidence. While the relation of logical deduction establishes a necessary
connection between premises and conclusion, the relation of inductive support establishes just a
confmnatoiy or probable connection between evidences and hypothesis. To Camap, the
confirmation conferred by a piece of evidence to a hypothesis is a purely semantical relation
independent of any kind of empirical consideration, be it one’s opinion or the relative frequency
with winch hypotheses of the same kind have occurred in connection with similar evidences. In
other words, it is a completely objective or togical notion. The following quotation illustrates well
these points: “Deductive logic may be regarded as the theory of the relation of logical consequence,
(E and inductive logic as the theoiy of another concept winch is likewise objective and logical, viz.
probability1 or degree of confirmation.”31 As one might suspect, tins conception is essentially the
same as the one described in the last section and labeled the contemporary notion of induction.
The use of the index in the above quotation is meant to distinguish the Iogical, objective
concept of probability (called probabilityt) from the empirical concept of probability deait with by
the relative frequency school of probability (called probability2)32. Much more significant for us,
however, is the second name given to this logical concept of probability: degree of confirmation.
As the word “degree” indicates, such conception of probability is intent to be an essentially
numerical one. This has to do with Camap’s threefold division of probability concepts. According
to him, there are three sorts of logical concepts of confirmation: the qualitative (positive or
classificatory), the comparative and the quantitative (or metrical) concepts of confirmation. In his
words33:
We may distinguish three concepts of confinnation, concepts which have to do with the logical
side only of the problem of confirmation [...] (i) The positive concept of confirmation is that
relation between two sentences h and e winch is usually expressed by sentences of the
following foetus: [a] ‘li is confirrned by e.” [b] “h is supported by e.” [e] “e gives some
(positive) evidence for h.” (ii) Tha comparative [...] concept ofconfirmation [winch] is usuallv
3t Camap (1962), p. 43.
Sec Camap (l945b) and (1962). chapter II. Recentlv. the same distinction bas been made under the narnes
of”statistical” and “episternic” probabilities. Sec, for instance, Pollock (1983).
Camap (1945b), p. 516. Italics in the original, h and e mean, respectively, the hvpothesis and the evidence.
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We may distinguish three concepts ofconflrmation, concepts which have to do with the logical
side oniy of the probiem of confirmation [...] (j) The positive concept o! confirmation is that
relation between two sentences h and e which is usuaily expressed by sentences of the
following forms: [al “h is confirmed by e.” [b] “h is supported by e.” [c] “e gives some
(positive) evidence for h.” (ii) The comparative [...] concept ofconfirmation [which] is usualiy
expressed in sentences [like] “h is more strongiy confirmed (or supported, substantiated,
corroborated etc.) by e than h’ by e’.” [and finallyj (iii) The metrical (or quantitative) concept
ofconfirmation, the concept of degree ofconfirmation
This quantitative probability or degree of confirmation is what Carnap, for ail intents and
purposes, proposes to expiicate. However, even though he expiicitiy takes the quantitative
approach as superior to the other two, lie did flot deny the importance of the qualitative and
comparative notions of probability. In fact, Chapter VII of Logical Fozindations ofProbability is
dedicated to the elaboration of a comparative inductive togic34. Despite this, many authors have
overemphasized the numericai aspect of Carnap’s approach to the point of taking quantitativeness
as an essential feature of inductive iogic. Branden f itelsen, for instance. wrote35:
More precisely, the foilowing three fundainental tenets have been accepted by the vast majoritv
of proponents of modem inductive logic [...] Ï. Inductive logic should provide a quantitative
generalization of (classical) deductive logic. That is, the relations of deductive entailment and
dedtictive refutation should be captured as limiting (extremes) cases with cases of ‘partial
entailment’ and ‘partial refutation’ lying somehow on a continuum (or range) between these
extremes.
This quotation gives us an important hint about how this quantitative approach bas been
undertaken by iogical probabilists. The point is flot oniy that the proper or best way to refer to the
relation of confirmation that exists between e and h is throtigh a number, but that this number
should lie somehow on a continuum whose extremes represent the relations ofdeductive entailment
and refutation. As fitelsen clearly puts, inductive support is understood as a quantitative
generalization of the relation of logical validity. Because of that, almost invariably logical
probabilists have taken the calculus of probability as the standard ofhow degrees of confirmation
should logicatly behave.
Tuming back to the discussion about the relation and the status approaches to inductive
probability, this distinction is important because the place one puts the notion of probability in his
analysis of induction will determine several foundational aspects ofhis philosophy of induction. In
particular, it will allow one to give or flot an answer to the question we have posed at the beginning
ofthis section. Clearly, if we adopt an exclusively relational approach, it will be somehow difficult
to give any kind ofanswerto our question. In fact, most philosophers who have taken this position
defended that, in an inductive inference, from true premises we cannot infer anything whatsoever.
‘ See also Camap (1953).
Fitelsen (2003), p. #. The other two features are the tise ofthe probability and the notion of inductive
support as being logical and objective.
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probableperse, but only in relation with some body of evidence. Ihis of course has implications to
the very definition of induction as a ldnd of inference. Camap is very clear about that36:
If we wish to use the word ‘inference’ [.,.] we may say that the hypothesis h is inductively
inferred from the evidence e. [...] But in this case we must be careful flot to overlook the fact
that the probability value characterizes flot the hypotheses [...j but rather the inference from the
evidence to the hypothesis or, more correctly speaking, the logical relation holding between the
evidence and the hypothesis [...] Thus we sec that from the evidence e together with the
statement ‘the probability of h with respect to e is 1/5’ vie can infer {...] neither h itself, which
may be false, nor a statement of the probability of h, which would be meaningless. In fact,
nothing can be inferred from those two premises.
That position is, for obvious reasons, unsatisfactory. In practical situations, we want to be able
not only to assert that e gives such and such inductive support to h but also, in appropriate cases
where e is truc, to detach h from e and conclude something about it. for instance, it may happen
that a theory or hypothesis has to be higffly confirmed before it can be cited as the explanation of
anything, or juries have to bring in an unconditional verdict ‘Guilty” (or higffly probably guilty)
before the accused can be sentenced. However, according to traditional logical probabilist’s view,
none of that could be donc.
Tins problem became known among philosophers of science as the problem of inductive
C’ detachrnent, i.e., how to detach the (probability qualified) conclusion of an inductive inference
from its premises. Trivially, solving this problem means to go from a relation approach to a status
one. In the next chapter we will talk in some detail about how philosophers have tried to deal with
tins problem and winch sort of difficulties they have encountered.
Another aspect that will be determined by the position we chose is related to the problem of
justification. If we do like the logical probabilists and decide to take induction (or probability) as
being an objective or logical relation between propositions, we will have to show that there is
effectively such ldnd of relation between the propositions vie believe are inductively connected to
each other. from an analytical point ofview, tins implies having tu disclose the intemal structure of
the relation and showing it to depend solely on a priori principles. In other words, we will have to
show that the structure by itself, without any extemal help, can teil us whether or flot (and to what
extent) one proposition supports other proposition. Obviously tins action of showing is itself a
justificatory act. 0f course one may object that these a priori principles may be self-evident. Even
though that is not the case with the existing inductive logics, supposing someone finds such a
formulation, the very act of showing the relation to be dependent on these principles is also a
justiflcatory staff. And even if we do not take tins analytical point of view, it should be recalled that
36 Camap (1962), p. 33. In this and other staternents bv Camap to be quoted in this section reference will be
made tu a numerical value charactenzinc’ the inductive relation betwec: hvpothesis and evidences. That is
due to alreadv mentioned quantitative aspect ofCarnap’s approach.
logical is an important instance of rationaÏ. Therefore, to show something to be logical is
tantamount to showing it is rationai. We see then that, indepeident1y of the way we proceed,
adopting a relational position brings inevitably the necessity of dealing with the problem of
justification. Because of that, we can daim the logical school’s position to be essentially in
accordance with what we have narned thejustificatory approach to induction.37
These two aspects, the inability to infer anything from inductive inferences and the necessity of
dealing with the problem ofjustification, are the two main (bad) consequences of adopting the first
position. But how about the second one? Is the status approach somehow incompatible with the
first position? It will be free from the two mentioned problems? b start with, ciearly it is flot, in
any sense, incompatible with the decision of taking probability as a relation between propositions.
In fact, it seems to us that the most natural way of dealing with the problem is to consider both the
inference itself and its conclusion as probable.
Camap has afready pointed out something very similar to that. While most of the time being
very strict about the possibility of inductively inferring something from the truth of an inductive
premise, Camap has given some few hints about how sometimes that movement may afier ail be
possible. for instance, talldng about what he called the methodoÏogy of induction, he says that “If e
expresses the total knowledge of [an agent] X at the time t, that is to say, his total knowledge of the
resuits of his observations, them X is justified at this time to believe h to the degree r [••]38
Elsewhere he says: “If e and nothing etse is known by X at t, then It is confirmed by X at t to the
degree 2I3.” In other words, if the mentioned conditions are satisfied, h can be taken as a
confirmed or probable hypothesis. Then, should we conclude that Camap is contradicting himself
when he says that nothing can be inferred from an inductive inference? Not quite so. Right afier the
above statement he adds40:
Here, the term ‘confirmed’ does not mean the logical (semantical) concept of degree of
confirmation [...] but a correspondingpragrnaticat concept; the latter is, however, flot identical
with the concept of degree of (actual) belief but means rather the degree of beliefjustified by
the observational knowledge of X at t.
So, we have here a clear distinction between a logical, on the one hand, and a pragmatical
concept of probability on the other. This pragmatical concept is an instance of what we have called
staflis approach to inductive probability. 0f course, Camap is here talking about a quantitative
concept akin to his degree of confirmation. However, given bis previously explained distinction
between the qualitative, comparative and quantitative notions of (Iogical) confirmation, we may
In chapter 4 we will give more detaiis about this justificatoiy aspect of the logical school.
Camap (1962), p. 211.
Camap (1916). p. 594. Italics in the original.
° Ibid. The italics are mine.
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fairly suppose that, in addition to what he calis degree ofjustified belief, there is also a comparative
and qualitative pragmatical notions of probability. In what follows, we will make use of the term
“pragmatical probability” in a broader, not necessarily quantitative sense.
According to Camap, the point where the logical and the pragmatical concepts of probability
interact is at the application of inductive logic, conceived exclusively as the logic of the relation of
inductive support. That is to say, as soon we have such a logic, we can, provided the evidences are
known and certain restrictions are satisfied, conclude that the hypothesis at hand is (pragmatically)
probable. These restrictions have to do with the expression “and nothing else is known” in the
quotation above and have been taken into account in Camap’s philosophy by what he called the
reqicirement of total evidence41. Briefly put, the requirement of total evidence states that in order to
apply inductive logic for, among other things, getting the mentioned pragmatical probability, one
must make sure that the evidences represent all the available knowledge. Tins is of course needed
because e may be an evidence for h when taken in isolation, but against or neutral to it when taken
in conjunction with e’. It is important to observe nevertheless that the requirement, as Camap puts
it, is not the only way to achieve that sort of (pragmatical) completeness. In chapter 4 we will see
how Artificial Intelligence theorists have acineved the same goal by using a somehow different
mechanism. In the rest of tins chapter we will refer to such sort of restrictions as total evidence
conditions.
Another important point contained in the quotation above is the reference to belief. According
to Camap, even though tins pragmatical concept is not “identical with the concept of degree of
(actual) belief,” it is stili a sort of belief, namely that winch is justified by the observational
knowledge of X at t.” Others like Keynes have made similar points about the connection between
logical probabiiity, belief and justified belief (or pragmatical probability): “The theory of
probability is logical, therefore, because it is concemed with the degree of belief winch is rational
to entertain in given conditions, and flot merely with the actual beliefs of particular individuals,
winch may or may not be rational.”42
From tins we can lay down two important features of tins pragmatical concept of probability.
First, it is a sort of belief and, therefore, flot a logical, but an epistemological notion. For that
reason, we xviii also refer to tins new concept as the epistemic concept ofprobability. Second, it is
not, properly speaking, the saine as beliefs people ordinarily have. Rather, it is that kind of belief
winch is obtained in a justified or rational way. More specifically, the belief in h is rational if and
41 Camap (1962), pp. 211-13.
42 Keynes (1921), p. 4. Because of passages like that, sorne authors interpret Keynes conception of
probability as being essentiallv epistemic. and flot logical. Sec for instance Fitelsen (2003). As far as we are
concemed, we take the traditional inrerpretation according to which even though Keynes’ use ofsome ternis
may not be as clear and unifomi as CamaD’s, his main concem is with a Iogical concept cf probabilitv.
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only if there is a proposition e such that e is certain, e gives (logical) evidential support to h, and e
expresses the total available knowledge. Therefore, the pragmatical probability as conceived by
logical probabilists is essentially dependent on the logical one. On the other hand, it is in the
formation of these rational degrees cf belief that the logic of inauction finds its more important
application.
It is important to resist the temptation te identify this epistemic probability with the probability
concept deait with by the so-called subjectivistic theories ofprobabiÏity (traditionally represented
by Frank P. Ramsey, Bruno de Finetti and J. Savage and nowadays extensively used by Bayesian
confirmation theories43.) The point is that even though these theories follow a sort cf status
approach and use terms like “rational degree cf belief’ and “consistent degree of belief’ (which are
basically those quantified beliefs that conform te the probability calculus), it is widely
acknowledged that they are concemed in fact with what we have been referring to as actual degrees
cf belief. In general, subjectivists hold that it does net matter how one come te assign a certain
degree of belief to a proposition, the important is how he relates this degree with the measures cf
bis other beliefs.
Henry Kyburg has appropriately laid down a threefold division cf thecries cf degree cf belief
in which the mentioned aspect is one cf the criteria used44:
Sometimes [the theory] is explicitly subjective, in the sense that it is intended to capture the
psychologicai state cf an individual subject [...] That is, it is a term being employed in a
descriptive psychological theory. Sometimes the theoiy is constnied as a theory of ‘idealized’
subjective belief, that is, there is no argument about whether your degrees cf belief are rationat
or net, but we can argue about whether or net they ‘fit together.’ And finally, the theory is
sometimes ccnstmed as a general theory cf rational betief in which we can assess the
rationality of particular degrees cf belief (given the evidence the agent has at bis disposal) as
well as the rationality of their relations te each other.
What we have called subjectivistic thecries cf probability belong te the second ldnd cf thecry of
Kyburg’s classification. Camap’s systems would belong te the third kind.
Inside Camap’s tradition (but net precisely inside Camap’s wcrks), much has been talked
about this pragmaticai notion cf probability. Despite “accidentai” references like the ones we have
quoted, this notion has been extensiveiy discussed in connection with the probiem cf inductive
detachment. As we have mentioned, due te the necessity cf getting something inferred from
inductive inferences, many philosophers felt compelled to deal with a status approach. Although
many times the terms “rational”, ‘justified” and “warranted belief’ were used, as a mie the
problem cf detachment was discussed with regard te so-called i”es ofacceptance. The idea was
that the problem cf detachment is te be soived by specif’ing certain conditions according to which
See Kvhurg & Srnokler (1964) and Curd & Cover (1998), chap. S.
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the conclusion of an inductive inference could be detached from the premises and taken as
accepted. In the 1960’s and 1970’s philosophers such as Kyburg, Hintikka, Risto Hilpinen and
Keith Lehrer have ail followed a status approach along with some sort of “acceptance” notion4. An
important remark is that much of their endeavors were directed towards the solution of a puzzling
problem apparently inevitable when one deals inside a numerical probabilist framework: the so
called Ïotte.’y paradox. Nowadays, the relevance of the lottery paradox has flot lost its strength,
having transcended the boundaries of officiai philosophical literature and been extensively debated
inside artificial intelligence46. In the next chapter we will talk about the lottery paradox and the use
ofthe notion of acceptance in the philosophy of induction.
Regarding the second question, whether the status approach will be free from the two
mentioned problems, we believe the answer is ‘yes.’ The first problem, not to allow anything to be
concluded from an inductive inference when its premises are true, is trivialiy solved. After ail, the
notion ofpragmatical probability is defined as that status the conclusion of an inductive inference
gets when its premises are known to be tme and some total evidence conditions are satisfied. An
objection one may raise against this conclusion concems the apparent fact that this alleged solution
is not a solution at ail: while our problem concems inferring something when the premises are tme,
the pragmatical probability as defmed by Camap can be applied just in those cases where the
premises are known to be tnte. Ibis objection can be replied in several different ways. for
example, we could say that the levels to which each one of these descriptions refers are flot the
same: while the defmition of pragmatical probability refers to the object-language level, the
defmition of inductive inference refers to the meta-language level. Letting be a modal operator
meant to represent knowledge about tmth, this means that while the first definition refers to
statements of the form Da itself, the second refers to the truthfulness of this sort of statement.
Another possible reply is to say that, despite unquestionabie differences, the notions of a sentence
being taie and being known to be taie are connected in such a way that if ct is true, Da is aiso so.
Therefore, since “a is pragrnatically probable” is obtained from Lia, it may also be obtained from
(and defined through) “a is true”. However, independentiy of the path we chose, this objection
raises a very important question conceming the nature of induction: shouid it be taken in
connection tvith truth or in connection with knowledge about tmth? In other words, should
induction be considered intrinsically as an ontological or as an epistemologicai notion? We wiII
Kyburg (1994), p. 401. Italics in the original.
Kyhurg (1964), Hintikka & Hiipinen (1966). Hiipinen (1968), Lehrer (1970).
° Sec for instance Stalnaker (1984), Pollock (198T. Poole (1991) and Kyburo (1997)..
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postpone the analysis ofthis question to the next section, where we should lay down in a systematic
way our view on induction.
Another possible objection to the conclusion that the pragmatical notion of probability solves
this first problem is to say that, since the inductive support given by e to h may change as we add
new premises, even if we take an epistemic notion to refer to h when e is known to be truc and
some total evidence conditions are satisfied, this epistemic status of h xviii be strongly dependent on
the knowledge situation. Keynes is veiy clear about that47:
The terms certain and probable describe the various degrees of rationai belief about a
proposition which different amounts of knowledge authorize us to entertain. Ail propositions
are true or false, but the knowledge we have of them depends on our circumstances; and while
it is ofien convenient to speak of propositions as certain or probable, this express strictly a
relationship in which they stand to a corpus of knowledge, actuai or hypothetical, and flot a
characteristic of the propositions in themselves. A proposition is capable at the same time of
varying degrees of this relationship, depending upon the knowledge to xvhich it is related, so
that il is without significance to cail a proposition probable uniess we specify the knowledge to
which we are relating it.
Therefore, even if we take an epistemic notion ofprobability, we will stiil not be able to appiy it to
propositions without reference to a body of evidence. In other words, probabiiity statements like “a
is (pragmatically) probable” are incomplete and consequently meaningless.
One important point contained in the above passage is the reference to certainty. Afier
introducing probability along with the notion of certainty, Keynes says that knoxvÏedge-dependence
applies equally to both certain and probable propositions. In a more general way xve can say that in
one way or another every epistemic concept is knowledge-dependent. The question then is whether
or not this fact wili prevent us from speaking of propositions as being certain or probable without
mentioning the knoxvledge situation at hand. b start xvith, ordinariiy people do speak about
propositions as being certain and probable without giving a description of ail the statements they
believe. Second, many sorts of truths are context-dependent. A posteriori and synthetic statements,
for example, are obviously dependent on tirne and circumstance. From a formai point of viexv, this
means that we need some interpretation to ciassify a sentence as truc or false. But of course xve do
flot say that statements belonging to a formai language are elliptical or meaningless when no
reference to some interpretation is given. They are just uninterpreted statements. Similarly, in
ordinaiy usage we do not requfre at every utterance of a statement the time and circumstance to be
mentioned. We just take some specific context or interpretation as the default one: unless some
other time-circumstance pair or interpretation is exphcitly rnentioned. we take this default one as
the one we are referring to. But then why flot to ailow the same thing to be donc with epistemic
concepts? We sincerely cannot sec how one could reasonably ans’:er tins question.
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About the second problem, the necessity of dealing with the problem of justification, there are
two points to be considered. First, since we do flot intend to take into account the inductive relation
that allows one to classify a hypothesis as probable but just the status itself, we vill flot be forced to
say why the step from evidences to hypothesis is rational. However, and this is our second point, as
we have seen, to Camap the notion of pragmatical probability is dependent on the relation of
inductive confinnation: if e gives evidential support to h, e is known to be true and expresses the
total of our knowledge, then h is pragmatically probable. It is just because of tins connection that
we can classify these beliefs (or degrees of beliefs) as rational. Therefore, if we equate epistemic
probability with rational (degree of) belief in the way Camap does we will fali again into
justificatory matters. On the other hand, if we take inductive and rational in the way we have
suggested at the end of Section 2.1, that is, as depending on the cousensus ofa community, then we
will flot have to bother about that sort ofjustffication. And, as it can be clearly seen, in contrast to
the relation approach, the position that takes only the epistemological notion of probability is
susceptible to tins sort of pragmatical approach to induction. We may however object that saying
that rational is what is taken as 50 by a community is tantamount to giving an answer to the
problem ofjustification, by the way a very similar one to Hume’s solution. However, that is surely
flot the sort of justification winch philosophers have been looking for. In fact, we wonder even if
someone would take it as an answer to Hume’s challenge. The point is that, even though we make
use of the term “rational,” the meaning we are giving to it does not correspond to what we expect
rationality to be: to be a consensus seems simply too weak.
2.3 Induction and PÏausibility
Now we have arrived at the point where we can start stating in an explicit way the pinlosophy of
induction and plausibility we will develop here. It should be advised that even though many of the
ideas contained in tins section are not new, for the sake of completeness we will take the trouble of
discussing even those established and uncontroversial points concerning induction and probability.
To start with, we are dealing of course with the contemporary conception of induction
according to winch induction is the class of (rational) ampliative or non tmth-preserving inferences.
There is however one important feature of tins conception that we shall deliberately avoid. As we
have seen, the contemporary view places induction in sharp contrast with deduction. Despite tins,
in a very important aspect it stili makes induction undistinguishable from deduction. As we have
shown, a very’ usual way of contrasting deduction with induction is to say that while in a deductive
inference the premises give full evidential support to the conclusion, in an inductive one the
47 Kevnes (1921). pp. 3-4. Italics in the original.
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support is just partial. This means that even though the two sorts of supports are different in
C “quantity,” they are stili identical in “quaÏi.” In other words, the nature of the support given by a
deductive inference is the same as the one given by an inductive one. This is reflected in the almost
universally held opinion that this evidential support varies from O to 1, where the bounds O and 1
represent, respectively, the relations of logical inconsistency and logical deduction, and in between
them lay the several degrees that characterize inductive evidential support. We have already
remarked that because of that the probability calculus has invariably been taken as the canon of
how probability statements are to behave.
We do flot think this is a very trivial matter. To us it seems much more reasonable to hold that
the nature of the supports occun-ing in deductive and inductive inferences are essentially different
from each other. If the blatant fail of more than half-century of attempts to provide a logical
characterization of inductive inferences does flot convince the skeptic, maybe the two centuries and
haif ofunsuccessful attempts to solve Hume’s problem wilI do it, for, as we hope have showed, in
order to show that the inductive evidential support bas the same (logical) nature of deductive
support, one bas to justify the logical rectitude of inductive inferences. Because of this fundamental
disagreement we will keep the expression “evidential support” to refer exclusively to inductive
inferences (and maybe cali the support present in deductive arguments demonstration, proof or
validity relation) and define induction as that sort of inference whose premises in certain
circumstances serve as evidences for the conclusion.
Besides historical-foundational arguments of tins sort, tins position of ours can be supported by
observations conceming the use of the probability calculus to derive degrees of inductive support.
As many authors such as H. Heidelberger, francis Dauer, John Pollock and Johathan Cohen have
pointed out, approaches like the ones based on the calculus ofprobability winch take induction as a
continuum starting from the relation of logical inconsistency and ending at the relation of logical
validity seem to be in sharp contrast with some very basic intuitions concerning induction48. The
most exhaustedly mentioned problem concems the way confirmed hypotheses are conjoined in the
probability calculus. If, for example, we take the testimony of a certain art expert as a strong
evidence to believe that such and such pictures are genuine Vermeers, for instance, then his
judgments that picture A is a Venneer and picture B is a Vermeer would make us take flot only the
hypotheses “A is a Vermeer” and “B is a Vermeer” as credible, but also the hypothesis “A and B
are genuine Vermeers” as equally so. This however is in sharp contradiction to the way probability
values are conjoined in the probability calculus. In the words of Cohen19:
s Heidelberrer (1963), Dauer (1980), Pollock (1983), Cohen (1970) (l9SQa).
Cohen (1989a), pp. 19-20.
O [...] this conflicts with Pascalian principles because the above mentioned multiplicative law forthe probability of a conjunction ensures that, except in limiting cases, the conjunction is less
probable than either conjunct. If p(A)>O and p(BIA)<l, p(A&B) must aiways be Iess than p(A),
since in accordance with the multiplication principle for conjunction p(A&B), as we have seen,
is equal to a proper fraction of p(A), namely, p(A) x p(BjA). 0f course, the chance of both
pictures’ being genuine may well be a lot less than the chance ofjust one’s being genuine. But
is the credibility of their genuineness to be judged in terms of such chances [...] or in terms of
the reputation of the author of the warranties that have been given to you?
Another famous counterintuitive resuit which shows up when we use the calculus of
probability to represent inductive probability values is connected with the additive character of
negation in the calculus of chance, which is materialized by the following principle:
p(A)+p(—1A)= 1.
The point is that tins principle makes sense only if the negation wr have in mmd is the incredibitity
ofA, but flot if it is the credibility of -A. Given a certain body of evidence, the credibility of A and
the credibility of —1A (that is to say, the justification for believing A and the justification for
believing —TA) may be both low. for example, the statement that some accused has neyer been in
the jail before may provide the same amount of evidence for believing that he is innocent as for
believing that lie is guilty. In tins sense of probability, the probability of being innocent will not
vary inversely with the probability of being guilty. The negation of the epistemological concept of
certainty is similarly non-additive. As the certainty of A goes up, the uncertainty of A goes down.
But there may well be very littie certainty that A and also very little certainty that —1A50.
Another important point of our theoiy of induction is that we want deliberately to avoid the
problem of justification. That position could be defended by referring to the arguments some
philosophers have laid down against the solubility of tins problem. Even though tve do agree on
tins point, it is flot our intention to present it as the rationale of our choice. Rather, we would like to
do that by referring to the already mentioned distinction between the problem of justification and
the problem of description of induction. Our main goal here is to adopt a purely descriptive or
pragmatical approach to induction. That means that our concem will be exclusively the
representation of the established schemas of inductive inference, without any consideration
whatsoever for their rationality or logical rectitude. By saying this, one may object that our goal of
explicating the notion of induction could not be properly achieved. Since we have defined
induction as the class of rational non truth-preserving inferences. in order to explicate it we vill
have not only to give an account for non truth-preservingness, but also for what means an inference
to be rational. The answer to that question will corne up some few paragraphs below when we lay
° Fora full list cf similar paradoxes sec Cohen (1970) and (1977). Fora critical discussion cf some cf these
problems sec Schoernan (1987).
30
down in more a precise way the role that our second explicandum will play in our account of
inductive inferences.
At first glance tins descriptive approach may appear to be a quite straightfonvard task. Not
quite so. First of ail, the attempts to represent some of the simplest inductive pattems of inference
in a sound fashion have been sources of insurmountable problems for philosophers51. Second, the
methodological commitment of avoiding the problem of justification is not so easily ftdfihled. It
involves decisions concerning the very way one characterizes the class of inductive inferences. For
instance, if from the very beginning one decides to define inductive inferences in an intensional
way he is sure to deal with the problem ofjustification. In chapter 4 we will briefly show how one
of the most traditional systems of inductive logic, Camap’s logic, winch allegedly tvas concerned
only with the problem of description had, in its essence, ajustificatory root.
Tins decision of ours of adopting a descriptive approach and keeping distance from the
problem of justification has two immediate and mutualiy dependent consequences (winch tvere
aiready mentioned at the end of the iast section.) First of ail, since the use of an intensional
approach would inevitably force us to deal with the problem of justification, we are ieft with no
choice but to adopt an extensional or pragmatical approach to induction. Second, since the use of a
probability notion as conceived by the logical school would certainly commit us to dealing with the
probiem of justification, we shah adopt something akin to Camap’s pragmatical concept of
probability. Moreover, we are concemed here with what we may cail inftrentiaÏ conception of
induction, that is to say, a view according to winch induction is a sort of inference with some Idnd
ofinferentiai power, in the sense ofbeing able to conciude something about its conclusion when its
premises are tme or know to be true52. Therefore, we have to have some epistemic notion able to
distinguish the inductively obtained facts from the deductively obtained ones.
About the use we will make of tins pragmatical or epistemic notion of probability, we have to
acknowledge that using an old term like “probabiiity” (winch has flot only one but over haif dozen
different interpretations) with a somehow new meaning may be quite troublesome. for instance,
the existence of a established mathematical calculus of probability may somehow play a role in
one’s decision of representing our notion, winch by whatever reason is also referred to by the term
“probabiiity,” through such calculus. However, the instorical roots of the calculus of probability
lays on problems not concemed at ail with what we are calling here induction. Therefore, in order
to apply the calculus of probability to ins analysis of induction, our friend will have to reject the
(not so precise but still) phulosophical motivations behind the developrnent of such calculus and
‘ for a brief description of sorne of the difficuhies found in the solution of the prohiem of description of
induction sec Lipton (1991). pp. 6-22.
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conceive another one. But what if there is a real incompatibility between the notion of probability
deait with by the calculus ofprobability and our intuitions concerning inductive probability?
Because of that, rather than using “probability” to denote our pragmatical notion of probability
we will adopt another term which we believe is less susceptible to this sort of trouble:
“ptattsibility.” Without abandoning completely the terms “pragmatical probability” and “epistemic
probabiiity,” we wilI from now on use the term “plausibility” to refer to the epistemological notion
that designate that status the conclusion of an inductive inference gets when its premises are known
to be true. Ibis choice however is flot just a tenuinological decision or a mere term change. We do
believe that the term “pÏausibility” and the notion it means are much more likeiy to succeed in the
conceptualization of our pragmatical probability than the term “probability.”
To start with, we note that lilce the concept of probability, plausibility has both the negative,
uncertain or defeasible aspect and the positive, reasonabteness aspect required by inductive
inferences. This means that we can fairly take the conclusions of inductive inferences as plausible
or, equivalently, take inductive inferences as sources of plausible facts. This connection is, we may
say, the bridge between the two concepts. On the one hand, plausible facts can be refuted: they are
not certain, unquestionable facts, but are subject to revision and therefore can be defeated. Also, as
we have seen, the tmth-relation between premises and conclusion of an inductive inference are not
certain: even though in the case where the premises are tme and we may accept provisionally the
tmth of the conclusion, this acceptance may have to be re-evaluated in the presence of additional
information. On the other hand, because a plausible fact is plausible, we expect it to have some sort
of reasonableness: we are not ready to accept eveiy hypothesis as plausible; some veiy good
reasons are required. And these good reasons will be given, in the case of inductively obtained
plausible facts, by the supposed logical rectitude which inductive inferences posses.
A natural question that may arise concems the other sources of plausible facts. Are we taking
plausibility exclusively in connection with induction or in a broader sense as to encompass also
other sources of plausible facts? Even though we are above ail concemed with what we may cail
inductive plausibility, there is another way of getting plausible facts that is of particular interest to
us. It is commonplace among philosophers to translate the Greek words “eikos” and “endoxa” as
probable or plausible. S. Sambursky, for instance, leaves no doubt that what the ancients meant by
these terms was something veiy close to our epistemic probability: “11e Greek equivalent for
‘plausible’ or ‘probable’ — eikos — vas in use from pre-Socratic literature onwards and well into the
Hellenistic period, in the same sense as these terrns are applied today. i.e. ‘10 be expected with
This point rnav sttrely be redundant, but given the exposed in the last section e think it is indispensable to
stress it.
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some degree of certainty.”53 Even though there is sorne controversy over whether by eikos the
ancient writers really meant something like our inductive probability54, rnost philosophers agree
that the term “endoxa”, which hterally means standing in doxa in respect of ail or rnost of the vise,
represents a quite unambiguous sense of probable or plausible. Speaking about Aristotle’s use of
the term, George Grote writes: “The Endoxon may indeed be rightly called probable, because,
whenever a proposition is fortified by a certain body of opinion, Aristotle admits a certain
presumption (greater or iess) that it is true.”55
The fttndamental point here is that piausibihty now is taken as the result of a sort of consensus
achieved arnong the most reputable experts on some subject mater (the wises). Nichoias Rescher
has called this specific source of plausible facts the atttÏzority-oriented approach to plat tsibiÏity. In
his words56:
This authority-oriented approach to plausibilistic inference was in fact envisaged at the very
origin of the subject in Aristotle’s Topica. He took the basis ofpiausibility to lie in the probity
of sources: the opinions held ‘by ail or the majority or the experts or the best and the most
reputable among them.’ But his approach was broad, and encompassed flot only the opinions of
authorities as such, but aiso the cognitive principles on which they are generally founded (such
as induction
— epagôgê)
It is interesting to note that in this case, the rationality of plausible facts cornes flot frorn the
logical rectitude of sorne inference, but from the probity of these authorities. In contrast to our
inductive plausibility or epistemic probability, the rationality of plausible facts here is not
explained by a further reference to the notion of rationality, but by reference to a different and vie
believe less problematic notion. That is important to us because we will use a sort of authority
oriented approach to semantically explicate the notion of plausibiiity57. That is what will make
possible for us to deal with the rationality of plausible facts and inductive inferences without
having to handie the problem of justification. Consequently, given the rnentioned connection
between the rationality of inductive inferences and the rationality of inductive plausible facts, it
will also make possible for us to account for this positive side of inductive inferences through an
approach which deliberately avoids any consideration of why inductive inferences are rational and
restricts itselftojust describing inductive pattems ofinference.
At the beginning ofthis section we have mentioned that ta us induction is that sort of inference
whose premises in certain circurnstances serve as evidence for the conclusion. We also have
defïned plausibility as that status the conclusion of an inductive inference gets when its premises
Samburskv (1956), p. 36.
Sec for instance Madden (1957).
Grote (1872), p. 389. Italics in tbe original.
Resoher (1976), p. 6.
That will be donc in Chapters 5 ancl 6.
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are known to be true and some total evidence conditions are satisfied. Bringing the two definitions
together we arrive at a preliminary explication, we may say, of the notion of plausibility: plausible
facts are those which there are evidences for. In other words, the sentence “a is plausible” is to be
taken as the same as “there are evidences for a.” This meaning is what we xviii try to maRe precise
through the formai systems we will introduce in Chapters 5 and 6.
This definition and its use of the notion of evidence bring us to an important difference
between our approach and the Iogicai probabilists’. To the logicai probabilists, evidence is a way of
calling the premises of an inductive inference tvhich reflects the sort of logical relation that exists
between them (the premises) and the conclusion. In other words, being an evidence for some
hypothesis depends exclusively on the iogical form of the evidences and hypothesis and has
nothing to do with the knowledge situation at hand. What will depend on that knowledge situation
is the satisfaction of some total evidence condition xvhich will determine xvhether or flot the
plausibiiity of h can be concluded from the truthfulness of e. Tire point of divergence between this
conception and ours is that xve take e as evidence for h only when such total evidence condition is
satisfied. In other words, oniy when we are in position to conclucle “h is plausible” is that we take
tire e as being an evidence for h. Adopting a veiy simple sort of total evidence condition, we couid
say that e is inductively related with h if and only if, xvhen taken in isolation, e is an evidence for h.
Now we are in a position to analyze the objection raised against the use of the pragmatical
notion ofprobability at end of the last section which, vie have ciaimed, bas important implications
for the nature of induction. It was pointed out there that we couid not in fact take plausibility or
pragmatical probability as an answer to the question as to xvhat we can conclude from an inductive
inference xvhen its premises are tme because plausibiiity, as we have defined it, is that status the
conclusion of an inductive inference gets, not xvhen its premises are tme, but when they are known
to be true (and some total evidence conditions are satisfied.) The whole point is of course that the
notion of plausibility is primariiy concemed with knoxvledge about the world and not with the word
itseif. Therefore, unless induction is itself redefmed in epistemological ternis, our use of the notion
of plausibility in connection with induction is simply out of place.
Given our previous discussion about the consequences of taldng induction as iogical and the
guidelines presented at the beginning of tins section, the choice for an epistemic position follows
naturaliy. If xve take plausibility, xvhich xve may thmnk of as an epistemic mark vie attach to
propositions in order not to ieave any doubt about their reftitable character, as the inherent product
of inductive inferences, induction will have an indubitable and quite strong epistemological aspect.
More specifically, it wiil be taken as sorts of epistemoiogical niles of inference intent basicaliy to
fIl the gap that exists between data and theon,’, understood in a broad sense. As a consequence of
that, the so-cailed loieai rectitude of inductive inferences will be nothing more than a subjective
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feeling of soundness and reasonableness that cannot be a prfonstically justified. The only
necessary connection that shah exist between the one hundred observed black ravens and the
hypothesis that the next raven to be obsenied wihl be black is the psychological necessity of
inferring things even in the presence of incomplete and imprecise evidencesSS.
There are some important consequences of taking inductive inferences as primarily concemed
with knowledge of truth rather than with truth itself. First, it places the notion of truth in its right
place and leaves the path to certainty open. In other words, regarding the application and
characterization of inductive inferences, it is not only the truth of the premises what we should look
for, but also, and maybe primordially, their certainty: from a pure epistemological point of view,
inductive inferences are not those inferences which lead from truth premises to plausible
conclusions, but those which lead from certain statements to plausible and therefore uncertain
ones. Second, as we mentioned at the end of Section 2.1, the distinction between induction and
deduction is not a matter of logic, but of epistemology. While deduction applied to matters of
knowledge is certainty presen’ing, induction is not. The perhaps unnoticed but fundamental
asymmetry here is that while deduction is concemed with tmth and can be apptied to epistemic
concepts, induction is essentially epistemic and consequently cannot be dissociated from
knowledge issues. finally, according to this new conception, what inductive inferences weaken by
going from certain statements to plausible ones is not the degree of tmth of statements, but their
degree of revocability or, in other words, our readiness to give them up. This is in sharp contrast
with the many times held view that induction diminishes the degree of tmth of the conclusions, and
plausible (or probable) statements are a sort of partial truth. This point is particularly important to
us because we wihl take this susceptibihity of being given up of a statement as what effectively
distinguishes a certain statement from a plausible one. While the first is irrefutable and very hard to
be given up, the second is intrinsically refiatable, defeasible and therefore susceptible to be
reconsidered59.
Ail this talk about induction and plausibility (or pragmatical probability) as being intrinsically
epistemic is of course not new. Afier ail, the so-called classical interpretation of probabihity takes
probability essentiahly as a measure of our ignorance. According to Roy Weatherford, for example,
“For the most part, classical theorists held that probability is flot genuine part of metaphysical
reality, but a human invention cleverly designed to assist us in niaking rational choices when we
This conclusion does not necessadlv imply that inductive inferences are irrational or indistinguishable
from nonsense. We could, for example, proceed like many philosophers and try to justify inductive
arguments by non-logical means without going against our epistemic position regarding induction.
It is important to note that we do flot deny that certainty and pÏausihility have other equally important
aspects. For instance, this position of ours neither denies nor asrees that certaintv is something 1ie a sort ofjustified troc be];ef. b our theorv. this simplv does not rnatter.
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have less than conclusive information” 60 re have also seen how Keynes bas taken probability as
intrinsically connected with the notion of certainty and belief However, it is equally tme that in
part due to its connection with games of chance and ils use in modem and classical physics,
probability has many times been understood as an empirical, non-episteniic concept61. Probability
as conceived by Camap has also been understood as an intrinsically non-epistemic concept. This
seems then only to reinforce the advantages oftaking “plausibility” rather the “probability” to refer
our pragmatical notion ofprobability.
One objection one might raise is that such an epistemic view of induction and plausibility
would certainly render the philosophy of induction into a psychological enterprise. In his Logicat
foundations of Probability, Camap addresses this very point when discussing psychologism in
deductive logic62:
Many logicians prefer formulations winch may be regarded as a kind of qua1fled
psychoÏogism. They admit that logic is not concemed with the actual processes of believing,
thinking, inferring, because then it would become part of psychology. But stiil clinging to the
belief that there must somehow be a close relation between logic and thinking, they say that
logic is concemed with correct or rational thinking.
The point is that in the same way certainty is a psychological state people may have regarding a
specific proposition but nonetheless has a logical aspect winch we may say deductive logic
formalizes, plausibility and induction also have a logical aspect susceptible to being formalized.
And in the same way tins logical aspect of certainty is not concemed with how one appraises ins
certain beliefs, the logic of plausibility and induction is not concemed with any subjective feeling
of plausibility people may use in practical judgments. Rather, the goal of the logic of plausibility,
winch, as we will sec in Chapter 4 is distinct from the logic of induction, is just to set the logical
constraints plausible beliefs are subject to63. In its tum, even though the logic of induction aims to
represent inductive pattems of inference, tins is donc in an unambiguous and objective way
completely independent of any subjective matter64.
There is stili another very important point that distinguishes our approach from the majority of
theories of probability and induction. As we have afready mentioned, almost alI theories of
inductive probability take the calculus of probability as the basic canon of how to get derived
60 Weatherford (1982), P. 44.61 Popper’s and the so-called frequency interpretations of probabiiity are the best examples of this non
epistemic understanding ofprobability.
6 Camap (1962), p. 41. Italics in the original.
6i The situation is analogous to the epistemological logics developed in philosophy and artificial intelligence.
Sec Gabbay et al (1995).
64 There is nevertheless an important difference between our conception of the logic of induction and the
traditional one conceming what is to be considered sound criteria of confirmation. Due to our choice cf
taking a purelv descriptive approach, our logic of induction vi11 ha.e very little to say about when a
statement confinns another one.
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There is stili another very important point that distinguishes ouï approach from the majority of
theories of probability and induction. As we have already mentioned, almost ail theories of
inductive probability take the calculus of probability as the basic canon of how to get derived
probable facts. This allows us to classify them as quantitative theories of induction. In contrast to
that, our approach is essentially a qualitative one. Had Camap empioyed bis threefold taxonomy of
confirmation to the pragmaticai notion of probability, we could say that our approach is an attempt
to explicate the qualitative notion ofpragmctticalprobabiÏity. This should flot be seen however as a
case against the fruitfulness of a qttantitative approach. Even though we are inctined to agree tvith
philosophers such as Ernest Nagel, Keynes, Richard von Mises and Mario Bunge who have
claimed numerical inductive probabilities to be applicable oniy in special cases and therefore a
general quantitative account to confirmation to be fundamentaliy misleading65, we do flot discard
the usefulness of a numerical approach to plausibility66. It shoutd nevertheless be seen as a case
against the tvay this quantitative approach has been traditionally carried out. As we have atready
said, we explicitly reject the calculus of probability as suitable to characterize the logic of
pragmaticai inductive probability.
A iast feature ofinductit’e inferences which we cannot avoid mentioning is related to Carnap’s
requirement of total evidence. As we have said, the raison d’être of any total evidence condition is
to make sure that ail availabie evidentiai knowiedge will be taken into account at the time of
applying inductive inferences to get pragmaticaily probable conclusions. One way to understand
the necessity of such sort of condition is as foilows. In deductive logic, if cx is iogicaily deduced
from f3, it will remain so independentty of the amount ofadditional information we get (in symbols:
if {f3} H cx, then {f3}uA H cx, for any set of formulae A.) That is the well-known monotony featcire
of classical logic. The relation of inductive support, however, does flot have this sort of behavior:
the fact that {[3} gives evidentiai support to cx does flot guarantee that {f3}A wili also do so. And
if we allow one to conclude the (pragmaticai) probability of cx on the basis of this much of
evidentiai support, it may happen that whule from f3 alone we get “it is probable that cx”, the same
thing cannot be conciuded from {f3}uA. In other words, inductive inferences are nonmonotonic.
This nonmonotonicity is essentially the same as non truth-preservingness appiied to a formai
inferentiai system67. Therefore, if we want to base our believes, let us say, on what our inductive
65 Nagel (1955), pp. 68-71, Keynes (1921), chap. III, von Mises (1957), p. ix. The position ofM. Bunge was
heard by the author at his FallJ2003 seminar at McGiil University, entitled “Philosophy of Science.”
66 In fact, in chapter 6 we will present a brief sketch of how our qualitative approach can be very easily
tumed into a quantitative one.
67 Even though this feature was wetl known among classical logical probabilists, the term “nonmonotoniticy”
vas completely absent ftom their writings. It was only in the 1970’s that AI theorists paid attention to that
aspect as the distinguishing feature of commonsense and started developing so-called nonmonotonic logical
systems.
One imrnediate consequence of the nomnonotony of inductive inferences is thefr global
character. In order to infer the conclusion of a deductive inference we need to be concemed only
with the truthftflness of the premises. We do flot need to look at the whole logical theory68: a local
inspection is enough to warrant the acceptance of the conclusion. On the other hand, an inductive
inference does flot have this feature. If e (taken individually) gives some support to h, the same
thing may flot happen when we take e in conjunction with e’. Therefore, if we want to inductively
conclude h from e we vill have to look flot only at the tmth value (or, to be more precise, the
certainty value) of e, but at the whole set of accepted facts, in order to make sure that no one of
them defeats the evidential support given to h by e.
In order to finish this section, some words about the recent history of the term “plausibility”
wili be opportune. The term “plausibility” is flot in any way absent from the philosophical
literature. Many probabilists have used it, for example, to designate that status a hypothesis
achieves when it has got enough evidential support (or, in other words, our inductive pragmatical
probability.) For instance, in one of his 1940’s papers Camap wrote: “[...] the situation is rather
this, that we ascribe to the proposition a certain moderate degree of confirmation (or plausibitity,
probability, credibility, acceptability)”69 from tins quotation we can understand the role the term
“plausibility” has played in the logical probabilists writings. Invariably, the notion they wanted to
explicate (or the expÏicanda of their theories) was the notion of probability or degree of
confirmation. The use of terms such as “plausibility,” “corroboration” and “credibility” vas intent
just to clarify the meaning of these explicanda, without being themselves subject to the same sort
of explicative analysis.
Another probability-dependent use of the term “plausibility” vas made by Glen Shafer to
designate what A. Dempster originally named “lower probability.” The whole idea was to use two
numbers to represent our state of uncertainty with regard to a sentence, one meaning the degree of
support given by the evidence for the sentence and the other the degree of support given against it.
‘vVhile Dempster named the first lower probability and the second upper probability, Shafer called
them plausibility and belief, respectively70.
A little bit more independent use of the term vas provided by those who saw plausibility as a
sort of e priori, evidence-independent status of reasonabieness that hypotheses may have. Peirce,
Émue Meyerson, Norwood Hanson, Salmon and Dudley Shapere for example, have taken
6 Given a formai language l, an inferential relation H, and a set of formula logicians use the term
“theory” or “logical theory” to mean the set of ail fomuilae of that are inferred from A according to H. In
symbols: 1h (A) = {ae3 I A H ct}.
Carnap (1946), p. 597. The italics are mine.
70 Dempster (1967) and Shafer (1976).
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plausibility in this sense71. Salmon is clear about how, according to tins view, plausible hypotheses
would be distinguished from probable or conflrmed ones72:
There are, it seems to me, three logicaily distinct aspects of the treatment of scientffic
hypotheses. [...](l) thinldng of the hypothesis, (2) plausibility considerations, and (3) testing
or confirmation. Hanson has argued (correctly I think) that there is an important distinction
between plausibility arguments and the testing of the hypotheses, but he lias (mistakenly I
think) conflated plausibility arguments with discovery.
Finally, there are those like Nicholas Rescher, George Polya and René Leclercq who have
really engaged thernselves in the task of forrnally explicating something they narned
“plausibility.”73 While Rescher’s theory is sornehow sirnilar to the approach we shah develop here,
Leclercq’s and Polya’s seem to be much doser to some modem interpretations of probability. The
important point however is that ail of them have given priority to the notion of plausibility itself
over its connection with induction. In other words, they acknowledge that plausible facts may corne
from inductive inferences, but the concept is analyzed in a broad way independently of tins specific
source.
In the field of Art(flciat Intelligence (AI), the term “plausibihity” lias been used in a very close
connection with inductive inferences. A very important task of AI has been the mechanization of
the so-called commonsense reasoning. One of the most important features of tins sort of reasoning
is that it is performed in situations of incomplete and imprecise knowledge. M example
traditionally given in M literature is the situation where the only two pieces of information we have
is that (1) a certain animal called Twenty is a bird and that (2) bfrds usually fly, and based on that
we wish to conclude whether or not Twenty flues. Even though from the point ofview of deductive
logic we carmot conclude anytinng from these premises, in ordinaty situations people do conclude
things on the basis of typical mies hike (2), namely that Twenty does fly. But the inferential step
from (1) and (2) to “Twenty flues” is clearly a non tmth-preserving one: it may happen that Twenty
is a penguin and the proposition that il flues is a false one. Therefore, common sense inferences are
inductive in essence74.
It is important to observe that the terrn “induction” lias rarely been used to refer to tins non
tmth-preserving feature of common sense reasoning. Rather, AI theorists adopted the already
mentioned and much more technical terrn “nonmonotony” or “nonrnonotonicity.” Accordingly, the
‘ Peirce (1957), sect. 8.223, Meyerson (1989), Hanson (1961), Salmon (1953), Shapere (1966).
72 Salmon (1966), p. 114.
Rescher (1976), Polya (1954), Leclcrcq (1974).
for discussions about the sirnilarities hetween philosophy and AI conceming indLlctive inferences sce
Pollock (1988), Kyburo (1991) (1994) and Tan (1991) (1997).
39
logical systems developed to formalize this sort of reasoning were named nonmono tonic logics7.
Another important difference is that since the veiy beginning AI theorists preferred qualitative
approaches over quantitative ones. The central point however is that since nonmonotonicity is
essentially the same as non tmth-preservinness, these common sense inferences are nothing more
than a special class of induction conceived according to our contemporary sense76.
Despite the lack of the term “induction,” from the very’ beginning M theorists made use of
terms like “plausibility” and “plausible” to informally explain the nature of common sense
inferences. For instance, at the beginning of bis classical paper “A Logic for Default Reasoning”,
Raymond Reiter says77:
Various forms of defauit reasoning commonly arise in artificial Intelligence {. .] Reasoning
patterns of this kind represent a form ofplausible inference and are typically requfred whenever
conclusions must be drawn despite the absence of total knowledge about the world.
Others such as D. McDermott, Robert Moore, Judea Peari and Kyburg have equally used expressions
like “plausible inference” or “plausible conclusion.”78 However, akin to the work of most logical
probabilists, these uses of”plausibility” were mostly intended to help the reader to comprehend the
intuitions lying behind the formai systems at hand.
More comprehensive accounts of plausibility has been provided by theorists such as Tarcisio
Pequeno, D. Lehmann, Karl Schlechta and David Billington, who someway or another are inclined
to classify their systems as logics of plausibility79. As would be expected however, ail these works
emphasize primordialiy the formai aspects of their systems and their application in AI problems.
And even though we may say some important insights about the nature of plausibility have been
given in these works, as a rule what we may cali “a phiiosophical explication of a concept” is
absent from them.
With exception to the works of Reiter and Pequeno, it is not our purpose here to give details
about these plausible logics, both either in phllosophy or M. We mention them just to give the
reader an idea of the extent to which the notion ofplausibility bas been used in these domains.
For an overviev cf the filed of nonmonoonic logios see Ginsber (1987), Iukaszewicz (1990), Brewka
(1991) and Gabbay et al (1994).
76 In Chapter 4 we shah analyse to what extent nonmonotonic logits can be taken as logics of induction in the
philosophical sense.
77 .
.Rcter (1980), p. 81. The italics are mmc. Sec also Reiter & Cnsuo1o (1981).
‘ MDemiott & Doyle (1980), Moore (1935). Peari & Geffner (1990), Kyhurg (1994).
Pequeno & Buchsbaum (1991), Lehmann (1991). Schtechta (1996). Billington & Rock (2001).
CHAPTER3
INDUCTIVE INCONSISTENCIES AND THE
$KEPTICAL AND CREDuLous APPROACHES TO
INDUCTION
In this Chapter, we vil1 investigate an aspect of inductive inferences that will play a very crucial
role in our philosophy of induction and plausibility: the appearance of contradictions. After
describing the problem, identifying its role in the phiÏosophy of induction, and surveying the
pertinent literature (Section 3.1), we tum in Section 3.2 to the two most important positions which
one may take when faced with inconsistencies: the so-called skepticaÏ approach to induction and
the credulous approach to induction. After explaining these concepts and talldng about how
philosophers and lA theorists have deait with them, we flnally in Section 3.3 investigate the
properties of the two plausibility notions that these approaches give rise: the skeptical notion of
plausibility and the credulous notion of plausibility. As it shah become clear later, the study of
these two notions is essential for properly explicating the notion of inductive plausibility.
3.1 The Problem(s) of Inductive Inconsistencies
Now we tum to an important facet of induction that will play a very significant role in the task of
explicating the notions of induction and plausibihity: the problem of inductive inconsistencies. In
order to give a fairly introduction to that aspect of induction, we wiIl have to speak a littie bit about
other field of the philosophy of science to which inductive inferences has been of considerable
importance: scientfic expÏanation.
Traditionally, the expression “scientific inference” has been used to designate those inferences
meant to appraise theories and hypotheses. In those cases, the premises are the pieces of evidence
and the conclusion is the confirmed (plausible or probable) theory or hypothesis. As we have seen,
these inferences are intrinsically inductive. Besides these extemal (we use tins term because this
sort of inference is performed, we may say, outside the theoty or hypothesis, which is the very
thing we want to conclude), confirrnatory scientific inferences, there are those performed inside
scientific theories and aimed to go from the theory’s basic priniples to the derived ones. It is
through these inferences that predictions and traditionally, but flot non-controversiahly,
explanations of singular facts and explanations of derived laws arc obtained. These inferences,
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whch we may cail inte,7aÏ scientfic infrrences, have been traditionally understood as being
strictly deductive.
Ibis deductive view of internai scientific inferences was incorporated in its most precise form
by Hempel and Paul Oppenheim’s deductive-nonmological (D-N) model of scientific explanation,
first published in 1948’. According to the D-N model, explanations and predictions of singular
facts are deductive arguments whose premises are tme, have empirical content, and contain at least
one general law essential for the derivation of the conclusion2. Later on, in 1962, Hempel proposed
what, according to him, would account for the scientific explanations that clearly could flot be
fitted into the D-N model: the inductive-statistical (I-S) mode)3. The general schema of I-S
scientific explanations is the following:
P(G,F)r
Fb
[r]
Gb
Here the first premise is a statistical law asserting that the relative frequency of Gs among Fs is r, r
being close to 1, the second stands for b having the property f, and the expression ‘[r]’ next to the
double line represents the degree of inductive probability conferred on the conclusion by the
premises. We notice that even though the probability value of the statistical law and the argument
are identical, they are not the same sort of probability: while the flrst stands for a statistical nomic
connection between two properties of objects, the second stands for a relation of evidential support
between premises and conclusions. Because of that the model is called inductive-statistical.
If we ask, for instance, why John Jones (to use Hempel’s favorite example) recovered quickly
from a streptococcus infection, we would have the following argument as the answer;
P(G,fAH)=r
fb A Hb [r]
Gb
where f stands for having a streptococcus infection, H for administration of penicillin, G for quick
recovery, b is John Jones, and r is a number close to 1. Given thit penicillin tvas administrated in
John Jones case (Hb) and that most (but flot ail) streptococcus infections clear up quickly tvhen
treated with penicillin (P(G,FAH) = r), the argument above constitutes the explanation for John
Jones’s quick recovery.
‘Hempel & Oppenheim (1948).
2 It is important to note that to Hempel, predictions and explanations of singular facts have the same logical
structure. Yhe only difference between them is that while in an exrlanation the conclusion of the inference is
already known, in a prediction it is unknown. Sec Hempel (1965). pp. 366-376.
Hempel (1962).
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However, it is known that certain strains of streptococcus bacilli are resistant to penicillin. If it
turns out that John Jones is infected with such a strain of bacilli, then the probability of bis quick
recovery afier treatment of penicillin S 10w. In that case, we could set up the following inductive
argument:
P(G, FAHAJ) = r’
Fb A 1fb A Jb [r ]
Gb
or, equivalently,
P(-1G, FAHAJ) l-r’
fb A Hb A lb
[l-r’]
where J stands for the penicillin-resistant character of the streptococcus infection and r’ is a number
close to zero (consequentiy, 1 — r’ is a number close to 1.) This situation exemplifies what Hempel
cailed explanatory or inductive ambigttities. In the case of John Jones’s penicillin-resistant
infection, we have two inductive arguments where the premises of each argument are logicaily
compatible and the conclusion is the same. Nevertheiess, in one argument the conclusion is
strongly supported by the premises, whereas in the other the premises strongly undermine the sarne
conclusion.
Since the publication of Hempel’s paper, many attempts to solve this probiem were proposed.
It should 5e remarked that since philosophers working on the field of scientific explanation are
obviously concemed with explanation and not with induction, their solutions to the problem of
explanatoiy ambiguities are flot necessarily solutions to the problem of inductive ambiguities.
Among ail models of explanation, only those which take inference as the key concept of scientific
explanation may be of interest here. And among these inferential models, only those that admit the
existence of non-deductive explanations can give us hope to solve the problem of inductive
ambiguities4. Given this, we will concentrate exclusively on the solution given by Hempel.
Hempel tried to solve the problem of ambiguities by proposing a requirement, called by him
the reqtdrement of maximal specficity or RM$, which every inductive argument is supposed to
satisfy to 5e classified as an authentic explanation5. The RMS vas meant basically to prevent the
property or class F (to be used in the explanation ofGb) from having a subclass F’, let us say, such
that the relative frequency of Gs among F’s is different from P(G,F), In other words, in order to be
used in an explanation, the class F must be homogeneous with respect to G. Clearly enough,
For an overview of the problem of inductive ambiguities inside scientific explanation see Salmon (1989),
chaps. 2 and 3. Sec also Coffa (1970).
Hempel (1965), p. 400. Later on, in order ta response ta a counterexample ta P21S construed by Richard
Grandy, Hempel proposed a modifled version of the RMS called RMS*. Sec Hempel (1968).
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Hempel’s solution is able te deal only with those conïlicts taking place between a class and one of
its suhclasses. Moreover, il lias the obvious consequence of limiting our inferentiai power. first, ah
cases of ambiguities involving non-inclusive classes wihl be blocked by the PJ\IS. Second, even
regarding those cases the RMS was meant for, only in those rare situations where we have a quite
complete knowledge about the properties at hand is that we can infer something6.
Even tliough it was inside the field of scientific explanation that most of the research on the
problem of inductive ambiguities was donc, it is important te note that it is flot an exclusivity of
internai scientific inferences. Elsewhere, Hempel has explained the same problem from the
viewpoint of confirmation7. That the problem of inductive ambiguities can be explained from the
viewpoint of both internal and extemai inductive inferences is flot surprising. Being inductive
arguments, the explanatory/predictive inferences may also be seen as sorts of confirmatory
inferences. In the example above, we concluded that (1) it is higffly probable that John Joncs will
recover quicIdy based on the information that (2) he has a streptococcus infection, (3) he took
penicilhin and that (4) most streptococcus infections clear up quicldy tvhen treated with penicillin.
As the inference concerning penicilhin-resistant bacilli shows, conclusion (1) may be defeated in
the presence of additional information. Therefore (2)-(4) do not prove or establish (1) conclusively,
but just serve as evidences to it. Therefore, forgetting about whether or net we know the truth-vaiue
of(1) and taking only the inferential relation between it and (2)-(4), we can fairiy name (1) and (2)-
(4), respectively, hypothesis and evidences.
This shows that the arising of contradictions is not due te the purpose with winch the inductive
inference is performed, but in fact to its non tmth-preserving nature. Te make tins point clearer,
consider two consistent sets of premises, A and B, each of them deductively related te the
conciusions cx and f3, respectively. Since A and B are consistent, there is at ieast one interpretation
that satisfies both sets of propositions. Let us caii tins interpretation I. Aise, since the relation
between A and B and their respective premises is tmth-preserving, I satisfies both cx and (3.
Therefore, cx and (3 are necessarily consistent. On the other hand, if the inferential hinks between A
and cx and B and (3 are net deductive but inductive, we cannet be sure that cx and (3 wil be satisfied
by I. Consequently, since there is ne guarantee that there exists t least one interpretation able te
satisl’ simultaneously cx and f3,there is ne guarantee of consistency between them. In other words,
giving up truth-preservingness imphies opening the door te ambiguities: even when the premises of
two induçtive inferences are consistent, they may give evidential support te contradictory
conclusions.
See Silvestre & Pequeno (2004).
Hempel (1960) and (1966).
Given the above discussion, it is expected that the problem of inductive ambiguities have
appeared in other fields like AI which are aiso concemed with inductive inferences. Not
surprisingly, the very sanie problem of inductive ambiguities (naturally under a different label) has
been one of the main concems of AI theorists working on the formalization of commonsense
reasoning. It lias been identified in connection with most ofthe noumonotonic formalizations, such
as Reiter’s default logic, McDermott-Doyle’s non-monotonic logic and McCarthy’s
circumscriptive logic8. To many Ai experts such as D. Israel, Donald Perlis and Tarcisio Pequeno,
the arising of inconsistencies is flot simply an unfortunate feature of the available formalisms, but
in fact an inevitable and essential characteristic of commonsense reasoning9. As Pequeno wrote10:
Inconsistency and nonmonotonic reasoning play complementary roles in the common sense
reasoning. Nonmonotonic reasoning can Iead to contradictions and to achieve them is just to
give the right account for the situation. [...J The achievement of contradictory conclusions is a
natural, and possibly unavoidable, companion of nonmonotonic reasoning.
b exemplify this, let us consider one of the most important sorts of commonsense reasoning
discussed in AI literature: the so-called defauÏt reasoning. Consider an expanded version of the
exampie of Twenty given in the last section (winch is an instance of defauli reasoning) where we
have two default statements (that is, statements of the form “usually A’s are B’s.”), one universal
statement and a singular fact: (1) usually animais do flot fly; (2) usualiy birds fly; (3) bfrds are
animals; (4) Twenty is a bird. If we use (2) along with (4) tve will conclude that Twenty flues. But
if rather we use (1) along with (3), (4) and modusponens, we will get the contradictory conclusion
that Twenty does not fly.
Akin to John Jones’ case, we know in the above exampie that one of the contradictory
conclusions is the right one. In the same way that patients infected with penicillin-resistant bacilli
exceptionally do not recover quickly; it is taie that animals usuaily do not fly, but birds are an
exception to that. Naturally then, the efforts of both Ai researchrs and philosophers of science
were directed towards the elaboration of mechanisms that could prevent the arising of these
undesired, anomalous conclusions. It is not surprising then that Ai theorists have named the first
sort of inconsistency probiem to be recognized inside a non-monotonic fornialism — Reiter’s
defauit logic — theproblem ofanomatous extensions.
h is important to note that it is flot always the case that we are able to know winch one of the
statisticai laws or defauh statements bas priority over the other. Since inductive reasoning is
intrinsically reasoning in the presence of incomplète information, it may liappen that we simply do
Reiter (1980), McDennott & Doyle (1980), McCarthv (1980). Sec Perlis (1987).
9See Israei (1980). Perlis (1987) and Pequeno (1990).
Pequeno (1990), pp. 2 and 4.
‘ Monis (1938).
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flot know which of the two contradictory conclusions is the right one. In order to illustrate that, we
give two very simple examples taken from both AJ and philosophy of science literature. Consider
first two default statements saying that usually Quakers are pacifists and usually republicans are
bellicose. But if we take Richard Nixon, who vas both a Quaker and a republican, we will be able
to conclude that lie is a pacifist and that lie is a bellicose, that is, a non-pacifist. Second, consider
two statistical laws saying that most Texans are millionafres and most philosophers are flot
millionaires. But if we take our old friend John Jones, who happens to be a Texan philosopher, we
will be able to conclude that John Jones is a millionaire and lie is flot millionaire’2. Supposing that
in these two exarnples the mentioned statements are the only information we possess, we will have
no choice but to admit our incapability to decide which one of the contradictory conclusions is the
right or desirable one.
The similarity between the two above-mentioned examples is flot mere coincidence. That is
stiil a relatively unexplored issue, but due to the very fact that default reasoning and inductive
statistical explanation both deal with inductive inferences, they are in a very important sense
different manifestations of the same problem’3. Even though tins point may look quite obvious to
many (ourselves included), it may be worthy to talk a little bit about it. One of the ways to see the
similarities between the two sorts of reasoning is to characterize them in terms of evidential
support. We have afready done this in connection with explanatory reasoning. Regarding default
reasoning, take the first version of our Twenty example. There, we concluded that (1) (it is
plausible that) Twenty flues based on the information that (2) it is a bird and (3) usually birds fly.
But again, Twenty may be a penguin and flot be able to fly. Therefore, (2)-(3) do not conclusively
show (1) to be tme, but, we may say, just give evidence for it. So, akin to what we have done in
John Jones example, we may fairly cali (1) the hypothesis and (2)-(3) the evidences. We remark
that tins translation of any sort of inductive reasoning in terms of hypothesis and evidences is in
accordance with our decision to explicate “is plausible that a” through “there are evidences for ce.”
Another classical philosophical problem concemed with ambiguities is the famous lotteiy
paradox, first formulated in 1961 by Henry Kyburg’4. As mentioned before (Chapter 2), the lottery
paradox appeared initially as a consequence ofthe attempts to detach inductive conclusions, taking
them as reasonable or acceptable beliefs. If we do like most inductivists and take the logical
confirmation relation as a probability function, one of the most straightforward ways to formulate a
so-called mie of acceptance will be that winch takes highly probability as our criterion of
acceptance:
12 These examples are due to Reiter & Criscuolo (1931) and Coffa (1974), respectively.
Sec for instance Tan (1997).
k Kybur (1961).
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h is rationally accepted if and oniy if there is some e such that P(h,e) 0.9 (or some other high
value) and some total evidence criterion is satisfledt5.
Now, consider a lottery with a million tickets that is assumed to be administrated fafrly. Since there
is a probability of 0.999 on this evidence that ticket no. 1 will not tvin, we can rationaliy accept
statement “ticket no. 1 wiIi flot win.” The same of course is valid for ail other tickets. But if cx and
f3 are both accepted or rationally warranted, it is reasonable to suppose that Œ A f3 is aiso so.
Therefore, vie will have to take the statement “ticket no. 1 xviii flot xvin & ticket no. 2 will flot win
&
... & ticket no. 1000 wiÏi not win” as rationally warranted. Consequently, vie have to accept as
true the hypothesis that the lotteiy will have no winner, which contradicts our initial assumption
that the lotteiy is a fair one.
This same paradox may be formulated in connection with die-tossing. If we take our threshold
level of acceptance as being 0.8, for exarnple, then we xviii have to accept ail six statements “this
fafr and normal die wili not corne up j when tossed”, i=1,. . .,6. But if vie accept the conjunction of
these six staternents as equaliy reasonable, we xviii have to admit the absurd conclusion that it is
reasonabie to belief that no side at ail wiil corne up affer our fair die is tossed’6.
In contrast to the first problem of inductive inconsistencies, the above contradictions apparently
do flot rest soleiy on the non tmth-preserving feature of inductive inferences. Beyond the
assumption that it is not rational to accept or beiieve in an inconsistent proposition, the lottery
paradox depends on two more postulates: the mie of acceptance itself, which says when a statement
is to be rationaily accepted, and a sort of acceptance conjunction principle which states that if cx and
f3 are both accepted statements then cx A f3 is also so. Another important point is that the paradox
seems at first glance to belong to that class of “two-all draw” inconsistencies, that is to say, those
cases where the knowledge at hand does flot give us means to decide for any one of the
contradictory conclusions. Like our Texan-phiiosopher and republican-Quaker examples, we are
flot ready to give up neither the conclusion that at least one ticket xviii win nor the conclusion that
no ticket will win.
For our purposes here, it suffices to mention four main paths one may follow in order to solve
the lottery paradox. The first one is to try to formulate some other acceptance mie (stili under a
numerical probabilistic framework) that would prevent the paradox from arising. Keith Lehrer bas
u P(h,e) represents the conditional probability of h given e. Most formulations of the lotteiy paradox
disregard cornpietely the need of satis’ing some sort of total evidence criterion. Exception to this can be
found in Cohen (1989a). As we have shown however, any formulation o(detaching) inductive inference that
do flot do this sort of requirement is prone to be mistaken.
° Sec Resoher (1976). pp. 35-36.
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followed this path’7. A second one is flot to put too much emphasis on the mie of acceptance but
rather to postulate the thesis that warrant judgments do flot respect the conjunction principle: we
can inTer that each ticket vill iose but we cannot go on and inTer from this that ail tickets wiII lose.
Kyburg bas been the main defender of this approach’8. The third approach is to keep the
conjunction principle unchanged but to restrict (even more) ouï inferential power by saying that in
conflicting cases no detachment whatsoever is possible. Hintildca and more recently John Pollock
and R. Stainaker have adopted this way19. Stiil a fourth, flot so far well-explored way is to drop the
principle of contradiction and admit the acceptance of inconsistent statements without trivializing
the logical theory. Kyburg bas recently investigated this possibility in connection with the main
available paraconsistent logics20. In the next section we will examine the implications of each one
ofthese approaches (with the exception ofthe fixst) to ouï analysis ofthe notion ofplausibility.
Many authors such as H. Heidelberger, francis Dauer and Pollock have taken the lottery
paradox as a decisive argument against numericai acceptance mies and for the thesis that the
concept of warrant as used in the context of Imowiedge daims 5 stmcturally different from that of
probabiiity as defined by the probability calculus21. If these philosophers were right in arguing that
the lottery paradox evidences the inadequacy of the numerical approach, then a purely qualitative
approach would not be susceptible to the same sort of problem. In fact, this is one of the arguments
John McCarthy and Pat Hayes used in thefr classical 1969 paper to defend the use of qualitative
models of knowledge representation in M22. However, the same sort of problem bas been recentiy
shown to be present also in connection with traditional qualitative approaches to commonsense
reasoning23. To iliustrate this we will cite an example due to Donaid Perlis and named by him the
paradox ofthe Zookeeper. Consider a zookeeper who takes care of exactly 1000 birds and happens
to have strong evidences for the hypothesis that at least one of them is iii. 0f course he still knows
that usually birds fly. If he makes use ofthis default statement he will be able to conclude for eveiy
one of the 1000 birds that (it is plausible or worth believing that) it flues. Taking then the
conjunction of these 1000 conclusions lie will have that (it is plausible that) ail birds fly, which
contradicts the initial hypothesis that at least one of them is incapable offlying24.
0f course one may object that ail the above paradoxes are due to the veiy specific
characteristics of the situations in question, where there is always one assumption (the faimess of
Lehrer (1970).
18 Kyburg (1964), (1970) and (1997).
‘ Hintikka & Hilpinen (1966), Pollock (19$?), Stainaker (1984).
20 Kyburg (1997).
21 Heidelberger (1963), Dauer (1980), Pollock (1983).
22 McCarthv & Hayes (1969).
Sec Perlis (1987) and Poole (1991).
24 Perlis (1987).
the lottery, the necessity ofat least on side ofthe die to corne up, and the illness ofone of the birds)
that contradicts the conjunction of the inductive conclusions. That is to say’, it is nothing more than
the resuit of an unhappy combination of more or Iess artificial conditions, adding nothing to our
understanding of the problem of inductive inconsistencies. As a preliminary response to this2, we
can mention the formulation that some authors have made of a lottery-like paradox which shows
that, independently of the sort of situation one is dealing with, any fair account of (epistemic)
inductive reasoning is sure to arrive at contradictions. By faix account of inductive reasoning we
mean an account that takes into consideration what Periis called introspective indttctive
reasoning26, that is to say, the awareness of the error-prone feature of inductive reasoning.
Since inductive conclusions may be mistaken even when its premises are certain (something
the very past use of such sort of inference has shown), any fair account of inductive reasoning
should have as premise an axiom saying that, independentÏy of the circumstance we are working
on, it is plausible that one of the beliefs we now take as rationai is false. Let ? represent the
plausibility or acceptability of statements and {a1, ..., a} a set of statements such that, for
i=l,. . .,n, (ct1)? is true. In this way, the mentioned axiom can be represented the formula (—(c.t A
A an))?. But if ail a’s are plausible, then their conjunction should also be so: (at A ... A a11)?. We
therefore have a contradiction. Kyburg has used tins paradox as one more argument against the
conjunction principle, and D. Israel has used it to argue for the inconsistency of commonsense
reasoning27. Elsewhere, a very similar paradoxical situation has appeared under the name of
paradox ofthe preface28.
3.2 The Skeptical and Credulous Approaches to Induction
What ail the discussion of the preceding section shows is that inconsistencies are sure to appear
when one deals with inductive conclusions. They are not an accidentai phenomenon conceming
some sorts of application, but rather something inherent to inductive reasoning. But if tins is so,
how then are we to proceed when faced with inconsistencies?
Before answering tins question, we need to make explicit a distinction we have aiready
mentioned between those inconsistencies which are due to the inability of our formai devices to
block the undesired conclusions, and those winch we have classified as “two-ali draw”
inconsistencies, that is to say, inconsistencies which are due to the very nature of our knowledge
25 The rest of the response will be given in Section 3.3, where we will show the relevance of the notion of
sceptical plausibility or acceptance for the task ofexplicating the notion ofplausibility.
26 PerÏis (1987). As a matter offact, Perlis uses in this paper the terni “introspective default reasoning,” rather
“introspective inductive reusoning.”
27 Kvburg (1997), p. 113 and Israel (1980).
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situation, which does flot supply any means for us to decide for one of the contradictory
conclusions. For the first sort of case the answer to our question is obvious: find a more powerful
representational tool able to draw just the intended conclusion. Concerning the second one, the
situation is flot so easy. Since in the light of the available knowiedge both of the contradictory
conclusions seem to be equally well supported by the evidences, the wanted solution of choosing
one ofthe conclusions is simply unrealizable.
Independently of adopting a qualitative or a quantitative account, it seems to us that there are
two broad ways one can deal with this question. The first one is to adopt a skepticat or cautious
position and flot to allow any sort of ambiguity. Even in the case where two hypotheses are equally
supported by the available evidence, if they contradict each other, both of them are to be rejected.
A skeptical posture regarding the lotteiy paradox, for instance, would not unable us to conclude
anything whatsoever about our 1.000 tickets: since they contradict each other, none of them will be
take as sound conclusions. The other possible way is, through the adoption of a credttlotts or brave
position, to accept any sort of inductive conclusion and tly to somehow manage the arising of
contradictory conclusions. In our lottexy example, this would mean that, independently of the
logicai result that this may entail, ail the 1.000 conclusions about our iottery tickets are to be taken
as sound conclusions.
Let K 5e a consistent set of statements. Supposing the existence of some inductive mechanism
of inference (closed under deduction) to be applied to the members of K, we name each maximal
consistent set of conclusions obtained from K an extension29. The cases where there is more than
one extension mean that ambiguities are obtained from K. Whilc a skeptical treatment implies to
take as sound only those inferences whose conclusions belong to the intersection of all extensions,
a credulous one recognizes as sound every inference whose conclusion belongs to the union of the
extensions30. We will name these two positions regarding the way one may deal with “two-all
draw” contradictions the skepticat approach to indttction and the credutotis approach to induction.
An irnmediate consequence of that is that, if we do like we are doing here and decide to attach
the label “plausible” to the conclusions of inductive inferences, then we vil1 have two different
ways of evaluating the plausibility of a statement. While the first, skeptical one will take as
plausible only those statements which are consistent with all others inductive conclusions (in other
words, those which belong to ail extensions) the second, credulous one will take any inductive
29 Makinson (1965).
29 The terrn “extension” is boffowed from nonrnonotonic logic terminology.
30 It should be observed that even though from a strict point ofview these two approaches make sense only in
connection with “two-all draw” cases of inconsistencies, they can be adopted as general guidelines to be
followed in any sort of inconsistency. In fact, having not alwavs been able to realize that their study cases
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conclusion as plausible no matter what its relation with the other conclusions is (in other words,
everything that belongs to at least one extension.) As a resuit of these two ways of saying when a
statement is plausible, the inevitable conclusion is that the notion of plausibility is in fact what we
may term a twofold concept, formed by two different but intimately connected notions of
plausibility: the skeptical plattsibility and the credtttous ptausibility.
According to the way we are taking the plausibility of a statement a, namely as meaning “there
are evidences for a,” these skeptical and credulous plausibility notions can be distinguished from
each other by reference to what will count as evidence. While in the credulous approach the
knowledge ofthe tmth of the evidences along with the satisfaction of some total evidence condition
is enough to classify the hypothesis as plausible, the skeptical one requires more: the hypothesis
must be consistent with ail other inductive conclusions. If that is flot the case, even when the
premises are known to be tme and the total evidence condition at hand is satisfled, the premises
cannot be taken as evidences for the hypothesis.
This can be more precisely put by bringing together the authority-oriented approach to
plausibility mentioned in the iast chapter and the notion of extension just expiained. More
specifically, we can say that each extension is a consistent set of statements representing the views
of some leading experts about issues belonging to his domain of research. Since the opinions of
such experts may be wrong, their conclusions should not be taken as certain, but just as plausible.
The existence of more than one extension wili amount to the existence of divergences or
contradictions between the views of two or more experts. To an outsider then, there will be two
ways of evaluating the plausibility of statements conceming the field at hand: skepticaliy, requiring
ah experts to agree on the statement, and credulously, requfring at ieast one of them to hold it.
While for the first approach evidence is something very strong, nameÏy, the consensus among the
experts, for the second one it is much weaker: just the confonnity of at least one expert. Because of
that, we wihl sometimes refer to the skeptical and credulous plausibility notions, respectively, as the
strongplausibility and the weakptausibitity.
From a generai point ofview, we can say that the credulous and skeptical approaches represent,
respectively, minimizing and maximizing strategies of truth assessing. According to the exposed in
the last paragraph, if one adopts a credulous position he wihl flot require too much to accept a
statement a as plausible. If we follow rnany logicians and decide to use 1 to represent tmth (and O
to represent falsehood), this can 5e restated by sayina that he will sornehow try to maxiinize or
bning close to 1 the tntth-value of statements like “a is plausible.” On the other hand, if one adopts
a skeptical positional, he xviii be more demanding in the matter of accepting n as plausible, which
could be solved by developing more powerftil formalisms, philosophers and AI theorists have rnany times
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means that he will try to minirnize or bring close to O the truth-value of statements like “a is
plausible.” Therefore, while adopting a skeptical position means to be strict in the matter of
accepting something as true, in our case the plausibility of sentences, adopting a credulous one
means to be tolerant, not so demanding in the matter of taking something as truth. Because of that,
we vill also refer to the skeptical and credulous points ofview as, respectively, the minimal and the
maximal positions.
The reference to the authority-oriented approach to plausibility is significant because it
incorporates a very important aspect of the theory of induction and plausibility: the idea of a
plttraÏity of ways to achieve the same goal. This of course bas to do with the picture where several
experts are trying to evaluate, according their own criteria (which may of course be different and
even incompatible with each other), the truth-value of a specific set of propositions. The same
plurality effect could be obtained if we replaced the experts by several competing theories trying to
account for the same range of physicai phenomena. In this case, while a skeptical view would mean
to accept as plausible a statement only if it is implied by ail competing theories, a credulous one
would mean to consider as plausible eveiy statement that is implied by at least one theory. Another
plurality-oriented situation is the one where an annalist, for example, has to make a decision based
on the consideration of the different ways a specific situation may evolve. In this case, he will have
at bis disposai several incompatible scenarios on which he can base bis decision. While by adopting
a creduious strategy he would take as valuable ail facts present in any one of the scenarios, by
adopting a skeptical strategy he would consider only those facts present in ail scenarios. We wiil
call this way of explicating the notion of plausibility the ptttrality approach to plattsibility.
Conceming inductive inferences and the arising of ambiguities, the extensions — consistent sets
grouping the conclusions of an inductive mechanism of inference
— may be said to represent
different ways the conclusions may be extracted. We will have then a similar sort of plurality
where each extension can be though of as a plausible scenario. In the case of a Texan philosopher
knowledge situation, for example, we will have at least two different plausible scenarios: one in
winch John Jones is millionaire and other in winch he is not. The important question here however
is flot which scenario is the right one, for, as we have seen, we do not have means to decide
between them, but instead Ïiow to proceed given this ignorance of ours and tue mentionedpÏuraÏity
ofscenarios.
This brings us to the important relation that exists between induction, plausibiÏity and the
skeptical and credulous approaches to induction. As far as we reason inductively, we are sure to
an-ive at contradictory conclusions and therefore at a plurality of scenarios. But due to the lack of
stuck to ccc cf these tvo paths.
Ç-)
criterion of preference to choose one these scenarios, we have, as a matter of acting, to consider at
least the skeptical and the credulous positions. Deciding then to cail the conclusions of inductive
inferences plausible facts vi1l force us to deal with two plausibility concepts: a skeptical, strong or
cautious plausibility and a credulous, weak or brave plausibility. The skeptical and credulous
positions, wbich can 5e made explicit with the help of the two corresponding plausibility concepts,
can be said then to be the minimal, necessary approaches that ail answers to the mentioned question
shouid include. In other words, we cannot daim to have properly exphcated the notions of
induction and plausibility without having gone also through these skeptical and creduious
approaches to induction. As we viil sec in Chapter 5, a good part of our theory of plausibihty will
be devoted to the anaiysis of the intrinsic characteristics of these skepticai and creduious
approaches to induction materialized in the notions of skeptical plausibility and credulous
plausibility.
Traces of these two approaches can be found in both philosophicai and M literature of
induction. Most of the time however, theorists have adopt exclusively one of the two approaches
without neither taldng into consideration nor being conscious about the reasonableness of the other
approach. Usually, when some sort of distinction was made, it was on a meta-theoretical level. for
instance, M theorists working in the fieid ofnonmonotonic logic have used the distinction between
the credulous and the skeptical approaches to classify the different sorts of formalisms to
conunonsense reasoning3t. It is wideiy acknowledged among Al theorists that whiie Reiter’s
default logic uses a sort of credulous approach, McCarthy circumscriptive logic takes a skeptical
one. However, as pointed out by David Makinson, this classification is more due to an historicai
accident than to an intrinsic feature of these systems, for it is aiways possible to use these systems
either under a skepticai perspective or under a credulous one32.
Aiso very seldom the awareness of these two approaches has given risc to a conceptuai
distinction between the skeptical and credulous concepts of piausibility. The oniy exception seems
to be the work of Pequeno and bis collaborators, who identified both approaches and their
respective plausibility concepts as well as incorporated them inside a sole ftamework33. Even
though with a somehow different motivation and using another methodology, the distinction made
by Pequeno between the skepticai and the credulous notions of piausibility is the same as the one
we are making here. Incidentally, our formai analysis of induction and plausibility will be strongiy
influenced by Pequeno’s approach. The description of Pequeno’s Iogical systems as weli as the
‘ D. McDermott (1982) was the flrst to propose a specific terminoiogy to make such sort of distinction. He
used the ternis cautious (for skeptical) and brave (for credulous), but others ternis such as “conservative” and
“liberal” and our “skeptical” (or “scepticai”) and “credulous” have also been used. Sec Ginsberg (1994) and
Makinson (1994).
Makinson (1994).
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relevant references will be given in the next chapter. In the rest of this section and in the next one
we tvill try to localize in the relevant literature references to this methodological and conceptual
dichotomy in hopes of identifying the most relevant features of our two plausibility concepts.
In his classical paper ‘Studies in the Logic of Confirmation” of 1945, Cari Hempel proposed a
set of necessary conditions that any definition of confirmation is supposed to satisfy. By definition
of confirmation he meant any way of saying, for any pair of evidence and hypothesis e-h, whether
or flot e confu-ms (or inductively supports) h. Among the conditions he lays down, one of them
along with its two most important consequences have been particularly controversial34:
(8.3) Consistency Condition: Every iogically consistent observation report is logically
compatible with the class of ail the hypotheses which it confirms.
The two most important implications of this requfrement are the foilowings:
(8.3 1) Unless an observation report is self-contradictory, it does not confirm any hypothesis
with which it is not logically compatible.
(8.32) Unless an observation report is self-contradictoiy, it does not confirm any hypotheses
winch contradict each other.
The reason of the controversy is described by Hempel himself Right after the above quotation he
adds35:
The first ofthese corollaries will readily be accepted; the second, however,— and consequently
(8.3) itself—will perhaps be feit to embody a too severe restriction. It might be pointed out, for
example, that a fmite of set of measurements concerning the variation of one physical
magnitude, x, with another, y, may conform to, and tins be said to confirm, several different
hypotheses as to the particular mathematical functions in terms of winch the relationship of x
andy can be expressed; but such hypotheses are incompatible because to at least one value ofx,
they will assign different values ofy.
However, even afler admitting the polemic side of(8.31) as well as the possibility “to liberalize the
formai standards” by “dropping (8.3) and (8.32) and retaining only (8.3l).36, Hempel decides at
the end to maintain bis original formulation. The important point for us is that Hempel’s two
options of keeping (8.3 1) and rejecting it are respectively related to what we have called the
skeptical and credulous positions. If we decide to keep (8.31), in the case where e gives inductive
support to both h and h’ but h and h’ happen to be mutually inconsistent, we are not allowed to say
neither that e confirms h nor that it confirms h’. Consequently, even if e is tnie (or certain) and the
requirement of total evidence (or some other total evidence condition) is satisfied we cannot say
Sec Pequeno & Buchsbaurn (1991), Martins (1997) and Buchsbaum et al (2004).
Hempel (1945), p. 105. The italics are in the original. In Section 6.4, ve wiIi analyze these and the others
conditions laid down bv Hempel in the light of a purely descriptive approach to induction.
Ibid, pp. 105-106.
Incidentally, as pointed out by rnany authors and acknowledged by Hempel hirnself, the satisfaction of the
other conditions (81) and (8.2) along with (8.31) logicaliy implies the satisfaction of (8.3). Sec Coffa(1970).
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that h and h’ are plausible. Converseiy, if we drop (8.3 1) we are allowed to have in the same set of
C plausible facts contradictory hy-potheses.
vIany authors such as Carnap, Popper ai-id Feyerabend have urged against the tenability of
(8.32). The whole point of course is centered around the arising of contradictions. As Hempel
himself adruitted, we feu that (3.32) is a too strong condition exactly because it prohibits the
inevitable cases where the same piece of evidence inductively supports two contradictory
hypotheses. According to the ordinary notion of confirmation that layrnen and scientists have in
mmd, the same (consistent) body of evidence do sometimes confirm contradictory hypothesis. Let
a, f3 and (p be three pieces of evidence belonging to the same (consistent) body of evidence in such
a way that, according to some criterion of confirmation, Œ, f3 and (p confirrn, respectively, ct’, f3’
and (p’. Suppose still that CL’ and f3’ are mutuaily inconsistent. Accepting (8.32) then entails the
disappointing conclusion that even though CL and f3 are supposed to conflrm a’ and f3’ by the same
criterion that ( confirms p’, we are not entitled at ail to say that such confirmation occurs. A
credulous approach then seems to be what Carnap, Popper and feyerabend had in mmd when they
criticize (8.32) as well as the rationale behind Hempel’s alternative of dropping (8.3) and (8.32)
and retaining (8.31).
Despite the intuitive appeal, as the lottery paradox shows, the credulous approach bas trivially
a very problematic side: if we allow every sort of inductive conclusions, we are sure to arrive at
inconsistencies. We could of course go further and ask why inconsistencies are problematic, but
that seems to be a worthless point. Afler ail, it is because ofthe inconsistencies that the whoie thing
is seen as paradoxical. How then AI theorists and philosophers have deait with that in their
attempts to account creduiously for the problem of inductive ambiguities? One very common way
adopted by M theorists and weil exemplifled by Reiter’s default logic is to admit contradictory
hypothesis but not to bring them together. That is formally obtained by keeping the extensions
(which are consistent sets of statements) both from the semanticai as well as from the syntacticai
level separated from each other. Supposing the existence in the formai language of a piausibiiity
modal operator, this wouid have the consequence of restricting the universe of discourse to one
extension at each time in such a way that one would not be able to utter statements ofthe kind “CL is
plausible & —cc is plausible.” Each one of these sub-sentences could be uttered, but just inside
different extensions.
In a very important sense, this solution adopted by Reiter bas the disadvantage of flot strictly
satisfring Camap’s requhement of total evidence: in the cases vhere both u and —ct are plausible,
because they are kept separated from each other we will flot be able to use hoth in the same
Camap (1962), pp. 476-47$, Popper (1959), p. 374. Feyerabend (1962). pp. 2-97.
inferential chain. Consequently, important parts of the available knowledge may be left out of the
solution of problems which depend on such sort of inferential procedure.38 Because of that, some
authors have acknowiedged that this approach does not embody, strictly speaking, a credulous
position. Makinson, for example, has created another expression to designate this sort of approach
— choice perspective
— and reserved the term “liberal” to a stricter one where the union of ail
extensions will effectively be considered as the set of plausible facts39. It is interesting to see bis
opinion about this liberal perspective, which reflects well the traditional view conceming a truly
credulous approach: “The liberal perspective is also possible in principle, but is far less interesting:
under most [formai systems], whenever there is more than one extension their union is
inconsistent.”40
In the context of the lotteiy paradox, Kyburg has provided a credulous account that, despite the
criticisms, gives some important hints about how to refttte Makinson’s daim41. We have seen that a
way of solving the lottery paradox is to reject that the conjunction principle can be applied to
acceptance daims. According to this view, the fact that a is acceptable and 3 is also acceptable
does flot warrant us to conclude that a A f3 is acceptable. The solution to our problem then cornes
trivially: even though we may have that a is acceptable and that —cc is acceptable, we could not
conciude that (a A —‘a) is acceptable. That is the way Kyburg daims to have solved the lotteiy
paradox. As a matter of fact, one of his main theses is that the principle of conjunction is to be
banished from the iogical study of knowledge daims:
we shouid be cautions about proceeding from the acceptance of p1 and the acceptance of
P2 to the acceptance of their conjunction. But that is something we knew all along: acceptability
is not adjunctive. An argument that used enough empirical premises (say, a million), could
surely use premises that are individualiy acceptable, but lead to a completely unacceptable
conclusion.42
In M, some theorists have also held a similar opinion. Afier analyzing Pollock’s theoiy, Kevin
Korb for example concludes the following: “A philosophy which endorses the Conjunction
Principle, therefore, can hardly serve as a framework for developing an artificial intelligence that
leams inductively about its world.”43
Some philosophers such as Lehrer and Jonathan Cohen have taken the exact opposite
direction44. They maintained that the conjunction of acceptance daims is a very intuitive and
See Pequeno (1990).
Ivlakinson (1994).
° Ibid. p. 38.
See Kyburg (1964) and (1970).
42 Kybcirg (1997), p. 119.
Korb (1992), p. 234.
Lehrer (1970), Cehen (1989a).
indeed necessary principle for the logic of induction. Cohen has given the following exampIe4.
Suppose an art historian declares two pictures to be genuine Vermeers. Intuitively, lie seerns to be
giving us a warranty
— the warranty of an expert — to believe that the first picture is a Vermeer, a
warranty to believe that the second is, and a warranty (ofjust the same nature) to believe that they
both are. Supposing then that the judgment of an expert is a good reason for us to accept a
hypothesis, the daim that we are entitled to accept separately both statements but flot their
conjunction is simply absurd.
Hempel has also supported this view. Among the other conditions laid down by him in bis
1945 paper, one states that “if an observation report confirms every one of a class K of sentences,
then it also confirms any sentence which is a logical consequence of K.”46 Therefore, if cc and f3 are
both acceptable, ail consequences of them, inciuding cc A f3 will aiso be acceptable. Even though in
the mentioned paper he does flot refer to the concept of acceptance, elsewhere, in bis 1962 paper,
he states the same condition as weli as the controversial consistency condition (8.3) — at tins time
without any sort of objection — regarding the acceptance of hypotheses:
(CR1) Any logical consequence of a set of accepted statements is like-wise an accepted
statement; or, K [the set of accepted statements] contains ah logical consequences of any of its
subclasses. [...] (CR2) The set K of accepted statements is logically consistent.47
About the other solutions to the problems of inconsistencies mentioned in the previous section,
Hempei’s RMS, Hintikka’s, Pollock’s and Stalnaker’s ah adopt a skeptical approach. By requiring
the class F to be homogeneots with respect to G, Hempel accepts only those inductive conclusions
that do not generate contradictions. Trivially enough, the RMS vas conceived exactly to prevent
the arising of contradictory explanations. Regarding the mentioned solutions to the lottery paradox,
ail of them, as we have said, solved the paradox by preventing detachment in case of conflict.
Pohlock, for instance, proposed what he calÏed the principle of collective defeat, which basicaily
states that if we have a set of inductive and therefore defeasible conclusions where for each
conclusion there is an argument from the other conclusions and the knowledge situation to its
negation, then none of the conclusions is warranted. As he puts it when speaking about the lottery
paradox:
Intuitively, there is no reason to prefer some of the [inductive conclusions] over the others, 50
we cannot be warranted in believing any of them unless we are warranted in believing all of
them. But we caimot be warranted in believing ail ofthem [because ofthe inconsistency].48
Cohen (1989a), p. 19. We have slightly modified the exampie in order to make Cohen’s point clearer.
° Hempel (1945), p. 103.
Hempel (1962). pp. 151-152.
Pollock (1987). p 494.
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As Kevin Korb has pointed out, in the context ofthe lottery paradox, Pollock’s solution can be
seen as derivative from the contrapositive of our acceptance conjunction principle: if a conjunction
is flot acceptable, then flot ail of its conjuncts are acceptable49. But of course the fact that at least
one of the conjuncts is not acceptable is quite different from ail of conjuncts being unacceptable.
Korb takes this as evidence for the absurdity of Pollock’s principle of collective defeat and
indirectly for the absurdity of our skeptical approach. Such a strong conclusion is clearly due to the
fact that, because of the policy of preventing contradictions by blocking inductive conclusions, the
skeptical approach restricts in a too severe way our inferentiai power. According to Kyburg and
Harman, for example, this sort of solution to the iottery paradox (the one they analyze is
Hintikka’s50) does not model anything recognizable as scientific induction: the price it pays to
avoid contradictions is to restrict acceptance to what are essentiaily redescriptions of the available
evidence51. The conclusion of Korb is that Pollock’s theory is plagued by the same sort ofproblem.
We have elsewhere pointed out the same think regarding Hempei’s RMS2.
To sum up, we may say that an intrinsic feature of the skeptical approach is the acceptance of
the conjunction principle. We have seen how Hempei’s theoiy of confirmation and acceptance —
which, despite flot have been primordially conceived as a solution to the problem of
inconsistencies, addopts a skeptical approach to induction — endorses the conjunction principie.
Pollock also expiicitly defends it. In fact, in the context of inconsistencies the necessity of dropping
the conjunction principie is due to our tolerance regarding inconsistent conclusions. Since the
skeptical approach biocks from the very beginning inconsistent hypothesis, there is no need to
reject such an intuitive principle like that the conjunction of two accepted facts is likewise
accepted.
3.3 PÏausibility and AcceptabiÏity
We have aiready observed that, with exception to some AI scientists, in general theorists working
on the problem of inductive inconsistencies have not been able to clearly distinguish between the
two approaches to induction we are talking about here. The point is that while working on either a
skeptical or credulous approach, most philosophers and lA scientists took their respective
approaches as the solution to the probiem of inductive inconsistencies, without recognizing the
reasonableness of the other one. An example of this is the dispute over the tenability of the
acceptance conjunction pdnciple we have shown in the last section. We are going to argue in this
Korb (1992).
50 Hintikka & Hilpinen (1966).
‘ Kyburg (1970) and Harman (1967).
2 Silvestre & Pequeno (2004).
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section that such quarrel is due to lack of a somehow more global perspective where both
approaches are taken into account. When such position is adopted, the entire dispute is dissolved.
In order to understand why, we have to analyze in more detail the twofold conceptual division we
mentioned at the beginning of the last section between the skeptical and the credulous concepts of
plausibility.
One of the rare occurrences of something akin to the above-mentioned conceptual distinction
can be found in section 87 of Camap’s Logicat foundations ofFrobabitity where Hempel’s theory
of confu-rnation and his conditions of adequacy are analyzed53. Camap points out that Hempel’s
controversy about condition (8.32) is due to a meaning confusion: in contrast with the
unambiguous use Hempel thinks to 5e maldng of the tenu “confirmation,” there are in fact two
quite distinct confirmation concepts involved in his analysis of confirmation. According to Salmon,
who has investigated the Hempel-Camap dispute, this conceptual distinction may be explicated as
follows54:
On the one hand, we may intend to say that the special theory [of relativity] has become an
accepted part of scientific knowledge and that it is very nearly certain in the light of its
supporting evidence. If we admit that scientific hypotheses can have numerical degrees of
confirmation, the sentence, on this constmal, says that the degree of confirmation of the special
theory on the available evidence is high. On the other hand, the same sentence might 5e used to
make a very different statement. li may 5e taken to mean that some particular evidence — e.g.,
observations on the lifetimes of mesons
— renders the special theory more acceptable or better
founded than it was in the absence ofthis evidence.
He cails these two notions respectively the absolute and the relevance senses of confirmation.
While the relevance sense may 5e said to fit into condition (8.32), the absolute one is incompatible
with it55:
[Hempel’s condition 8.32] is suitable for the absolute concept of confirmation, but not for the
relevance concept. for, although no two incompatible hypotheses can have degrees of
confirmation on the same body of evidence, an observation report can be positively relevant to
a number of different and incompatible hypotheses [...] This happens typically when a given
observation is compatible with a number of incompatible hypotheses [...J
The important point here is the explicit recognition of two different conceptual approaches we
may take regarding the appearance of contradictions: a skeptical and a credulous one. The
explanation then for Hempel’s apparently paradoxical behavior of defending both the rejection and
acceptance of (8.32) is that he was unknowingly dealing with two different concepts of
confirmation. Nevertheless, even though Salmon’s relevance and absolute notions of confirmation
can be said to be in accordance with our skeptical and credulous approach, they are not. strictly
Camap (1962), section 87.
Sahmon (1975), p. 5.
ibid. p. 8.
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speaking, skepticai and credulous notions of confirmation. If we attach te the absolute confirmation
degrees inferior or equal te 0.5, for example, it will net satisfy any more (8.32), and if a hypothesis
has a tee high degree of confirmation on the background evidence then, no evidence vill be able te
be relevant both to it and te a hypotheses incompatible with it. Furthermere, these two concepts are
concemed with the logical, and net with the epistemic or pragmatical notion of prebability. Even
though we may say that from the relevance point of view e confines both h and —,h, we cannot say
they are probable or plausible. Aise, the two concepts are net equally appiied te hypotheses and
evidences. While the absolute notion takes a fixed bound to say whether or not e confirms h, the
relevance notion compares the degree of confirmation given by e te h on the presence of
background evidence j with the degree conferred te h by i alone
More recently, Cohen has urged for a distinction between conditions for rationally believingp
and conditions for rationally acceptingp. According to him, the resuit of these two things’ having
been treated indistinguishably in much of the philosophical literature is a “widespread tendency te
ignore the fact that there are many important differences between belief and acceptance, which are
relevant to quite a range of issues in epistemology, the philosophy of science and cognitive
science.”56 While taiking about the controversy over the reasonabieness of the acceptance
conjunction principle and the alleged consequence of the introspective inductive reasoning
(according to winch, since it is plausible that some of our inductive conclusions are mistaken, it is
flot rational to take their conjunction as likewise plausible), he makes use of the mentioned
distinction to show that the whole quarrel rests on a conceptuai misunderstanding57:
But here some rather subtle differences between rationality of belief and justfiabiÏity of
acceptance are in play. We need to check our intuitions rather carefully. It may be rational te
believe
— in the everyday sense of the expression — that one may sometimes err. But if it is
justifiable te accept H1, justifiable te accept H2, ... and justifiable te accept H, it is certainly
justifiable to accept both the conjunction H1&H2&. .&H and also any logical consequence of
that conjunction.
The suggestion implicit in this passage is that while the introspective principle of inductive
reasoning is applicable te beliefs, the conjunction principle apphes to accepted hypothesis.
Consequently, unless acceptability implies belief (what Cohen explicitly denies), no contradiction
vi1l arise. Te see how these features of belief and acceptance give rise te a credulous/skeptical
conceptuai distinction, we need just te require these two principies te be applicable exchtsively te
beliefand acceptance, respectively. Letting ? represent rational beliefand ! justifiable acceptability,
we have then the following picture: (I) (—(H1 A H2 A.. .A H,,))? but net (—(H1 A H7 A,. .A H,,))!; and
(II) from H1!, H,! ... and H,,! we get (H1 A H7 A . . .A H,,)! but from H1?, H7? ... and H,,? we do flot
Cohen (1989b), p. 367.
Cehen (1989a), p. 207. The italies are mine. Sec also Cohen (1936).
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get (H1 A H, A . . .A FIN)?. Without too much effort, we can sec that (I) and (II) are in accordance
with our credulous (or weak) and skeptical (or strong) plausibility concepts. first, by admitting that
it is rational to believe but not to accept that sorne of our inductive conclusions are wrong, (I) sets
rationai belief as something we can arrive at rnuch casier than acceptance. That is to say, our
criterion of acceptance is much stronger than our criterion of rational belief. Second, by restricting
the conjunction principie only to acceptability, (II) at the same time that leaves the path open so
that we may admit contradictory beliefs and therefore have a credulous approach in the style of
Kyburg, restricts acceptability to a skeptical treatrnent in the manner of Pollock. (II) also by itself
resolves the lottery paradox and the controversy over the conjunction principle: supposing that the
data about the lottery is enough for us to belief but not to accept that each one of the tickets wiil
win, we can go on with our reasoning without bothering about inconsistencies and without going
against the intuitiveness of the acceptance conjunction principie.
We have corne then to a quite promising solution to the lotteiy paradox that unites the
credulous and skeptical approaches we have shown in the last section. More specifically, we
recognize the rationale of both positions conceming the conjunction principie and enor-prone
feature of inductive reasoning but applicable to only one of the two plausibility concepts. While
skeptical plausible facts do conjoint but are not susceptible to the error-prone feature of inductive
reasoning, credulous plausible are susceptible to the error-prone feature of inductive reasoning but
do flot conjoint. In this way the whole controversy is dissolved. While for example it is sound to
believe or take as credulously plausible that each one of the tickets will not win, we cannot take as
credulously plausible the statement that says that there will be no winner. On the other hand, if we
could accept or take as skeptically plausible that each one of the tickets wouid not win, it would be
equally acceptable that that there would be no winner.
following Cohen’s suggestion, we will use the term “acceptability” or “acceptance” to refer to
our skeptical notion ofplausibility. We wili also sometimes use the terrn “plausibility” without any
qualification to mean the credulous notion of plausibility. It should be noted that this
terminological choice is flot arbitrary. Indeed, ail terrns we have used so far to refer to our inductive
conclusions could be fairiy classified according to one of the two approaches. As the laymen and
philosopher discourses show, while the tems “piausibility”, “probabiiity” and “rational behef’
intuitively seern to be weaker and more susceptible to a credulous approach, “confirmation” and
“acceptability” seem to be stronger and more subject to a skeptical approach. for instance, to
confirrn literally means to make fim, rigid, which in a semantical context would mean to he so
strongly connected with tmth that any change of opinion regarding a confirmed hypothesis wottld
5e donc only through considerabie effort. The same seems to hold for the term “acceptance.”
Taking for example the expert pluralitv-oriented model we have mentioned earlier, a staternent
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would be skepticaliy plausible if and only if there is a consensus arnong the experts conceming the
proposition in question. But it seems to us that being able to form such sort of consensus is the
outmost criterion of acceptability of scientific or any other kind of hvpothesis. Even though a
hypothesis may flot be certain (which seldom if ever happens) but ail members of the community of
experts in that subject fmd it reasonable, that collective appraisal allows one to take it (the
hypothesis) as accepted58.
A remark we have afready made is that these terms have been many times used by phiiosophers
with no connection at ail with induction. We have afready pointed this out regarding “probability”
and “belief.” As far as “acceptabiiity” is concemed, there is one very common way of
understanding it that shouid be sharply distinguished from what we can calI inductive acceptability.
We have already seen how in his 1962 paper Hempel supported a skeptical view of acceptability of
hypotheses. Besides laying down important features of tins inductive acceptability (iike conditions
CRi and CR2 winch we have quoted before) Hempel analyzed what at that time was the most
common way of understanding the notion of acceptabiiity: tbrough some sort of pragmatic-utility
approach. At the very beginning of the paper, he expiicitiy connects bis notion of acceptance with
inductive inferences and lays down the strong, skeptical aspect of tins concept: “Thus, the study of
inductive generalization gives rise to the question whether it is possible to formulate criteria for the
rational acceptabiÏity of hypotheses on the basis of information that provides strong, but not
concÏusive, evidence for them.” Afier laying down some necessary conditions for acceptability,
Hempel discusses how tins notion couid be formalized according to tins pragmatic-utiiity
approach60. After analyzing some possible ways of proceeding in tins way, he lays down bis
conclusion61:
The preceding considerations seem to indicate that it would be pointless to formulate criteria of
acceptabiiity by reference to pragmatic utilities; for we are concemed here with purely
theoretical (in contrast to appiied) explanatory and predictive arguments. We might just add the
remark that criteria of rationai acceptabiiity based on pragmatic utilities might direct us to
accept a certain predictive hypothesis [...] exceedingiy improbable on the avaiiable evidence,
f... for] what is qualified as rationai is, properly speaking, flot the decision to believe h to be
truc, but the decision to act in the given context as if one believed h to be truc f...]
Referring to tins non-equivalence between the theoretical and applied approaches to
acceptability and the exclusively applied treatment given by philosophers at the time to the
Despite this. wc will keep using the terrn “confirmation” and its derivates in the sarne wav vie are using the
term “plausibility,” that is to say, with both skeptical and credulous mcanings. On the other hand, the tenn
“acceptability” or “acceptance,” by an imposition ofits own nature, we think, will be used exclusivelv in the
skeptical sense.
Hempel (1962), p. 149. The italics are mine.
bO Sec Braithwaite (1963). For more hibliographical references sec Hempel (192), pp. 149-163.
Hempel (1962). p. 162.
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problem, he elsewhere expresses his doubts about the possibility of developing a purely logical
C account of acceptability62:
Indeed, it is by no means clear whether the conception of basic scientific research as leading to
the provisional acceptance or rejection of hypotheses is tenable at ail. One of the problems here
at issue is whether the notion of accepting a hypothesis independently of any contemplated
action can be satisfactoriiy explicated within the framework of a purely logical and
methological analysis of scientific inquiry.
We take this theoretical acceptability of Hempel as being the sanie as our skeptical or strong
plausibility. Consequently, we also accept Hempel’s challenge of developing a purely logical
analysis of the notion of acceptability independent of any sort of contemplated action. What vie
believe to be an answer to such challenge will be presented in Chapter 663.
b sum up then, we have concluded that while skeptical plausible facts do conjoint but are not
susceptible to the error-prone feature of inductive reasoning, credulous plausible are susceptible to
the error-prone feature of inductive reasoning but do not conjoint. The difference concerning the
error-prone feature can be generalized by saying that while we may admit contradictory plausible
facts, we carmot allow Œ and —icc to be both accepted or skeptically plausible at the same time. We
also have shown that these principles are in accordance with the credulous and skeptical
approaches. If by adopting a skeptical approach we prevent from the very beginning the arising of
contradictory conclusions, there is no reason to reject such an important logical mie as the
conjunction principle. In the case of the weak plausibility and the conjunction principle, its
rejection is not only compatible with, but in fact necessary for a credulous approach. If vie want to
allow things liice “a is plausible” and “—ct is plausible,” we have to somehow prevent that from
this one conclude “a A —icr is plausible.” That is the essence of Kyburg’s solution to the lottery
paradox.
Now it is opportune to recall Makinson’s daim that the credulous approach is uninteresting and
our daim that Kyburg’s solution gives some hints of how to refute that. Kyburg’s solution of
rejecting the conjunction principle prevents contradictions of the sort “u A —,CL is plausible.” But
how about cases lilce “u is plausible” and “—,cc is plausible”? Are they unproblematic as Kyburg
believes? Afler all, a knowledge situation containing these two statements will strongly look like an
inconsistent theory. Trivially, Makinson’s classification of the credulous approach as uninteresting
is notbecause ofthe inconsistencies per se, but because traditionally (that is, according to classical
logic) inconsistencies lead to the trivialization of the logical theory. That is the farnous ex
contradictio seqtdtitr quod liber principle: from inconsistent statements one eau infer anything.
62 Hempel (1966), p. 130.
63 See Swinburg (1970) for a hcid analysis 0f when a given theory of confirmation can be said to be also a
tlieory of acceptabilitv.
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From a semantic point of view, this trivialization happens because no interpretation or model can
satisfy an inconsistent set of statements. Since a statement a is a logicai consequence of a set of
statements A if and only if every model of A is a model of a, if A has a pair of contradictory
sentences, then every Œ vill by vacuity satisfy this criterion.
This seems to make then a credulous approach even in the style of Kyburg’s unsusceptible of
any sort of worthy logical analysis. Titis is, to speak the truth, quite disappointing. We have seen
how phiiosophers have defended the rationality of the idea that a consistent body of evidences may
inductively support two or more mutualiy contradictory hypotheses. By doing this however, they
did not of course mean that in these circumstances every statement whatsoever wouid be tumed
into a “scientific (plausible) truth.” Intuitively also we are ready to (rationally, we hope) accept the
plausibility of a and the plausibility of —cc without having to conclude every sort of nonsense.
Therefore, both from an intuitive and from a confirmation point of view, the existence of plausible
contradictions does flot ailow the inference of ail sorts of statements. In other words, despite the
mentioned feature of classicai logic, it seems trivial that plausible contradictory facts do not lead to
the trivialization of the logical theory to which they belong.
Given the way we have characterized the notions of plausihiiity and induction, inductive or
plausible inconsistencies are a sort of what we can cail epistemic inconsistencies. This is in sharp
contrast with the inconsistencies that classical logic can be said to deal with, winch can be narned
ontoÏogicaÏ inconsistencies. While the first sort of inconsistency concems our way of seeing the
word, the second concems the world itself4. Therefore, it is understandable that classical
inconsistencies are not susceptible of having any sort of semantical interpretation, for if they had, it
would mean that there could be true contradictions in the world. Even though some philosophers
such as Hegel have defended the idea that there are ontological or tme inconsistencies, that is a
very disputable thesis and one that has neyer generated any sort of consensus among philosophers
and scientists65. On the other hand, epistemic inconsistencies are a veiy reasonable and
uncontroversial idea. There is no absurdity in holding two mutually contradictory hypotheses as
reasonable or plausible at the same time. It is consensual among scientists and philosophers that
two mutually contradictory- hypotheses may get the same amount of evidential support from the
same body of evidences. The history of science is full of cases where contradictory hypotheses co
existed during considerable periods of time. In the theory of knowÏedge also, it is consensual that
from the standpoint of our perceptions inconsistencies are sure to arise. Therefore, if the scientific
and philosopincal discourse, winch we hope do represent sornething, contemplate the notion of
epistemic inconsistencies, there must be sorne sort of semantic interpretation able to satisfy
61 This distmc[ion has firsrly appeared in Rescher & Brandom (1980).
That is the so-calied FIeractitus-ffegeÏ thesis. Sec Petrov (1979).
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inconsistent sets of plausible statements. And if there is at least one interpretation able to satisfy’ the
set {“a is plausible”, “—iŒ is plausible”}, then from tins set no trivialization should follow. Thus,
the just mentioned idea that inductive contradictions are uninteresting is due in fact to a lack of
understanding about the nature of inductive inconsistencies.
We see then that in order to deal with plausible contradictions a new sort of logic is required,
namely one able to represent inconsistent but nontrivial theories. Since the 1970’s, there is a
specific term used to refer to those logical systems that do not trivialize in the presence of
contradictions: ‘paraconsistent.” The origins of such sort of systems go back to the work of J.
Lukasiewicz, who published in 1910 a pioneer article proposing to revise some traditional laws of
logic, particularly the principle of non-contradiction. In the 1940’s, following Lukasiewicz’s ideas,
S. Jaskowski developed a propositional logical system where contradictions were tolerated without
trivialization. Later on in the 1950’s, Newton da Costa developed a first-order paraconsistent system
with application to set theory that ultimately led to the development of several other systems and the
establishment of paraconsistent logic as a independent domain of studyt6. Nowadays, paraconsistent
logic is a growing and respectable field oflogic with applications in many domains.
We will use the term “paraconsistent” to refer te that inconsistency-toÏerance behavior that the
notion of plausibility seems to requfre. Because from a credulous viewpoint plausible inconsistencies
are allowed but no trivialization should foÏlow from them, we will say that the very notion of credulous
plausibility is essentially paraconsistent. Ibis way of speaking of course necessarily involves a
somewhat new understanding of the term “paraconsistency,” which has traditionally been used in
connection with logical systems or components of logical systems (ofien a paraconsistent logic is said
to be one containing a paraconsistent negation) but neyer in connection with concepts. We may try to
precise this by saying that the adjective “paraconsistent” in the expression “the credulous notion of
plausibility is paraconsistent,” means, in a broad way, something like that: the notion of credulous
plausibility, if represented in a formai system, should iricorporate some sort of mechanism winch do
flot allow the trivialization ofa theoiy containing plausible inconsistencies67.
We note in passing that what we are taking as plausible inconsistencies are something like “Œ is
plausible” and “—,a is plausible” and not “a A —icc is plausible.” Tntuitively, tins can be justified by
making reference to the distinction between epistemic inconsistencies and ontological inconsistencies.
If we do flot want to commit ourselves to the thesis that there exist in the world real inconsistencies, we
have to maintain a minimal rationality regarding what we take as vorthy of being called hypothesis.
66 Sec Arruda (1980).
6’ One 0f the few people te explicitlv mention paraconsistent logcs in connection with issues related te
credulcus plausibiht was Kyburg. In (1997) lie lias inveszigated if paraconsistem Iegics muid lie successfuiiy
used te solve the lotlely paradox. Incidentallv, lie cornes up with a negative answer.
And one ofthese criteria of rationality is not to set forth contradictoiy hypotheses. In contradistinction
to “Œ is plausible” and “—CL is plausible” admitting things like “a A —iCt is plausible” as reasonable is
tantamount to admitting the existence of ontological inconsistencies. Jncidentally, it is because of tins
absurdity that the whole controversy around the conjunction principle took place.
Another common way of formally defining paraconsistent systems is to say that they generally
do flot respect the principle of contradiction68. Another Aristotelian principle that has also been
rejected by logicians was the excÏuded middteprincipte. Starting from the 1930’s and following the
ideas of L. E. J. Brouwer, figures such as A. Heyting, G. Gentzen and S. C. Kïeene started
developing the so-called Intiiltionistic logic, which explicitly does flot satisfy the pnnciple of
excluded middle. As Saul Kripke showed in 1965, from a semantical point of view intuitionistic
logic can be defined as that sort of system in which statements and their negations can be both false
(but flot both tme)69. More recently, a very similar idea was undertaken without the intuitionistic
motivation by da Costa and his collaborators to develop what they called paracomptete togics.
According to him, while a system is paraconsistent if it cari represent nontrivial theories in which
certain statements and their negations are true, it is paracomplete “if it can ftinction as the
underlying logic of theories in winch there are [...] formulas such that these formulas and their
negations are simultaneously false.”7° This is of course a semantic defmition. In order to give a
proof-theoretical definition similar to the one we have given to paraconsistent logics we need to
restate in another terms the notion of complete theoiy. Traditionally, a theory T is taken as
complete iff T is closed under deduction and for every sentence Œ, either ŒET or —,ŒET71. Inside
the framework of classical logic, we can equivalently say that a theory T is comptete iff T is closed
under deduction and, for any sentence Œ such that aT, T{Œ} is a trivial theory. Given tins
second definition, we can say that a logic is paracomplete iff it can function as the underlying logic
ofcomplete theories T such that, for some sentence ct, neither anT nor —aET.
Trivially, paracomplete logics do not satisfy the excluded middle principle. Besides da Costa,
Perlis for example have also worked on something worthy of being calÏed a paracomplete logic72.
Others such as Rescher, Buchsmaum and da Costa hirnself have proposed systems that are
simultaneously paraconsistent and paracomplete73, winch have been called paranormal or non-
68 Even though this way of defining paraconsistent logic is very often found in the literature, depending on
the way we formulate the principle of contradiction, it should be taken only as an informai defrnition. Outside
classicai logic, it is not necessariiy the case that H —(ct A —icc) is equivalent to a, —cc H 3, for every J3.
69 Kripke (1965). Sec also Moschovakis (2002).
70 Loparic & da Costa (1984), p. 119. Sec also da Costa (1986) and (1989).
71 Enderton (1972).
Perlis (1989).
Rescher & Brandom (1980), Bucbsbaum & Pequeno (1993) aid da Costa (1939).
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C alethic logics74. It is interesting to note that in a very important sense paracompleteness and
paraconsistency are the dual of each other, and vice-versa. Jean-Yves Béziau bas expressed that in
the foilowing way75:
Intuitionistic logic appears as a dual of a particular paraconsistent logic. Reverse intuitionistic
logic, put his head down and bis foots up, bis foots wili look like a head and bis head like some
foots, and you vill get another logic, a paraconsistent logic. [...] ail the reverse of
paraconsistent logic are many more than ail the possible visions ofintuitionistic iogic, and form
the rich fieid of paracomplete Ïogics. Each paraconsistent logic has a paracomplete dual and
each paracomplete iogic has a paraconsistent dual. {...] Paraconsistent and paracomplete iogic
appear therefore like husband and wife.
In Chapter 5 when we show the semantics of our logics, this technical fact wili become more
evident.
We are mentioning this because it seems that the notion of acceptability or skeptical
plausibility has a sort of paracomplete behavior. Since plausibility is a knowiedge-dependent
notion, the truthfulness of plausible statements wiil be limited by the amount of evidence we are
abie to gather for them. Therefore, given a statement a, it is completely reasonabie to imagine that
we are in a position neither to accept Œ nor to accept —dx, in which case both “a is accepted” and
“—,c is accepted” will be false. In fact, for most part of the statements we can formulate with the
help of scientific languages, we do not have evidence neither to speak for nor against them. It is a
picture then where apparently the principle of excluded middle is apparently flot valid. We will say
then that the notion of skepticai plausibiiity or acceptability is essentialiy a paracomptete one. As
we did before, we shouid also here try to precise the way we are using the term
“paracompleteness,” which has traditionally been used in connection with logical systems but
neyer in connection with concepts: “paracomplete” in the expression “the skeptical notion of
plausibility is paracompiete,” means, in a broad way, that a formai system intent to represent the notion
of skeptical plausibility should allow what we may calI voici acceptance situations, that is, situations
where, for some a, both sentences “a is accepted” and “—iCL is accepted” are false.
These points can be made more accurate with the help of a plurality-oriented semantic model.
Let us try to define more preciseiy the notion of plurahty-oriented extension by saying that it is a
consistent and deductively closed set of statements build over some specific language winch, as we
have said, may represent the view of one or more experts, the consequences of one of the
competing theories, one of the scenarios specuiated by the analvst, a set of consistent conclusions
ohtained from an inductive reasoning mechanism, etc. We cail a specific set of extensions a
plurality-oriented interpretation. A statement a will be plausible in a specific interpretation if and
Béziau (1999).
Ibid.p. 12.
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only if it holds in at least one extension, and accepted if and orily if it hoids in ail extensions.
C Tvial1y, there may be an interetation I where a specific statement is truc in one extension but
false in another. Therefore we will have that both “(p is plausible” and “—i( is plausible” are truc in
I. Consequently, since there is at least one interpretation able to satisfr the theory {“p is plausible”,
“—p is plausible”}, it does follow that from it we will be able to conclude everytbing. Also, for the
same ( and I, since ( is truc in one extension and false in another, neither it not its negation will be
taken as accepted in I. Consequently, we may have a complete theory T winch does flot contain
neither “a is accepted” nor “—iCL is accepted.”76
So far then we have that the credulous plausibiiity does flot respect the principle of
contradiction and has a paraconsistent behavior. In its tum, the skeptical plausibility respects the
principle of contradiction but nevertheless does flot respect the principle of excluded middle and
has a paracomplete behavior. It remains then to find out whether the credulous plausibility respects
or flot the principle of excluded middle. At first glance the answer is no. There may be many
statements about winch no expert at ail has any sort of opinion, and consequentiy neither they nor
their negations will get the status of credulously plausible. Only if we conceive our experts as ideai
ones, that is, as having opinion about every statement of the language at hand is that we may take
the creduious plausibility are respecting the principle of excluded middle. In tins case, the situation
would be analogous to the traditional epistemic logics where the agent is an ideal one and is aware
of ail iaws of iogic as weÏl as of the logical consequences of bis beliefs. In Chapter 6 we will
investigate the formal properties of both of these two approaches to the credulous plausibility.
76 Incidentaily, it is by using a stmcture like that that Kripke arrives at a sound and complete possible-world
semantics for intuitionistic logic. This is also the path followed by Buchsbaurn anci Pequeno (1993) and
Rescher & Brandom (1980). For a discussion about the relations hetween Kripke’s sernantics and
paraconsistent and paracomplete logics sec Bèziau (2002).
CHAPTER 4
ON THE LOGIC 0f INDUCTION AND
PLAU$IBILITY
In this Chapter we vi11 switch from the conceptual problem of induction and plausibility to the way
we may tiy to formally solve tins problem. First, in Section 4.1, we will pick the most influential
logic of induction developed in philosophy
— Camap’s system — and try to figure out the rationale
behind today’s consensual opinion that the philosophicai project of building a logic of induction is,
as a whoie, a failure. Afler that we wilI try to figure out what features an inductive logic shouid
have in order to be in accordance with what we have named in Chapter 2 a purely descriptive or
pragmatical approach to induction and perhaps not to face the problems that undennined Carnap’s
project. In Sections 4.2 and 4.3 we wiil investigate to what extent AI nonmonotonic logics can be
ciassified as logics of induction and whether they can sornehow help us in the task of developing a
purely descriptive logic of induction. The nonmonotonic formalisms we vill analyze will be
Raymond Reiter’s default logic and Tarcisio Pequeno’s systems of induction and piausibility. It will
corne up from tins analysis that we may indeed have at hand a quite promising framework to be
used as the starting point of our formai explication ofthe notions of induction and plausibility.
4.1 The Logic of Induction: A Dead Horse?
4.1.] Carnap ‘s System ofindttction
For the last 15 years or so, it has been commonpiace among philosophers of science to consider the
whole project of building a iogic of induction as conceived by Camap as fundamentally misleading.
In a paper entitied ‘Why There Can’t be a Logic of Induction,” Stuart Glennan for example
compares such project to a dead horse’:
Camap’s attempt to develop an inductive logic bas been criticized on a variety of grounds, and
[...] I think it is fair to say that the consensus is that the approach as a whole cannot succeed. In
writing a paper on problems with inductive logic [...] I might therefore be accused of beating a
dead horse.
‘Glennan (1994), p. 78.
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A similar statement is found in the entry for “Inductive Logic” in J. Pfeifer’s Phitosophy of Science.
An fncycÏopedia, written by Branden Fitelsen2:
Moreover, [...] there are fiirther (and some say deeper) problems with Camapian [...]
approaches to logical probability, if they are to be applied to inductive inference generally. The
consensus now seems to be that the Camapian project of characterizing an adequate logical
theory of probability is (by his own standards and lights) flot very promising.
In order to undcrstand the rationale bebind such sort of daims, we have to identify winch were
the “standards and lights” that Camap wanted his logic of induction to satisfy. One way tins can be
done is by paying attention to the features Camap attributed to the relation of inductive support that
is supposed to exist between hypothesis and evidence: “Since we take semantics as the theory of
the meanings of expressions in language and specially of sentences [...], the relations [betweenj h
and e to be studied may be characterized as setnanticat.”3 One very common way Camap used to
use to clarif,’ the nature of tins semanticai relation vas to compare inductive logic with deductive
logic: “The principal coimnon characteristic of the statements in both fields [deductive and
inductive logic] is their independence of the contingency of facts. This characteristic justifies the
application of the common term ‘logic’ to both fields.”4 Elsewhere he details what tins
independence of contingent facts is supposed to be5:
It seems to me, however, that an elementary statement in inductive iogic [...] expresses apurely
logical relation between the two sentences involved in the same way that an elementary
statement of deductive logic does [...] The relation is in both cases purely logical in the sense
that it depends mereiy upon the meanings ofthe sentences [...]
In accordance to what we have expounded in Chapter 2 under the label of relation approach to
induction, the idea of Carnap’s logic of induction therefore was to formalize a purely logical
relation of inductive support in the manner as deductive logic formalizes the relation of logical
consequence or deductibility. In the same way that by simpÏy giving a semantical structure able to
assign meaning to the sentences of a language we automatically set the relation of logicai
consequence between ail these sentences, with a similar endeavor and with no additionai non
Iogical assumption we set a (numerical) relation of confirmation between the sentences. This same
idea is found in Hempel’s “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation,” where he says that the purpose of
the logic of confirmation is “to set up purely formai criteria of confirmation in the manner simiiar to
that in winch deductive logic provides purelv formal criteria for the validity of deductive
inferences”.6
2 fitelsen (2004), p. 9.
Camap (1962), p. 20. The italics are mine.
Cama (1962), p. 200.
Camap (1946), p. 596. The italics are mine.
6 Hempel (1945), p. 9.
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How Carnap tried to achieve this goal can be seen through a quick look at the system of
induction he presented in Logical fotmdations ofFrobabiÏity. Carnap’s initial project was to defme
a sort of function called by him c-function which when apptied to hypothesis h and evidence e
would return the degree of confirmation given to h bye (in symbols: c(h,e).) In order to achieve the
goal described in the above quotations, this function would have to be defmed in purely semantic
grounds depending “merely upon the meanings of the sentences” h and e. Cleariy enough, this
requires that no principle other than purely logical ones shoutd be used in the definition of c.
The fundamental concept of Carnap’s system of inductive iogic is the notion of state
description. Given some specific language LN (tvhere N amounts for the number of individual
constants of L), a state-description is a sentence which, by affirming or denying each property of
each individuat, completety describes a state of the world. from this notion of state-description
(which can be fairly thought of as a sort of possible world) we get what he cails range ofa sentence:
If h is a sentence of LN, the range of h is the ciass of ail state descriptions in which h holds. By
defining the weight of a sentence h (in symbols: m(h)) through these two concepts, we can then
characterize the degree of confirmation given to h by e as the ratio betxveen the weight of h A e and
the weight of e:
c(h.e) m(h A e)
m(e)
The central question now is then how to define the weight m(h) ofa sentence. The simplest way
to do that is to take m(h) as the proportion of possible worlds in which h is true or, in other words,
the ratio between the number of state-descriptions in the range of h and the total number of state
descriptions. This is of course equivalent to assigning to each state-description the weight of
1/(number of state-descriptions) and define m(h) as the sum ofthe weights of aIl state-descriptions
which belong to the range of h. Carnap cails this weight function and the corresponding c-function
obtained from it m and ct, respectively. This approach, which Carnap attributes to the early
Wittgenstein, is essentially nothing more than the classical definition of probability. The basic
difference is that in this case the probability value would be dependent on the language in which the
hypothesis and evidences are to be formulated.
The problem that Carnap sees with this cf c-function is that it would not allow us to learn from
experience, that is to say, independently of the evidence e we take, ct(h,e) is always the same. He
then proposes a new c-function, c, that is flot plagued by this sort ofproblem. The distinguishing
feature of c’ is that it no longer considers ail state-descriptions as being equal. Instead, it introduces
a definite bias towards uniformity by favoring more homogeneous state-descriptions. To
accompiish this, Camap introduces the notion of structure-description: j is the structure-
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description corresponding to Z1 (or, Z1 belongs to the structure-description of j) in LN =df Z1 is a Z in
LN, andj is the disjunction of ail Z which are isomorphic to Z1 arranged in lexicographicai order.”7
Two Z’s are isomorphic if and only if one can be derived form the other by merely exchanging
some individuais for others by means ofa one-to-one correlation. The idea of c’’ then is to treat each
of these structures as well as the state-descriptions inside them as equiprobable. That is to say, to
each structure-description it xviii be assigned a weight of 1/(number of structure-descriptions) and to
each state-description inside a specific structure-description s a weight of (weight of s) x (l/(number
of state-descriptions inside s)). The new weight m*(h) of h would then be defined as the sum of the
weights of ail states descriptions in the range of h. As usuai, c*(h,e) is defined as the ratio of m*(h A
e) to m*(e).
Now we are in a position to analyze the daim that c’ satisfies the purpose of the logic of
induction. To begin with, we may adopt a sort of orthodox position and state that if some system of
induction is to be classified as logical, then it must be not only a logic of induction but the logic of
induction. In the context of Camap’s formalism, this means that the c-function xvhich Camap takes
as the basis of bis logical system should be arguably a unique and universal way of assigning
degrees of confirmation to pairs of hypothesis/evidence sentences (or at least the core of
confirmation reasoning which ail the other not-so-universai c-ftinctions should be based on.) It is in
this direction for exampie that Giennan argues for the thesis that there can be no logic of induction
“in the sense of no uniquely deterrnined e flmction.”8 The example he gives is a situation where
would be preferred over c*.
It should be noted that in the very development of Camap’s inductive system xve find some
support for this conclusion. While in Logical foundations ofFrobability Camap did present c’’ as
the proper c-function of inductive logic, in later works he no longer argued that one c-function is
satisfactoiy in ail cases, but tried rather to develop a theoreticai description of an infinite continuum
of c-functions called x-continuum (the parameter 2 is supposed to indicate how sensitive the
corresponding c-function is to “learning from experience.”)9 And as Camap (1952) himself
concedes, no one value of 2. is “better a priori” than the others. In Camap’s view then, the
inexistence of a unique c-function does not seem to be a strong argument against the possibility of a
logic of induction. Afler ail, it may happen that even though c* cannot be shown to be the best c
function, it is, as Camap wished, a purely’ logicai notion.
Camap (1962), p. 116.
Glennan (1994), p. $2.
° Camap (1952). in more recent xvorks, Carnap has proposed two more additional adlustable parameters y and
r. Sec Camap (1971) and (1980).
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In order to appreciate this daim, it is important to note that even though c’’ may have some
advantages over c in the situations Camap considers, both of them make use of the same basic
principle: the principle of indifference. Ahhough in Logical fottndations of Pro bability Camap
denies such dependence and defends that because the mentioned principle “leads sometimes to quite
absurd resuits and in its strongest form even to contradictions, it must be rejected”°, later he
retreated from tins and went on to defend that the principle of indifference is in fact to a purely
logical assumption”:
[...] the statement of equiprobability to winch the principle of indifference leads is, like ail the
other statements of inductive probability, flot a factual but a logical statement. If the knowledge
of the observer does not favor any of the possible events, then with respect to tins knowledge as
evidence they are equiprobable. The statement assigning equal probabilities in tins case does
not assert anytinng about the facts, but merely the logical relations between the given evidence
and each of the hypotheses; namely, that these relations are iogically alike.
As would be expected, tins point is far from being uncontroversial. In fact, in the same way that the
principle of equiprobability has been the most attacked feature of classicai systems of probability
(as Camap himself pointed out), it has been one of the most indigestible characteristics of Camap’s
inductive iogic’2.
Even though we think there are plenty ofreasons flot to accept Camap’s point that the principle
of equiprobability is a logical principle of induction’3, it is flot our intent here to engage ourselves in
this sort ofdebate. Rather, wejust want to use tins controversy as an example ofthe daim we have
made in a good part of chapter 2 that the relation approach to induction inevitably brings us to
justificatory issues. Given what we have exposed so far, it quite trivial in winch point Camap gets
involved in justificatory issues. Since a semantical notion lias to make use of no other principles
than pureiy logical ones, in order to make the point that bis concept of degree of confirmation is a
logical concept, he has to make sure that ail principles bis inductive logic is based on are in fact
logical. But since one of these principles, the principle of indifference, was flot able to form a
consensus regarding its logical nature, Camap had to engage inmself in justificatory issues intent to
show that such principle is in fact a logical one. And exactly because bis arguments were flot
convincing at ail, bis project as a whole was taken as a fail.
It is interesting to note that tins justificatory aspect of Camap’s system has sometimes been
overlooked by philosophers. In the early days of Camap’s logical probabilisrn, for example, John
Kemeny wrote the following’4:
10 Camap (1962), p. 51$.
Camap (1955), p. 22. Italics in the original.
Sec Weatherford (1982). sections 11.11 and 111.11, and Salmon (1966), sections V.I and V.3.
b Fora couple of arguments against the principle cf indiftrence sec Fiteisen (2003).
b Kerneny (1963). p. 711.
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C The problem of induction [...] has stimulated two different but compiementary types ofresearch. First of ail there is the problem ofhow one canjustify the inductive inferences that we
do as a matter of fact make, a problem whose solution is seems impossible since the days of
Hume. The other approach is that of Bacon, Mil, and Laplace, who analyse the way we make
inductive inferences. They try to find reasonable methods of inference, without necessarily
giving justification that wouid go counter to Hume’s argument. It is this latte problem that was
successfully attacked by Camap.
As we hope to have shown, statements like tins are essentially misleading: because of the very goal
Camap proposed to achieve, his logic and ail others that have adopted bis cannons are justificatory
in essence.
4.1.2 Towards a Representationat Logic ofInduction
At tins point one may wonder if what we are have called in Chapter 2 a purely descriptive
approach to induction is a possible enterprise. Afier ail, we have seen that the rnost influential
tradition of inductive logic, winch was supposed to 5e essentially descriptive, was flot itself able to
keep distance from justificatory issues. And tins of course was not due, let us say, to the
mathematical resources employed by Camap and bis followers, but in fact to the veiy idea helU by
these philosophers of what the logic of induction is supposed to be. Therefore, in order to show that
a descriptive approach to induction is a tenable project, we will have to somehow retbink the
traditional conception of logic of induction in such a way as to make it susceptible to such a purely
descriptive account. By so redefining the purpose of the logic of induction, we will try to show that
our dead horse is perhaps not so dead afler ail.
From a general point of view, the task of the logic of induction as conceived in Camap’s
tradition could be divided into two:
(j) To set a specific way through winch probability values are obtained, that is to say, the
conditions according to winch one statement gives evidential support to another; and
(ii) To lay down the mies according to winch probability values are related to each other or, in
other words, the logical relations that are supposed to hold between probable statements.
Let us, for the time being, name the parts of the logic of induction responsible for each one of these
tasks, respectively, model of confirmation and caïculits of confirmation. Jobnathan Cohen defines
these two tasks in the context ofa numerical approach as follows1’:
Two problems in confirmation theoiy are not aiways sufficiently distinguished from one
another. [...] On the one hand there is the sernantical problem of deciding, in each case, what
are the elements of winch confirmation-flinctors are flinctors and what inetiic is rnost
appropriate for the assignment of values to these frmnctors. On the other hand there is the
syntactical problem of detennining any compatibilities or incompatibilities that may hold
‘ Cohen (1966), 463-464.
universally between such assignments. To construct a calculus of confirmation is to solve the
latter, flot the former.
Right afler the above quotation, Cohen correctly classifies the calculus of probability as a
caïculus of confirmation. Indeed, the only sort of value-determination the calculus of probability
does is to get derived probabilities from prior ones: except in limiting cases such as p(h,h) ‘1, it
says nothrng about how to assign such prior probability values. This task is responsibility of what
we have called model of confirmation. Using the notation of elernentary probability theory, we
would say that while the purpose of the model of confirmation is to determine, to any pair of
sentences e and h, the probability value P(h,e) of h given e or, in inductive logic’s terminoiogy, the
inductive support given by e to h, the goal of the caiculus of confirmation is to establish the mies
according to winch different probability statements P(h,e) should be related to each other.
Following Camap’s practice, we wiil now try to estabiish a sort of parallel between formai
deductive logic and inductive logic, as understood according to above-mentioned division. We first
of ail note that if we change “probability value” for “tme” in the above paragraph, we will get
something very similar to the way deductive logic deals with tmth-values. What we mean is that in
the same way that formai deductive logic gives no sort of effective procedure to decide whether a
sentence is tme or false (except in limiting cases such as a A —‘a) but just sets the logical
constraints according to which tmth is obtained from tmth, the calcuius of confirmation also does
flot say how one sentence confirms another, but just sets the logical carmons winch confirmation
statements are supposed to satisfy. Not less interesting is the foilowing conclusion: akin to the
inferences set by formai classical logic, the inferences set by the calculus of confirmation are, as a
quick inspection of the probability calculus will show, deductive rather than inductive. They have
the sole purpose of setting the necesscuy and consequently tmth-preserving restrictions the
reasoning about confirmation is supposed to obey.
The logic of piausibility being the deductive part of the logic of induction, it is needless to say
that the model ofconfnination viii be its inductive part. In fact, as we have said, it is the goal ofthe
model of confirmation to set down the process by winch hypotheses are inductively supported by
evidences. With tins observation in mmd and considering the previous paragraph discussion, we
note that deductive logic has no component sirniiar in purpose to inductive logic’s modei of
confirmation. The determination of how to assign truth-values to sentences is completeiy outside
the scope of the theorist who is building bis logicai system: it beiongs to the theory of knowiedge
rather to logic. Tins is relevant because if vie say that indctctive logic is a sort of logic in the sense
formai deductive logic is, then vie are assuming that a component able to determine the tmth-value
of sentences could he added to formai deductive logic without changing the meaning logicians and
philosophers atinbute to “iogic,” however fuzzv it mav be. ClearI’. enough, hardly any one slightly
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acquainted with logic will take seriously this assumption. If however, for the sake of argument, we
accept such postulation, we wiil have to accept that logic wouid gel merged into the theory of
knowledge. As such, it would have to deal with that component of knowledge which, despite being
the most controversial of ail, has aiways been present in one way or another in the epistemological
theories: the notion ofjustfication.
This point is important because, as we have seen, inductive logic does have the above
mentioned component which deductive logic lacks. Therefore, the conclusion we have made
regarding the possibulity of deductive logic’s having added to it a way of getting tmth-values
applies with the same intensity to inductive logic. In other words, since inductive logic has to
somehow detennine the degree of confirmation which evidence e gives to hypothesis h, the
component responsible for that, the model of confirmation, could be taken in a very important sense
as much more concemed with the theory of knowledge ffian with logic. As such, it will have
inevitably to deal in some way or another with the justificatory issues involved in that field. That
this is so can also be seen by recalling that inductive inferences, by being ampliative, bring
necessarily new pieces of knowledge which, due to their not being contained in the premises, wiIl
require some sort ofjustification.
The important point for us in ail that is something we have already observed a couple of times
before in another terms: the model of confirmation is, we may say, the window through which the
problem of justification of induction comes in the scene. This conclusion is of course anything but
surprising: being the only part of inductive Ïogic which deals with inductive inferences, there is no
other place the problem of justification of induction could appear except in it. However, from the
point of view of our endeavor of conceiving a pureÏy descriptive account of the logic of induction, il
is fundamental to know where precisely the problem ofjustification takes place in order not to take
it into account.
It should be observed that the definition of inductive logic’s purpose given by our twofold task
division does not take into account the task of detaching the hypothesis from the evidences and
concluding something like P(h). The reason for that, as we have seen, is that the probiem of
detachment is according to Camap not concemed with the logic of induction itself but with its
application. This is of course a problem if we want a logic of induction primarily designed to deal
with the pragmatical notion of probability rallier than with the logical notion of probability. At a
first glance, it seems we have two basic alternatives: to include one more component to the above
mentioned division in such a way as tu take mb account the mentioned task or to leave it hke that
and conceive another logic of induction intent b deal with these “detached” plausible hypothesis.
Considering what we have just concluded about the model of confirmation and our wilhngness of
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having a purely descriptive account of the logic of induction, it is understandable that we should
follow the second alternative and try to discover what such new logic of induction should be.
Given an application of the logic of induction and therefore a set of staternents of the form “the
degree of inductive support given by e to h is x” or, if we want to stick to a qualitative approach, “e
inductively supports h”, our basic problem would be then to formalize the process through which
hypothesis h is detached from evidence e. Since as we have seen this is done when e is the case and
some total evidence conditions are satisfied, sentence “e inductively supports h” can be seen as a
sort of inductive implication where the truth of e, we may say, inductively implies the plausibility of
h. From this perspective, e may be seen as the antecedent of the inductive implication, h as the
consequent and the mentioned process of detachment as a MP-lilce inferential relation stating that
(under the condition that some total evidence condition is satisfied) “h is plausible” is can be
inductively concluded from “e inductively implies h” and “e is the case.” Accordingly, we vil1 call
the component of our new inductive logic responsible for such inferential process the relation of
inductive consequence.
Supposing that we have such inferential mechanism at hand, we will need also to reason about
the inductively obtained plausible staternents. That is to say, we vi1l need a logical system able to
operate on the deductive level for saying which constraints plausible statements are subject to. This,
we must concede, is already done by what we have called calculus of confirmation. Taking a
quantitative approach based on the probability calculus as example, our detached hypotheses will be
probability formulae of the form P(h) = x, whose logic is trivially taken into account by the calculus
ofprobability. However, as the name chosen by Cohen indicates, the calculus of confirmation does
a bit more than only reasoning about such plausible forrnulae: it also reasons about sentences of the
form “e inductively supports h” or, what is the same, inductive implications of the form “e
inductively implies h.” In the case of the probability calculus, these two tasks are performed by the
same system because P(h,e) and P(h) can always be derived from one another. But of course it does
not need to 5e always like that. Therefore, we will separate these two tasks and call the component
of the logic of induction responsible for the first the catctilus or logic of plat tsibitity and the
component responsible for the second the calcuÏtts or logic of inductive implication.
In addition to these three parts, the logic of induction should obviously also provide a way to
represent the inductive implications and the plausible hypotheses inferred from them. We will name
this fourth component the inductive-plausible langttage. Now that we have got a logic of induction
with four basic components
— the relation of inductive consequence, the logic of plausibility, the
logic of inductive implication and the inductive-plausible language
— we may wonder if it really has
the descriptive purpose our pragmatic approach to induction requires. To start with. vo point out
that due to its not taking into account the task of saying whether (and to what extent) e confirnis h,
our logic of induction will not get involved into the problem ofjustffication of induction. Another
consequence of flot having nothing akin to the model of confirmation is that the confirmation
statements which the iogic of inductive implication is supposed to reason about and which the
relation of inductive consequence will act upon to “extract” the plausible facts will flot be settled by
the system, but rather shall corne from outside. Consequently, rather than being concemed with how
facts inductively support others, our logic of induction’s main concem will be how to provide a
logical framework where inductive implications along with any inferential capability they may
posses could be properiy represented. In other words, our inductive logic’s purpose will be shified
from the problem of “generating” confirmation statements to the problem of representing or
describing them.
At this point it may be useftil to recail oui previous discussion about inductive logic and deductive
logic to conclude that this new sense of inductive iogic perhaps deserves much more the titie “logic”
than its oldjustification-laden cousin. As it is widely recognized, one of the main purposes ofdeductive
logic is to serve as a logical framework for representing certain sorts of statements and drawing ail
logical consequences winch may be entaiied by them. As we have afready observed, nothing is said
there about whether or not these statements are correct or truc. The responsibility of picking truc or
reasonabie statements beiongs to the theorist who will use deductive iogic, not to deductive logic itself.
Simiiarly, in oui logic of induction, now called descriptive or representational logic of induction,
nothing is said about how hypotheses are confirmed by evidences or whether such and such evidence
confirms such and such hypothesis. Its purpose is rather to serve as a ftamework for representing
inductive implications and drawing the plausible hypotheses entailed by them in a specific knowledge
situation. The responsibility conceming the rationaiity of the represented inductive inferences
performed inside inductive logic belongs flot to inductive logic itself, but to the Imowiedge engineer
who is making use ofit.
Now, if oui plausible-inductive language, along with the inferential mechanism provided by the
logic of induction, is able to represent the axioms of a calculus of inductive implication’6 which teil us
how to obtain inductive implication statements from inductive implication statements, then it sure
vlli also be able to represent specific ways according to winch inductive implication statements are
obtained from something cisc (expressible of course in oui plausible-inductive language) than
inductive implication statements. In other words, it wili be able to represent what we have called
model of confirmation. In contrast to what one may think, this posibility of representing models of
confirmation is in complete accordance with our descriptive approach to the logie oC induction. In
the same way that, by allowing one to represent what he thinks to be truc, deductive logic does not
An instance cf such axioms would be v.hat we could caIl indactive implioa:ion transitRity axiom: if n
inductivelv implies 3 and 3 inductivelv implies u, then n inducti’,ev implies y.
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commit itselfwith the justification of such “true” statements, allowing one to represent the way he
thinks inductive statements are “generated” does flot commit our inductive logic to the justification
of such model of confirmation. The goal of the logic of induction itsetf is nothing more than to
serve as a logical framework where inductive implication axioms ofseveral sorts, including the sort
ofaxioms which could be taken as model of confirmation, can be represented, being the rationality
of what these axioms compietely outside the scope of the logic. We cali the logic of induction so
tised an applied logic of induction.
4.2 Nonrnonotonic Logic and the Logic of Induction
As we have mentioned before, from its very beginning Artificial Intelligence vas concerned with the
formalization ofcommonsense pattems ofreasoning. John McCarthy vas perhaps the first to discuss
the need for the mechanization ofcommonsense reasoning, before any theoiy on the subject existed’7.
It did not take too long for AI theorists to recognize the limitations ofclassical formaI logic to represent
commonsense reasoning. One ofthe first and surely the most famous of such acknowledges was made
M. Minsky, one of the founders of AI, in an appendix entitled “Criticism ofthe Logistic Approach” of
an influential paper of 1974 13:
Even if we formulate relevancy restrictions, logistic systems have a problem in using them. In any
logistic system, ail the axioms are necessarily ‘permissive’
— they ail help to permit new inferences
to be drawn. Each added axiom means more theorems, none cctn disappectr. There simply is no
direct way to add information to tell [...] about the kinds of conclusions that should not be drawn.
[...j Because logicians are flot concemed with systems that wilt later be enlarged, they can design
axioms that permit only the concitisions they want. In the development of intelligence the situation
is different. One bas to learn which features of situations are important, and which kinds of
deductions are not to be regarded seriously.
Later, when summarizing his criticism of logical (or logistic, as he calis it) systems, by which he meant
of course classical formai logic, he writes:
“[...] ‘Logical’ reasoning is flot flexible enough to serve as a
basis for thinking [...] The consistency that Logic absoÏutely demands is flot otherwise usually
available
— and probably flot even desirabte
We see here a direct reference to two topics already mentioned in previous chapters which have a
lot to do vih the theoty of induction we are describing here: classical logic’s monotonicity and its
intolerance of inconsistencies. According to Minsky, these two things are impediments to the proper
treatment of commonsense reasoning. The development ofnonmonotonic logics that took place in AI
afier the publication of Minsk’y’s paper did account for the nonmonotonic aspect required by
commonsense without however being able to overcome classical logic’s limitation of dealing with
17 McCarthy (1958).jg Minsky (1974). The italics are mine.
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inconsistencies. The mathematical treatrnent of inconsistent but nontrivial theories begun apart from AI
research about two decades had to pass for these two weaknesses of classical logic to be incorporated
into a sole theoretical system.
The first languages to have an explicit nonrnonotonic component were the Prolog programming
language developed by A. Colmerauer and his students and the PLANNER language developed by C.
E. Hewitt20. The formalization of the field of nonmonotonic reasoning, as we 1.mow it today, started
approximately in 1975/1976, with papers published in the 1977-1979 period2t. It was however in 1980
that nonmonotonic reasoning obtained its impetus, with the publication of a special issue of the
Artficiat Intelligence Journal devoted exclusively to nonmonotonic reasoning in winch the three
nowadays main nonmonotonic theories were presented: Reiter’s default logic, McDermott-Doyle’s
non-monotonic logic and McCarthy’s cfrcumscriptive logic22. Since then up to the middle of the
1990’s the amount of research clone on nonmonotonic formalisms was such that nowadays
nonmonotonic logic is established as an independent and importani field inside AI23.
In earlier chapters we have spoken about the similarities that exist between the philosophical
fleld of inductive logic and nonmonotonic logic. Although not aiways recognized by pinlosophers
and M theorists, these two domains deal, we have tried to show, with the same problem. If tins is
really so, then it is reasonable to expect the tools developed in one fleld to be somehow useftil for
the other. More specifically, if nonmonotonic logics in fact deal with the problem of representing
pattems of inductive inference, then it may be worthy to fmd out whether these logics can throw
some light upon our project of building a representational logic of induction. 0f course tins viI1 be
so only if nonmonotonic logics are absent from justificatory staffs: if they are plagued with the
same problems we have identifled in Camap’s inductive logic, then to look the whole thing from
M’s perspective would flot represent any gain. Keeping these two questions in mmd — if
nonmonotonic logics are ftee from the problem ofjustification of induction and if they deal to some
extent with the same problem we are concemed about here — we vill investigate one of the most
famous nonmonotonic formalisms in Ai: Reiter’s default logic. Ail tins will be donc with the
general purpose of finding out to what extent AI nonmonotonic logics in general and Reiter’s
system in particular can be taken as valuable tools in the philosopincal analysis of induction and
plausibility.
Ibid. The italics are mine.
° Colrnerauer et al (1973), Hewitt (1969).
2t Sec for instance McCarthy (1977), Reiter (1978), Clark (1978) and Doyle (1979).
22 Reiter (1980), McDennott & Doyle (1980). McCarthy (1980).
fora comptete oveniew ofihe fleld. sec Ginsbere (1987). Luiaszewicz (1999). Brewka (1991) or Gabbay
et al (1994).
s o
4.2.1 DefattttLogic
The main idea behind default iogic is to formalize what we have calied in Chapter 3 default
reasoning. As we have seen there, the core of such reasoning are statements of the form “typically
P’s are Q’s,” which we have named defauit statements. We also have seen that what makes this sort
of reasoning non truth-preserving are the exceptions that defauit statements are susceptible to.
Reiter explains this as foilows24:
A good deal ofwhat we how about the world is ‘aimost aiways’ tme, with a few exceptions.
Such facts usually assume the form ‘most P’s are Q’s’ or inost P’s have property Q’. For
example most birds fly except for penguins, ostriches, the Maitese falcon etc. Given a particular
bird, we wiil conciude that it flues unless we happen to know that it satisfies one of these
exceptions.
Afier analyzing the possibility of representing this “most” statements by stating ail exceptions,
he concludes that “what is required is somehow to allow twenty [our old friend bird] to fly by
defatdt.”25 that is, to conciude that twenty flues even without having ail information which may be
required to conclude that it is not an exception to the ruie that says that ail birds fly. It is important
to note that despite the above characterization of defauit statements as sentences of the form “Most
P’s are Q’s”, defauit reasoning is to be, according to Reiter, plainly distinguished from statistical
C reasoning26:
[In a] pureiy statistical connotation [such as] ‘Most voters prefer Carter’ [...] ‘most’ is being
used exciusively in the sense of ‘the majority of’. This setting does flot lead to default
assumptions: given that Maureen is a voter one wouid not want to assume that Maureen prefers
Carter.
The real purpose of default logic is to deal with what Reiter cails prototypical situations27:
[In a] prototypical sense [like] ‘Most birds fly’ [...] there is a statistical connotation [...] — the
majority ofbirds fly — but there is also the sense that a characteristic ofa prototypical or normal
bird is being described. Given a bird Poliy, one is prepared to assume that it flues uniess one has
reasons to the contrary. It is towards such prototypical settings that defauit logic is addressed.
In a footnote to the above quotation, lie adds that the best way to distinguish between these two
senses of “most” — the statistical one and the prototypicai one
— is by using the word “typicaily”:
whule “Typically voters prefer Carter” sounds inappropriate, “Typically birds fly” sounds ail right.
Reiter intends to investigate such default statements by interpreting sentence “typically birds
fly,” for exampie, as meaning “if x is a bird. then in the absence of any information to the contrary,
infer that x can fly.” I-le proposes to formalize this interpretation thought meta-linguistic devices
24 Reiter (1980), p. 82.
25 Ibid.
Rester & CHscuolo (1981). p. 270.
ibid.
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resembling inference rules called defanit rides (or simply defaitits.) Let ct(x), 13(x) and p(x) be
classïcal formulae whose free variables are contained in x = X1, ..., Xm. A default has the following
form:
Œ(x): Ç3(x)
p(x)
Œ(x) is calted the prerequisite, 13(x) the jusqfication, and p(x) the conseqttent of the default28. A
default is closed if and only if none of a(x), 13(x) and p(x) contain free variables. Commonsense
knowledge about the world is represented by what Reiter cails defaztÏt theoey: a pair <W, D> where
W is a set of closed formulae and D a set of defaults. A default theory <W, D> is called closed if
and only if every default of D is closed. Given a defauït theory <D,W>, Reiter defines through a
fixed point operator f what he cails the extension of <W, D>, that is, the set of conclusions we are
atlowed to draw from W and D:
Let S be a set ofclosed formutae and <W, D> a closed default theory. f(S) is the smallest set
satisfying the following conditions:
(j) Wcf(S);
(ii) Th(f(S)) c
(iii) If a: f3 e D, aef(S) and -9f3S, then QeF(S).
(p
A set of formulae E is an extension of<W, D> ifff(E) = E, that is, E is a fixed point of operator
f.
Condition (i) guarantees that what is known about the world is contained in each extension, (ii) says
that the extension has to be closed under deduction, and (iii) bas the effect that as many defanits as
possible will be applied. The minimality condition does not allow one to draw conclusions for
which no argument based on W and D exists.
From the definition of extension we can obtain an inductive inferential relation akin to the
inferential relation defined by classical logic, the difference being that it will be inductive (or
nonmonotonic) instead of deductive and will be held by default theories and formulae instead of
sets of formtilae and formulae. Another important difference is that some default theories have more
than one extension. As a consequence ofthat, this default inferential relation may be defined in two
different ways: by requiring the formula at hand to belong to at least one extension or requiring it to
belong to aIl extensions. Since the arising of more than one extension is obviously due to existence
28 The notation proposed by Reiter in (1980) was slightly different from the standard one we are adopting
here.
29 Th(A) stands for the closure under deduction ofthe set of formulae A, that is to say, Th(A) = {a j A H cL).
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of conflicting inductive conclusions, we have here a formai example of what we have called in
Chapter 3 the skeptical and credulous approaches to induction. Formally we have as follows:
Let <W, D> be a closed default theory and a a closed formula. Œ is skepticatty inferredfrom
<W, D> (in symbols: <W, D> H5 cL) iff. for ail extensions E of <W, D>, aCE. a is credutously
inferred ftom <W, D> (in symbols: <W, D> H, cL) iff for at least one extension of <W, D>,
ŒEE.
About the meaning and purpose of defaults, default theories and their extensions, Reiter writes
the fol iowing30:
Imagine a first order formalization of what we know about any reasonably complex world.
Since we cannot know everything about that world there will be gaps in our knowledge — this
first order theory will be incomplete. [...] [The] role ofa default is to fill in some ofthe gaps in
the knowtedge base, i.e. to further complete the underlying incompiete first order theory [...)Defaults therefore function as somewhat like meta-rules; they are instructions about how to
create an extension of this incomplete theory. Those formulae sanctioned by the defaults and
which extend the theory can then be viewed as beliefs about the world.
The set of formulae W of a default theory <W, D> represents therefore the certain, irrefutable
knowledge we have about the world. In their tum, the defaults of D instruct us how to extend this
certain but nevertheless incomplete knowÏedge in such a way as to obtain a set ofnonmonotonic
and therefore defeasible betiefs about the world. Since the publication ofReiter’s 1980 paper, this
interpretation ofdefauÏts in terms ofbeliefs bas been the standard one in Al literature. Even though
there is no syntactical way in Reiter’s logic to distinguish between deductively and inductively
obtained conclusions, each extension will contain two sorts offormulae: certain and irreflitable facts
obtained exclusively with the help of W, and uncertain and refutable betiefs obtained direct or
indirectly with the help ofdefaults.
If we were to formalize Twenty example, we would have the following schemata ofdefault31:
bird(x): fly(x)
fly(x)
Taking “Twenty” as the only constant symbol of our language and supposing it to belong to the
extension of”bird”, we would have as default theory the following pair <W,D>:
30 Reiter (1980), p. 86. Italics in the original.
31 The above definition of extension handies only closed default theories. Defaults containing free variables,
which are the more interesting ones, are interpreted as schemata ofdefaults representing ail ground instances
ofthe default.
W {bîrd(Twen)} bird(Twentyfly(Twen) }
Apptying the definition of extension, we wilÎ get Th({bird(Twenty), fly(Twenty)}) as the only
extension of<W, D>.
If we want to see how nonmonotonicity works in this case, it suffices to add to W the following
two formulae: Penguin(Twenty) and Vx(Penguin(x) —> —1fly(x)). As one might suspect, the belief
fly(Twenty) tvill flot belong any more to the extension of the new default theory. We see therefore
that the inferences formaiized with the help of defaults are in fact non truth-preserving and
consequently in accordance with our contemporaiy conception of induction.
Another characteristic of default logic determined by the definition of extension concems the
relation we have mentioned in Chapter 2 between inductive inference’s nonmonotonicity and global
character and what we have cailed total evidence conditions. As pointed out there, due to the
nonmonotonic feature of induction, when performing inductive inferences we need to make a sort of
global inspection in order to make sure that ail avaitable knowledge is being taken into account.
Ihis is done by step (iii) of the definition of extension. Since the test conceming the default’s
prerequisite and justification is made against the very extension we are trying to create, in order to
make a single inductive inference we need to check out the whole set of beliefs warranted by W and
D. The main difference between default logic’s total evidence condition and Camap’s requirement
of total evidence, for example, is that in default logic the whole thing is made flot by requiring, as
Camap suggests, ail available knowledge to be contained in the evidences. but by inspecting the
whole logical theory at the moment of detaching the hypothesis from the evidences.
Defaults like the one above whose justification is equivaient to the consequent are catled
normal defaults. In some cases, normal defaults give risc to unwanted extensions. Consider the
following situation to be formalized through default logic32:
a) “Typically high school dropouts are not employed”
b) “Typically Adults are empioyed”
c) “Peter is adult”
d) “Peter is a high school dropout”
This can be represented as follows:
1) school dropout (x): —iempioyed(x)
—empl oyed(x)
2) adult (x): employed(x)
employed(x)
$4
3) aduit(Peter)
4) school_dropout(Peter)
Given a n-tuple of constant symbols e = <c1, ..., en> and an open default labeled d with open
variables <x1, ..., x>, we cati U,, the closed default obtained by substituting e for x, i , ..., n. As
it can be easily seen, the theory composed by W {(3), (4)} and D {(i)<Peter>, (2)<peter>} witl have
two contradictory extensions, one containing employed(Peter) and the other containing
—emptoyed(Peter).
The point of course is that even though they may be aduits, school dropouts are exceptions to
(b), that is to say, default (I) has pciority over (2). Therefore, the extension that says that Peter is
employed shouid be somehow blocked. This can be done with the help of semi-normal defaults, that
is. defaults where the justification is flot equivalent to the consequent but just implies it. Given the
conjunctive normal form (f3 A ... A f3) ofthe justification f3 ofa default, we wili referto each t3 as
a component or part of the justification. If the defautt is flot abnormal33, we eau the (3 that is
equivalent to the consequent of the default the normal part of the default. The conjunction of the
other (31’s we cati the serni-normal part of the default. The exception condition mentioned above
could then be represented with the help ofsemi-normal defaults as follows:
2’) adult (x): employed(x) A —ischool dropout(x)
employed(x)
In this way, we will flot be able to use (2’)<peter> to conclude employed(Peter), for school
dropout(Peter) will belong to our extension.
4.2.2 Default Logic as a Logic ofInduction
At this point we may try to find out to what extent default logic can be taken as a Iogic of induction
as defined by us at the end of Section 4.1. To start with, since the inferences formalized with the
help of defaults are in fact non truth-preserving, default logic can be said to incorporate the
negative, non truth-preserving feature of inductive inferences. About the positive, rationat feature of
induction, triviatly the whole purpose of default logic (and ail other nonmonotonic Iogics) is to set
representational frameworks where cannons of commonsensical reasoning can be represented. 0f
course we expect these canons to be rationai, but default logic itself says nothing about which
inferences can be classified as rational. We may use defaults to represent reasonable statements
such as “typicaliy birds fly” but also absurd ones such as “typically black cats bring misfortune.”
That situation isa slight modification ofan example given in Reiter & Criscuolo (1981).
Abnormai defauits are those whose justification does flot imply the consequent. As far as we are concemed,
the applications we are envisaging here do flot require this sort ofdefaults.
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Given such representation, default logic just allows one to calculate the beliefs that may be drawn
from them if a certain set of hard facts W is given: if he wants to get only reasonable beliefs from
this process, then it is his responsibility to corne up with reasonabie default statements, according to
whatever definition of rationality he has.
As it can be easily noted, this is exactly how a system of induction is supposed to behave in
order to be said to be free from the problem of justification of induction and consequently satisfy
our representative criterion. Therefore, at least at first glance default iogic can be considered as a
sort of descriptive and justification-free approach to inductive inferences.
But if this is so, that is, if default logic can be said to provide a way to represent inductive
inferences, then default mies should be somehow susceptible of being interpreted in terms of
confinnation statements or inductive implications. In Chapter 3 we have shown how default
reasoning can be understood in tenns of hypotheses and evidences. According to that, what the
statement “typically birds fly” says is that x’s being a bird is an evidence for the hypothesis that x
flics. Since typicaÏly birds fly” may be formalized in default logic through
d = bfrd(x): fly(x)
fly(x)
the prerequisite and consequent of a defauit couid then be seen, respectively, as the evidence and
hypothesis of a confirmation statement or, equivalently, as the antecedent and consequent of an
inductive implication. Considering the possibility of an instance of d’s having its consequent added
to the extension, what d means is something like that: “being a bird inductiveiy imphes having the
property of flying.”
So far so good. But besides a prerequisite and a consequent, a default has also a justification
part. So, if defauits can realiy be read in terms of an inductive implication, where is the place of the
justification in the case where it is not equivalent to the consequent? As we have seen at the
beginning of this section, the traditional way of reading a defauit already embodies a sort of
implicative procedure:
a:j3
(
means that if CL is truc and h is consistent to assume j3, then conclude fp. This of course is the same
as saying that ct impiies f oniy in those cases where it is consistent to assume 3. Adapting this to
our inductive implication inteiretation, we would have that the above default means something like
“a inductively implies ( unless —,“ being the justification a sort of exception condition to the
inductive implication.
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In order to appreciate the importance ofthis conclusion, it xviii be useftil to look at some aspects
of the decision of adopting this inductive implication in lieu of the traditional relation of inductive
support. First of ail, it must be reminded that instead of a capricious choice, the rnentioned decision
is a necessary step if we are to proceed in a purely descriptive way. As we have seen, the very
notion of inductive support as conceived in Camap’s traditic’n leads to justificatory issues.
Therefore, if we want to deal with inductive inferences in a purely descriptive way, we have no
choice but to jump the inside aspect of the relation of inductive support and consider just the
extemal process according to xvhich a piece of evidence inductively implies the plausibility cf the
hypothesis.
An important consequence of this is that the representation of those exception conditions
capable of preventing us from concluding the plausibility of the hypothesis xviii become a necessary
part in the task of describing the relation of inductive support between two formulae. Traditionally,
only when the detachment of the hypothesis was taken into account was that particular ways of
defeating the plausibility of the hypothesis would be considered. Independently of the cfrcumstance
being or not favorable for detaching h, the relation of inductive support which xvas supposed to hold
between e and h would rernain unchanged. According to this new, purely descriptive position
however, a piece of evidence is said to inductively support a hypothesis only if the conditions
concerning the justification of the default are satisfied. Consequently, the very notion of evidence
xviii change: given a default
a: f3
a wouid be considered an evidence for p only if—43 does not hold. In the case of Twenty example,
its being a bird gives inductive support to or is an evidence for its flying only if Twenty is not one
of the exception to the mie that says that typicaily birds fly. As one can see, tins is in accordance
with the philosophy of induction and plausibility xve have sketched in Section 2.3. Anyway, the
important point is the insight which defauit iogic is giving us here concerning the notion of
inductive implication: in order te be properly represented, an inductive implication has to corne
along xvith information about the conditions according to xvhich its antecedent may 5e said to serve
as evidence for its consequent.
0f course the raison d’être of ail tins is the necessity of “detaching” the consequent from the
antecedent of these default inductive implications. We then arrive at a point winch one may have
already realized: besides fulfilling our inductive logic’s representative purpose, defauh iogic also
has the inductive logic’s component that we have narned relation of inductive consequence, winch
can be said to be default logic’s definition of extension or, from a more general perspective, its
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corresponding inferential relation H (be it deflned skeptically or credulously.) Indeed, interpreting
defaults in terms of inductive implications, the whole purpose of the definition of extension is to,
given a set of defaults and a knowledge situation, build a set called extension which will contain,
besides ail logical consequences of the knowledge situation, ail hypotheses that could be detached
from their evidences in that knowledge situation.
Despite this, we must cbncede that defauit logic does flot provide what we have called at the
end of last section a calculas of inductive implication. As a consequence of that, it will flot be abie
either to represent what we have called a n2odet of confirmation. The reason for this is that through
default logic we can represent only single inductive implication relations. We cannot represent
complex relations containing several defaults and other logical connectives to say, for instance, that
whenever a inductively implies 3 and 3 inductively implies (p, a inductively implies ; or that cc
aiways inductively implies cc. In order to perform such task, we would have to have a way of
concluding defaults or, we may say, a sort of meta-default logic.
About the “detached” consequents of inductive implications, according to our pragmatical or
descriptive approach to induction, they are to be taken as plausible or pragmatically probable
hypotheses. As we have said, default theories deal with two sorts of facts: certain and irrefiitable
formulae, obtained exclusively from W, and uncertain and refutable beliefs, obtained direct or
indirectly with the help of defaults. If we interpret defaults as inductive implications, these beliefs
will naturally be interpreted as om- plausible facts. However, as have seen, Reiter’s logic does
flot distinguish between these two sorts of facts. Once we have an extension of a certain default
theory, we are unable to differentiate between those formulae that were deductively obtained from
W from the ones that were obtained through defaults. With few exceptions such as Nute’s
defeasible logic and its variants34, almost ail nonmonotonic logics share this feature: they make no
distinction at ah between indefeasible and defeasible facts.
This indistinguishableness between defeasible and indefeasible formulae has some undesirable
consequences. The most trivial one is that we will not be able to represent at the same time certain
and plausible formulae: at each time that we get a specific set of formulae, we will have to decide if
we interpret them as “it is certain that” or as “it is plausible that.” This would be hannless if certain
facts were logically indistinguishable from plausible facts, that is to say, if at least in certain
situations plausible (deductive) reasoning had the sarne structure as certain reasoning.
Unfortunately, this assumption is incompatible with the characterization of plausihility and certainty
we have made in Chapter 2: tvhile certain reasoning is something susceptible of being formalized
through classical logic, plausible reasoning requires a paraconsistent and paracomplete logic.
Sec Nute (1994).
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Furthermore, by taking a iogic with no sort of qualification on formulae, we would neyer be able at
the language level to distinguish between the skeptical plausibiiity and the credulous plausibility.
Also, with no way to differentiate between certain and plausible facts, the whole conception of
induction as those inferences that generate plausible facts could neyer be properly represented.
Given ail this, it is clear that default logic lacks our third inductive logic’s component: the so-called
logic ofplausibiÏity.
4.2.2 The Logic ofPlausibiÏiry and the Froblem ofAnomalous Extensions
Besides these simple philosophicaily oriented arguments, there are some more technical ones that
point out the mentioned indistinguishableness between inductive and deductive facts (or, from a
deeper point of view, the lack of a logic of plausibility) as at the root of the problem of anomalous
extensions. One of the firsts to cail attention to that was Tarcisio Pequeno. In a paper of 1990, he
argues that there were fundamentally two problems arising from conflicts among nonmonotonic
conclusions that the existing nonmonotonic logics at the time couid flot give a proper solution35:
1) In cases where the simultaneous consideration of ail the evidence is able to decide in favor of
one of the conflicting partial conclusions, how to recognize it in order to select just the intended
conclusion and defeat the others? 2) On the other hand, in cases where the conffict cannot be
resolved no matter how carefully the available evidence is examined, a situation of real
contradiction arises. How should we give a suitable treatment for tins situation?
His diagnosis for these two problems rests on the satisfaction of Camap’s requfrement of total
evidence. According to him, the reason why most nonmonotonic logics are unable to solve these
problems is that they do not cope satisfactorily with the mentioned requirement. In order to
understand the rationale behind this daim, we need to take a doser look at the problems of
anomalous extension as described in AI literature. The first sort of problem mentioned by Pequeno
can be illustrated by slightly modif’ing our Twenty exampie as follows36:
a) Usually animais cannot fly;
b) Winged animais are exceptions to tins, they can fly;
c) Birds are animais;
d) Birds normally have wings;
e) Twenty is a bird.
If we were to use default logic, tins situation would be formalized as follows:
1) animal(x): —iflv(x) A —winged(x)
—fly(x)
Pequeno (1990), pp. 2 and 3.
This example was flrt given by P. Morris (193$).
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2) winged(x)
— fly(x)
3) bird(x)
—> animal(x)
4) bird(x): winged(x)
winged(x)
5) bird(Twenty)
As it can be easiiy checked, we wiil have here two extensions, one containing that Twenty flues
and the other that Twenty does flot fly. At first gÏance one may think that this is just one more case
of conflict bettveen defaults similar to the school dropout example and can be sorted out by
appropriate modifications of the justification part of some default mie. However, the justification
part of(1) is afready taldng into account the priority that (4) is supposed to have over it. The whole
problem is that by using (1) firstly, we are able to block the very default that will ailow us to
conclude the mentioned exception.
As we have mentioned, according to Pequeno the incapacity of default logic to solve probiems
like fi-ils rests on ils inability to represent ail the relevant knowledge. But what knowledge is lacking
in the formulation above? Considering what has been called defeaters of defaults, that is, formulae
which, being exceptions to an specific default, can defeat its consequent, he points out that we must
C distinguish between two ofthem: those that iogically contradict the consequent and those present in
the semi-normal part of the defauit thatjust biock its use. These are rougffly what John Poilock calis
rebutting defeaters and undercutting defeaters, respectively37. Adopting Pollock’s terminoiogy,
whule fly(Twenty) is a rebutting defeater of(l)Twenw, winged(Twenty) is an undercutting defeater.
That is the first sort of information that default Iogic fails to take into account. The second one
is related to the treatment that shouid be given to each sort of defeater. According to Pequeno, we
should requfre much more from rebutting defeaters than from undercutting defeaters. More
specifically, rebutting defeaters by his definition shoutd contradict the consequent of the default in a
strong, deductive way. As a resuit, formuiae which contradict the consequent and were obtained
nonmonotonicaiiy wouid not be taken as rebutting defeaters and consequently will not be abie to
biock the use of the default. On the other hand, formulae that contradict the semi-normal part of the
defauit just in a weak, inductive way are bona-fide undercutting defeaters. Consequentiy they may
by themselves block the use of the default.
Given this, it is trivial what the second relevant information that defauh logic fails to take into
account is: in the case of our Twenty example. that —winged(Twenty) was obtained through a
Q default. Since default logic makes no distinction at ail between deductiveiy obtained and inductivelyobtained formulae, it cannot treat rebutting defeaters and undercutting defeaters, or the normal and
Poflock (19$7).
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semi-normal parts of the default according to the way we have explained above. And it is the non
fulfiulment of Camap’s requirernent which this inability to distinguish between monotonic and
nonmonotonic fonnulae causes that makes default logic incapable of properly solving the problem
iilustrated in our last example.
As mentioned by Pequeno, the second class ofproblems concems cases of contradictions where
“the conflict cannot be resolved no matter how carefully the availahie evidence is examined” and “a
situation of real contradiction arises.” Consider the example we gave in Chapter 2 where it is known
that (a) Quakers usually are pacifists, (b) republicans usually are flot pacffist and (c) Richard Nixon
is both a Quaker (d) and a republican. This would be formalized in default logic as follows:
1) Quaker(x): pacifist(x)
pacifist(x)
2) republican(x): —ipacffist(x)
—ipacifist (x)
3) QuakerÇNixon)
4) repubiican(Nixon)
Trivialiy, we will have here two contradictory extensions: orie containing pacifist(Nixon) and
the other —ipacifist(Nixon). In contrast to our previous example however, we have here no means to
say winch default has priority over the other. The knowledge situation simply does flot provide such
sort of information. The cause of the contradiction is flot therefore the representationai framework
vie are using, but the incompleteness ofthe knowledge we are trying to represent.
Pequeno argues that Reiter’s choice approach38 precludes us from satisfying Camap’s
requirement of total evidence. In the case of Nixon’s example, keeping the two contradictory
conclusions apart from each other will make impossible for us to see from one extension that the
other conclusion is equaily plausible. That is to say, from the point of view of each extension, we
are triviaily failing to take into account ail relevant knowledge. 0f course if vie adopt an outside
point of view with respect to the extensions we will be able to see that both pacifistÇNixon) and
—ipacifist(Nixon) are plausible. However, since the logical reasoning (both monotonic and
nonmonotonic) aiways takes place inside and flot outside each extension (in such a way as to sec ail
extensions at the same time), we can say that the outside point of view leaves the scope of the
logicai reasoning we are concemed about. Therefore, if we agree that Camap’s requirement is to be
satisfied inside those structures in which the reasoning takes place, then the choice account in fact
does not satisfy from a strict point of view Camap’s requirernent of total evidence.
We havo explained in Section 3.2 why Reiters logic is better said te fonnaiize n choice approach to
induction than a stricti’. credulous one.
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Based on this, Pequeno argues that the proper way to deal with contradictory conclusions
obtained tbrough defaults is to keep them in the same extension and at the same time have a
paraconsistent mechanism to reason about them. In bis words39:
[...] these contradictory conclusions should be assimilated in a single theory and reasoned out
just as any other. This would emphasize the need for a better understanding of this kind of
situation in order to provide a purely Iogical analysis for them. In other words, to arrive at these
contradictions that emerge in the course of reasoning is just to give the right account of what is
going on in the situation. Obviously tins could not be done in classical logic. A special logic, a
paraconsistent one, is required.
We see then the very same point we have made in Chapter 3 being made in connection with the
fonnalization of commonsense reasoning. Despite the discussion being centered around
inconsistency problems arising from the use of a specific fonnalism, the thesis defended by
Pequeno is actually a general one according to winch since inconsistency is a natural companion of
nonmonotonic reasoning, paraconsistency should play some role in the formalization of such
reasoning.
Nowadays, as exemplffied by the work of many AI theorists such as Dov Gabbay, Ofer Arieli,
Amon Avron, Johan Akker and Pequeno himself, the importance of paraconsistency for the
formalization of monotonie reasoning has been more and more recognized40. As far as we are
concemed, the important point is that ah these theorists took a credulous approach of induction in
which the necessity of a paraconsistent treatment of inductive conclusions is explicitly recognized.
4.3 The System IDL & LEI
The problems mentioned in the previous section with default logic motivated some theorists to
develop nonmonotonic systems winch explicitly distinguish between certain and defeasible facts.
As a consequence of that, it became necessary the development of an inferential mechanism meant
to replace classical logic as the monotonie basis of the nonmonotonic logic in question and able to
reason distinctly about irrefritable, monotonically obtained conclusions on the one hand and
reftitable, nonmonotonically obtained conclusions on the other.
Incidentally, the special way according to which this new logic is suppose to treat defeasible
facts made possible to deal with Minsky’s two complaints about classical logic’s ability to represent
conunonsense reasoning winch we have shown at the beginnin of the previous section. While
nonmonotonic logics can be said to cope in a relativelv satisfactory way with Minsky’s first
constraint, regarding the second one no adequate way of dealing with contradictions vas seriously
Pequeno & Buchsbaum (1991).
Gabbav & Hunter (1991) (1992). Aie1i & Avron (2000), Avron & Lev (2001). Aider & Tan (1993).
considered during ail the 1970’s and 1980’s. Despite the existence since the 1970’s of a class of
logical systems able to represent inconsistent and nontrivial theories, namely paraconsistent logics,
it tvas flot until the beginning ofthe 1990’s that AI theorists came up with n “project” which would
effectively aHow us to answer Minsky’s two criticisms in a cohesive tvay. Arnon Avron and Ido
Lev describe the essence of such project41:
for a long time the research efforts on paraconsistency and on nonmonotonic reasoning were
separated. [...] However, in recent years the formai connections between these two areas have
begun to be revealed. It is only natural that such a connection would exist, because conclusions
that are drawn based on partial information may contradict new and more reliable information,
and each new piece of information may contradict previous information and hence force us to
revise some of our knowledge.
The idea is to adopt a paraconsistent logic to deal with the contradictions winch are sure to arise
from reasoning about commonsense. We have abeady mentioned in the previous section the names
of some theorists who have worked with a sort of paraconsistent approach to nonmonotonic
reasoning. From the point ofview of our division of inductive theories into credulous and skepticai,
tins step had the important consequence of tuming the credulous account of inductive inferences
into a logically tenable approacli. from a more technicai point of view, it showed how we might
have a paraconsistent logic as the underlying logic of a specific nonmonotonic inferential system.
Since the paraconsistent behavior is primarily directed towards nonmonotonically obtained or
plausible facts, these approaches also gave important hints of how a credulous logic of plausibility
should proceed in connection with an inductive logic in the style of the existing nonmonotonic
logics.
4.3.1 Inconsistent Defatilt Logic
Due to space reasons, we do flot intend here to survey ail or even the main paraconsistent
nonmonotonic Iogics. Rather, we will try to continue the analysis started in the previous section and
show how Reiter’s default logic could be expanded in such a way as to allow us to reason
paraconsistently about plausible facts.
Incidentally, this is exactly the project proposed by Pequeno in his 1991 paper. There, lie
presents n new default logic where nonrnonotonically obtained facts are syntactically distinguished
from certain ones and a paraconsistent logic is used to reason about the nonmonotonic, refutable
conclusions. Advancing a little bit our conclusive remarks, we may say that while Reiter’s default
logic does provide n descriptive account for induction but lias nothing whieh could resemble a logic
of plausibility, Pequeno’s defauli logic provides a similar inductive mechanisrn but at this time in
connection with a (exclusively credulous) logic of plausibility. In subsequent works, exploring a
31 & Lev (2001), p. 60.
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une already present in the 1991 paper, Pequeno extended his system in such a way as to incitide
also a skeptical treatment of plausible conclusions. Hotvever, both in the case of Reiter’s logic and
Pequeno’s systems, there is no way one could develop, out ofthe logical devices available, neither
something worthy of being called a calculus of inductive implication nor what we have called a
model of confirmation.
In his 1991 article, Pequeno proposes to solve the two problems we have mentioned in the
previous section by introducing a logic called by him Inconsistent Default Logic (IDL) which
modifies Reiter’s default in such a way as to explicitly distinguish between monotonic and
nonmonotonic formulae on the one hand, and the normal and semi-normal parts of the defatiit on
the other. The distinction between rebutting defeater and undercutting defeater cornes automatically
from that. In order to keep contradictory inductive conclusions in the same extension, he proposes a
new, paraconsistent logic in the lieu of classical logic as 1DL’s undertining monotonic logic. The
general IDL default rule is stated below.
u: ; [3
(p?
Pequeno caïls u the antecedent, cp the defaztÏt condition and f3 the proviso of the default. The
first of the two above-mentioned distinctions is achieved by attaching to the consequent of the
defautt the symbol ?, which is intent to indicate that the formula in question, if inferred, would be
done nonmonotonically. The second distinction is reached by spïitting the justification part of
Reiter’s default into two: one representing the normal component ((p), and other representing the
sem i-normal part (f3). Fie explains these points as fotÏows42:
This rule is a modification of Reiter’s rule in accordance with the following considerations:
[First] a defeasible conclusion can neyer have the same epistemic status as an irrefutable one,
obtained from deduction. Thus in IDL the former are distinguished from the latter by the use of
a question mark (?) suffixing defeasibte formulas. [Second] IDL implements the idea of
accommodating conflicting views in the same extension. Therefore, in IDL the defeasibte
negation of a defautt condition (—1B)? [here represented by (—p)?] (we eau it a weak
contradiction) does flot prevent the application of the default mie. In order to defeat a default
application a strong contradiction is —1B required. [Third] The seini-normal part of a defatilt is
frequently used to express an exception condition. In IDL, C [that here is represented by [3] is
really taken as aproviso for the application ofthe rule, receiving a different treatment. In order
to defeat the application of an IDL default rule by its proviso, a weak contradiction, (—1C)?,
s uffice s
As usual, a default theory, now called IDL theoiy, is a pair <W, D> where W is a set ofclosed
formulae and D is a set of IDL defaults. Closed defaults and closed theories are also defined as
usual. The notion of extension is defined as follows:
42 Ibid. Italics in the original.
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Let S be a set of closed formulae and <W, D> a closed IDL theory. f(S) is the smallest set
satisfying the following conditions:
(j) W c:
(ii) Th(F(S)) c
(iii) If a: cp; J3 e D, ŒeF(S), —pETh(W) and (—43)?ES, then (p?eF(S)
p?
A set of formulae E is an extension of<W, D> ifff(E) = E, that is, iff E is a fixed point ofthe
operator F.
In order to sec how the above definition distinguishes between rebutting defeaters and
undercutting defeaters, let us sec how it deals with the first sort of problem that default logic vas
unable to solve. Facts (a)-(e) tvill be represented in IDL as follows:
1) animal(x): —fly(x): —iwinged(x)
—ifly(x)?
2) winged(x) —> fly(x)
3) bird(x) —+ animal(x)
4) bird(x): winged(x)
winged(x)?
5) bird(Twentv)
We sec that (1) and (4) are now written in Pequeno’s notation. Assuming Twenty as the only
constant symbol ofthe language, the corresponding IDL theory tvill be <W, D>, where W = {(2),
(3), (5)} and D {(1)<iwenty>, (4)<Twentv>}. As before, we can use (4)<Twenty> along with (2) and
conclude that Twenty flics. Adopting the other, anomalous path we can conclude animal(Twenty’)?
from (5) and (2). From it, by using (l)<Tventy>, we conclude —,fly(Twenty)?, and by contrapositive on
(2) we get —winged(Twenty)?. Notice however that since —vinged(Twenty)? vas obtained through
a default, it does flot belong to Th(W). As such, by item (iii) ofthe definition of extension it cannot
be a rebutting defeater of (4)<Tventy>. Therefore, we can stiil use (4)<Twèn,’> to conclude
winged(Twenty)?. But since —tvinged(Twenty) is in the semi-normal part of (1 )<Ten>, by the same
item (iii), we have that the just inferred conclusion winged(Twenty)? is a undercutting defeater of
(‘)<Tweny>. Consequently, it will block the use of (l)<Twen> and therefore made us realize that its
previous utitization was in fact mistaken. Therefore, only one extension containing fly(Twenty)?
will be generated.
u Pequeno (1990), p. 20. As confirmed by Pequeno in personat conversation, the original version of the
defmition of extension contains a misprint in item (iii). What we present above is the corrected definition as
laid down by him in the mentioned conversation.
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As we have seen, in order to deal with situations such as Nixon example Pequeno proposes to
keep the plausible contradictory conclusions in the same extension and reason paraconsistently
about them. This is achieved by changing the logic that vi1l defme the operator Th( ) in the
defmition of extension: instead of classical logic, we will have a paraconsistent logic able to reason
non-trivially in the presence of plausible contradictions. In his words’:
In the definition of extension above, Th(f(S)) stands for the closure under deduction of the set
of formulas f(S). This deduction is flot deduction on classical logic, but a special logic [...j
[that] works classically for monotonic conclusions but paraconsistently for nonmonotonic ones
(Notice that f(S) includes formulas with ‘?‘).
Rewritten in IDL’s notation, Nixon example becomes almost like the formalization we gave in
Reiter’s logic:
1) Quaker(x): pacifist(x);
pacifist(x)?
2) republican(x): .-ipacifist(x);
(—ipacifist (x))?
3) Quaker(Nixon)
4) republican(Nixon)
As it can be easily seen, in this case we vi1l have only one extension containing both
pacifist(Nixon)? and (—pacifist(Nixon))?. Since the logic responsible for reasoning about the
extension’s formuÏae is a paraconsistent one, this contradiction will flot trivialize the logical theory.
Conceming the notion of inductive implication we have agreed Reiter’s default logic
formalizes, Pequeno’s IDL does a similar job but with a very important difference: it recognizes the
epistemological status of nonmonotonic conclusions, marking thom with a special symbol. The
other significant difference concems the interpretation given to the exception part of the inductive
implication. Transiating Pequeno’s default into our language of inductive implication,
c: (p; (3
cp?
would mean something like “a inductively implies (p unless —p is the case or
—43 is plausible.”
Operationally this means that while (—43)? is enough to prevent a from being taken as an evidence
for cp, (—p)? is not: we tvill need to ho certain about
—p to prevent ( from being inductively implied
by a. This, we must concede, is an important refinement of the notion of inductive implication as
understood from Reiter’s default logic. It has however the disadvantage of restricting the exception
of inductive implications only to plausible formulae. II would be much botter if we could choose
Pequeno (1990), p. 21.
95
C’ As we have seen, in order to deal with situations such as Nixon example Pequeno proposes to
keep the plausible contradictory conclusions in the same extension and reason paraconsistently
about them. This is achieved by changing the logic that will define the operator Th( ) in the
definition of extension: instead ofclassical logic, we will have a paraconsistent logic able to reason
non-trivially in the presence of plausible contradictions. In bis words44:
In the definition of extension above, Th(f(S)) stands for the closure under deduction of the set
of formulas f(S). This deduction is not deduction on classical logic, but a special logic [...]
[thatj works classically for monotonic conclusions but paraconsistently for nonmonotonic ones
(Notice that T(S) includes formulas with’?’).
Rewritten in IDL’s notation, Nixon example becomes almost like the formalization we gave in
Reiter’s logic:
1) Quaker(x): pacifist(x);
pacifist(x)?
2) republican(x): —ipacifist(x)
(—ipacifist (x))?
3) Quaker(Nixon)
4) republican(Nixon)
As it can 5e easily seen, in this case we will have only one extension containing both
pacifist(Nixon)? and (—ipacifist(Nixon))?. Since the logic responsible for reasoning about the
extension’s formulae is a paraconsistent one, this contradiction will not trivialize the logical theory.
Concerning the notion of inductive implication we have agreed Reiter’s default logic
formalizes, Pequeno’s IDL does a similar job but with a very important difference: it recognizes the
epistemological status of nonmonotonic conclusions, marking them with a special symbol. The
other significant difference concems the interpretation given to the exception part of the inductive
implication. Translating Pequeno’s default into our language of inductive implication,
u: cp; f3
(p?
would mean something like “u inductively implies p unless —p is the case or —if3 is plausible.”
Operationally tins means that while (—43)? is enough to prevent u from being taken as an evidence
for (p, (—p)? is flot: we will need to 5e certain about
—p to prevent p from being inductively implied
b u. Tins, we must concede, is an important refinernent of the notion of inductive implication as
understood from Reiter’s defauit logic. It has however the disadvantage of restricting the exception
of inductive implications only to plausible formcilae. It would be ;nuch better if we could choose
Pequeno (1990). p. 21.
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C what sort of formulae (plausible or certain) we want to consider in the exception of our inductive
implication.
4.3.2 Vie Logic ofEpistemic Inconsistencies (or A Logic ofFÏausibility)
A very important improvement of IDL vas that, by introducing a syntactical mark to
distinguish between monotonic and nonmonotonically obtained facts, it lefi the path to a logic of
plausibility open. Indeed, one year afier the publication of IDL, in an article written conjointly with
Arthur Buchsbaum, Pequeno laid down in an axiomatic and semantic way the paraconsistent logic
which is supposed to serve as the monotonic basis of IDL and which could play the role of our logic
of plausibility. They named it the Logic of Episternic Inconsistency (LEI)45. In addition to the
standard formulae ofpropositional calculus’ language, LEI’s language ? contains formulae marked
with the question mark ‘?‘ (in such a way that if ci is a formula of?, ci? is also so.) Formulae ofthe
form ci?, which may be read as “ci is plausible’”46, are exactly those formulae obtained with the use
of some IDL defauft and added to the extension with the syrnbol ? attached to it.
Following the strategy used by Newton da Costa in bis paraconsistent calculus C147, LEI’s
axiomatic an-ives at a paraconsistent behavior with regard to ?-marked formulae by modifying the
reductio ad absurdum axiom in such a way as to allow it to be used only in connection with ?-free
formulae. Letting Latin letters denote such ?-free formulae, the redttctio ad absttrdttm axiom is
rewritten as follows:
(ci —> B) —>((ci -> -B) - —ci)
Therefore, - behaves paraconsistently with respect to ?-marked formulae and classically with
respect to ?-free formulae. In order to get a negation that behaves classically independently of the
form of the formulae, they define a stronger negation as follows:
def ci _> (j A —p)
where p is an arbitraiy sentential letter.
‘ Pequeno & Buchsbaum (1991).
In the 1991 article, the interpretation given for ?-marked and ?-free formuiae is standard one given by
nonrnonotonic theorists: they are referred with the help of tenns like “defeasible” and “indefeasible” or
“refutahie” and “frrefutahle.” Only in an article alreadv cited in the 1991 paper but published only two years
after is that u? was explicitÏy taken as meaning “ci is plausible” (Buchsbaum & Pequeno (1993).) One year
after, in an article written conjointly with Ana Tereza Martins, u? was interpreted simultaneouslv as “o. is
plausible” and “there is evidence for ci” (Mai-tins & Pequeno (1994).) Despite these and others uses of the
tenn “plausibility,” it was onlv in 1997, in the doctoral dissertation of Martins. co-supenised hv Pequeno,
that LEI was explicitlv presented as something like a logic ofplausibility (Mai-tins (199f).)
da Costa (1974).
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It is interesting to note that in da Costa’s calculus C1 the reductio ad absitrditm axiom is
conditioned to B’s explicitly satisfying the law of non-contradiction. Letting B° be an abbreviation
for —(B A —1B), da Costa’s redttctio ad absttrdum axiom is stated as B° — ((A —> B) —> ((A —> —1B)
—* —1A))48. In other words, ail formulae B are taken as contradictable unless explicitly marked with
O LEI’s presupposition is exactiy the opposite: formulae are in general non contradictable, and only
those plausible, default generated ones are taken as having a paraconsistent behavior.
Besides the reductio ad absutdttm axiom, we can mention the following axioms or theorems of
LEI:
1. a—>a? 2. a??—>a?
3. —(a. A -9CC) 4. (—7CC)? -* -,(c?)
5. CC-CL 6. (Œ?—>f3?)—>(Œ--*f3)?
7. (ce? y f3?) *- (a y f3)? 8. (CL A f3)? —> a? A f3?
9. -i
—* f3) ÷-* (a A —if3) 10. -i(cc A f3) (—Œ y —if3)
l1.—7(Œvf3)-+(-iŒA-f3) 12.av-,Œ
The first four schemas requfre some comments. (1) and (2) lay down two important features of
? according to which irrefutability implies plausibility and additional ?‘s are frrelevant to plausible
formulae, respectively. From the point of view of a possible world style semantics, they mean that
the accessibility relation between what we may cali plausible worlds is reflexive and transitive,
respectively. As we will see below, the semantics proposed by Pequeno and Buchsbaum, which
does follow a Kripke style, really imposes these restrictions on its “accessibility relation.” It is quite
significant that in 1993 Johan Akker proposed a modified version of the LEI-IDL system (along
with practical arguments for it) according to which (2) is not valid and defaults are sensitive to
multiple level plausible fonnulae49. Even though he does not mention a semantic component called
“accessibility relation,” clearly bis solution can be characterized as a LEI where such relation is flot
necessarily transitive. Letting aside questions like which system is the best — with or without (2),
Akker’s proposai had the ment of showing that logics of plausibility slightly different from LEI in
which (2) (or, we may say, (1)) does flot hold may be both from a theoretical as well as from a
practical point ofview worthy of being investigated.
Formula (3), winch is a theorem, exemplifies a very interesting feature of LEI. It confronts in a
direct way da Costa’s statement that a necessary condition that ail paraconsistent logic should
satisfy is that the pninciple of non-contradiction nmst flot be a theorem50. As it vi1l be clear when we
Sec da Costa (1974).
Akker & lan (1993).
Sec da Costa (1974).
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show LEI’s semantics, the reason for (3)’s beii-ig a theorem is that —i(Œ A —ici.) is flot an intra-logical
representation of the principle of non-contradiction, for is a weak, non-exclusive negation. The non-
satisfaction of the mentioned principle is stated by a meta property according to which we may have a
non trivial set offormulae A such that, for some formulae a, A H Œ? and A H —(n?).
The right-side of axiom (4), let us eau it (4’), has been a very controversial feature of LEI.
Intuitively we may accept that the implausibility of ci. implies the plausibility of —ici. (—i(Œ?) —
(—‘a)?). The same however does not seem to hold regarding the plausibility of —iŒ’5 implying the
implausibility ofa ((—iCC)?
— —i(Œ?)). If we interpret ci.? as meaning “there is evidence for ci.,” then
—(cL?) will mean “there is no evidence for ci..” Therefore, (—ici.)? —> —i(Œ?) will mean “if there is
evidence for —cc, then there is no evidence for ci.,” which is unacceptably counterintuitive.
This objection is important for two reasons. First, from the point ofview of default reasoning, it
is (4’) what guarantees that “actual” {a?, —(ci.?)} and not just “apparent” {a?, (—,Œ)?} plausible
contradictions arise from the use of defaults. In Nixon example, from (4’) and (—1pacffist(Nixon))?
we are able to get —i(pacifist(Nixon)?), winch along with —ipacifist(Nixon) represents a
contradiction that unless treated paraconsistently has the capacity to trivialize the extension. The
point however is that if we do flot accept (4’), we will flot have —i(pacifist(Nixon)?) and
consequently any contradiction of the sort {a, —icL}. We at most will be faced with things like {a?,
(—iŒ)?} winch may indeed be called plausible contradictions but have no power to trivialize the
theory. Consequently, there will be no need of a non-classical, paraconsistent logic to reason about
?-marked formulae.
The problem with all that is that since it is the actual and not apparent plausible contradictions
what requires paraconsistency, we may quite fairly doubt if paraconsistency is really, as Pequeno
defends, a necessary or even desfrable feature of formalized common sense reasoning. If in the very
framework that Pequeno built to support his thesis, “actual” inductive contradictions appear only
with the help of a quite controversial and artificial axiom without winch no paraconsistency would
be requfred, then it seems that rather than supporting bis thesis, the system LEI-IDL in fact shows
that nonmonotonic reasoning can go on very nicely without paraconsistency.
0f course the conclusion stated above depends on the very particular formalism we are
discussing. If, for instance, we follow da Costa’s style and take formulac as contradictable unless
explicitly stated the opposite, then contradictions corning from the use of defaults would be actual
contradictions and consequently require some sort of paraconsistent mechanisrn to reason about
them. It also depends on the use of the phrases “actual contradiction” and “apparent contradiction.”
What we mean is that our twofold division comprises cmlv “formai contradiction,” that is.
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contradictions depending on the material language one is using. If we adopt a more general, we may
say conceptuai point of view, then the set {“a is plausible”, “—ii-C is plausible”} can be taken as an
authentic contradiction winch, depending on the language used, may or flot give rise to a formai
actual contradiction. If we use a modal operator in the style of Pequeno’s to represent plausibility,
only (formal) apparent contradictions will arise from the mentioned set. If instead we follow da
Costa’s path and decide to mark certain rather than plausible facts, then from the same set we will
be faced with (formai) actual contradictions. Therefore, the argument above stated tbreats
Pequeno’s thesis only with regard to formai paraconsistency. Even if we drop (4’) we are stili lefi
with a rnuch more basic form ofparaconsistency: what we may cali conceptual paraconsistency51.
The second point is concemed with the relation of plausibility and possibility on the one hand,
and LEI and S5 on the other. In Mai-tins (1997), (—iŒ)? — —i(Œ?) vas presented as the main
difference between the modal operators ? of LEI and D of S5. In a more general way, it was
considered as one of the most basic differences between the notions of plausibility and possibility:
if one decides to drop (4’), the two operators ? and as well as the notions of plausibility and
possibility will become indistinguishable from one another. The problem again is that, since we do
not have good reasons to keep (4’), aIl the use of the term “plausibility” as well as the presentation
of LEI as a logic ofplausibility loses its sense.
About the framework in winch the tme-value of ?-marked formulae is analyzed, the semantics
presented in the 1991 article suggests a very interesting way of explicating the notions of
plausibility. The intuition behind such semantics rests on the consideration of different observations
ofthe same phenomenon. As they write52:
The basic intuition to be captured by the sernantics of LEI is truthfulness relative to multiple
observations of a same phenomenon, taken under different conditions, when information about
these conditions (or even on how observations can be affected by them) is not available. [...]
We are facing again a situation of insufficient knowledge leading to disagreement. It parallels
our initial motivation about multiple extensions generated by a default theory when lack of
knowledge does not enable the control ofthe selection of plausible alternatives.
Following tins idea, a formai semantic moUd53 is defined as a non-empty collection C of
classical valuations winch attribute to each propositional symbolp a truth-value O or 1. The function
V winch will make use of the members of C to evaluated the semantic value of formulae is defined
SI In a similar way we can obtain the notion cf concepwal paracompleteness. Thèse two notions wiil play an
important raie in the discussion we xviii carry oui in the next chapter about the nature cf the skeptical and
credulcus notions cf plausibilitv.
52 Pequeno & Buchsbaum (1991).
From now on, we will use the term “moUd” in the sanie wav it is used in standard textbooks cf modal
iogic: rather thm denoting an interpretation that satisfies a specific set cf forrnulae, as it does in prapositionai
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through two auxiliary functions Vm< and V. Since the tmth-vaiue of formula ct, let us say, is
analyzed with the help of a set of ciassical valuations representing different interpretations of the
same phenomenon, one may adopt two different positions in this endeavor: a skeptical one which
by requfring a to be truc in ail members of C tries to minimize the tmth-value of a, and a credulous
one which by requiring Œ to be truc in at least one member of C tries to maximize its true-value. It
is these two positions what the functions vmax and Vm1r1, respectively, are meant to represent.
Plausible formuiae are analyzed tbrough a maximal position, and ?-free formula, which represent
irrefutable, certain formulae are analyzed through a minimal perspective. Formally, the functions V,
Vm and vm are as follows:
V(a) = 1 iff for ail cCC, Vm°(a) = 1;
= Vmmfl(p)
= vc(p);
vm1’e(iŒ) = 1 iffV() = O;
VmmC(_lŒ)
= 1 iffVm(Œ) = O;
= 1 iff for at least one c’ e C, VmC.(Œ) 1;
VmC(Œ?)
= 1 iff for ail c’eC, VmC,(Œ) =1;
C’ VC(a —* f3) = 1 iff Vx(a) = O or Vm(f3) = 1;
—> f3) 1 iff VrnaxC(Œ) = O or Vmmn(f3) = Ï.
A f3) = 1 iffVm(a) = Ï and V”(f3) = 1;
VmhIC(Œ A f3) = 1 iffVmhlC(Œ) = 1 and Vmmn(p) = 1;
V f3) = Ï iff Vxc(Œ) = 1 or Vax(f3) = 1
VmC(Œ y f3) = 1 iff VmmnC(Œ) = 1 or Vmu1(f3) = 1.
The most remarkable feature ofthis semantic framework to us is the recognition of two postures
supposedly necessaiy for the analysis of plausible facts: a skeptical and a credulous one. Even
though ?-marked formulae are analyzed according to a creduious perspective, both functions Vm
and vm are needed to assign tmth-values to formulae. This is due to the way negation formulae are
evaluated: the tmth-value of negation formulae given by the skeptical function depends on the
credulous function, and vice-versa. This strange behavior of negation is at the root of the axiom (4’)
ana consequently of the formal actual paraconsistent behavior of?. It is also it what differentiates
this sort ofsemantics from traditional modal logic’s one: if by Yack of philosophicaljustffication, for
instance, we drop (4’), we will be left with a semantics that is in ail essential aspects
indistinguishable from Kripke’s possible world sernantics. Aiso noteworthy is the way certain and
plausible facts are formally distinguished from each other: while in order for plausible, ?-marked
and first-order classical logic, a moUd vit1 be taken here as the interpretation itseÏf, that is, the structure in
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formulae to be valid the inside sentence has to be true in at least one valuation c, for certain, ?-free
formulae the whole formula has to be true in ail valuations.
After the publication of the 1990 and 1991 articles, different versions of LEI and IDL were
proposed. In Buchsbaum (1995) a first-order axiomatic of LEI, followed by a complete and sotind
semantics, was presented. In Martins (1997) a first-order sequent calculus presentation was laid
down. In Bucbsbaum (1995), the exclamation mark operator! was defined as follows:
Œ! df((’Œ)?)
Compared to traditional modal logic, would play the role of D: Vm(&) = 1 iff for ail c’eC,
VmC,(Œ)
= 1. However, in contrast to ?, ! bas a classical behavior: for fornnilae marked with !, alt
classical laws are valid.
The alternative of droping axiom (4’) has been formaliy explored in the most recent works of
Pequeno and Buchsbaum. In Pequeno, Buchsbaum & Pequeno (2001) and Buchsbaum, Pequeno &
Pequeno (2004), LEI (renarned in these works the Logic ofAppearance and the Logic of Plausible
Dedttction, respectively) does not contain (4’) as an axiom, which makes ? behave from a format
point of view no more paraconsistently. In the 2001 article, ! is introduced as meaning the strong or
skeptical plausibility, while ?, which is derived from it (cd =def —((-—a)?)) is meant to represent the
weak or credulous plausibility. Since now? is flot any more a paraconsistent operator, they came up
in these articles with two operators that are both from a syntactical as well as from a semantic point
ofview identical to S5’s c and D. Naturally, in these versions the atixiliary functions V’’ and Vi”
are given up and the semantic follows, in ail relevant respects, the traditional style of possible world
semantics.
In order to differentiate ? and ! from o and D as well as to justify the tise of the term
plausibility rather than simply possibility and necessity, they incorporate into the same logical
language the symbols o and D (being one primitive and the other derivate
— def —1D---1a) with
their traditional meanings. The formai distinction between the two notions of necessity and
skeptical plausibility (and consequently between possibility and credulous plausibility) is done
syntactically through the axiom DŒ
— a!. Semantically, this is done through the use oftwo sets of
worlds, one called the set ofpossible wortds and the other catled the set ofplausible worlds, where
the latter is a proper subset ofthe former. In this say, eveiy necessary (or possible formula) will also
be n skeptically (or credulously) plausible formula and every plausible world will also be a possible
world, btit not vice-versa. Conceming the philosophical analysis of the notion of plausibility, this
which the truth-value ofthe formulae ofthe language will be evaluated.
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Theorem 5.4.19. Ml formulae of L9 that satisfy one of the following schernas of formula are S5?-
theorems (and consequently S57-valid.)
(av f3!)! *3(a! y f3!) (av f3?)! ÷-*(a! y f3?)
(a A f3?)? +-* (CL? A f3?) (a A f3!)? <—* (a? A f3!)
5.4.2 first-order Paranormal ModctÏ Logic
Defrnition 5.4.10. Let f = <W,R,...> be an n-frame. Afirst-order modal interpretation y in F,
winch is a modal interpretation in and F, is a quadruple <D,VC,VF,VR> where D is a function
winch maps each weW to some non-empty set called the domain of w, Vc is a fiinction winch
assigns to each wcW and cKc an element ofD(w), VF is a function winch assigns to each n-ary
function symbol fEKf and weW a function from D(w) to D(w) and VR is a frmnction winch assigns
to each n-ary relation symbol rEKR and world wEW a subset ofD(w).
Definition 5.4.11. Let M = <W,R,. . .,v> be an n-model. We say M is afirst-order modet ofarity n
(or simply a first-order n-model) if y is a first-order modal interpretation.
Definition 5.4.12. Let F = <W,R1,. . . ,R> be an n-frame and y <D,VC,VF,VR> a first-order
modal interpretation in F. We say y is monotonic iff, for every w,w’ eW, if wR1w’ then
D(w)D(w’), for any i=l ,. . . ,n. We cali the first-order n-model M based on F a monotonic first
order n-modet.
Definition 5.4.13. Let f = <W,R,...> be an n-frame and y <D,VC,VF,VR> a first order modal
interpretation in F. We say y is a rigid first order modal interpretation iff, for each cEIÇ and
w,w’cW, Vc(w,c) = Vc(w’,c) and for eveiy feKf and w,w’EW, VF(f,w) = VF(f,w’). We cali the
first-order n-model M based on f a rigidfirst-order n-mortel.
from now on in tins section, we will consider only monotonic and rigid first-order n-models in
such a way that, when we speak of a first-order n-model, we are meaning a monotonic and rigid
first-order n-model.
Definition 5.4.14. Let M = <W,R,..., y> be a first-order n-model. An assignment in M is a
ftinction s that assigrs to each xEK an element s(x). (It is not required that s(x) be in the domain
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of eveiy world.) We write s{xla] for the mapping that is like s on ail variables except x and which
maps x to a20.
Definition 5.4.15. Let M <W,R,. . .,v> be a first order n-model with y = <D,VC,VF,VR>, weW a
world of M and s an assignment in M. The denotationfztnction is defined as follows:
(I) IfcEKcthen = Vc(w,c);
(ii) If xEKv then cI(x) = s(x);
(iii) If fEKF and t1 t, are terms in K, then IMW(f(t1, ..., ta)) = VF(w,f)(dIIv5(tI),
Definition 5.4.16. Let 3 be a ?-modal logic basis ofarity n. Afirst-order Qk-modaÏ valuation Q
in 9 and aflrst-order Tjk_modal valuation U in 9, which will also be referred to as thefirst-order
max-min k-modal vaïttations in 9, are max-min k-modal valuations in £ and 9, which, given a
first-order n-model M <W,R,.. . ,v> tvith y = <D,VC,VE,VR>, an assignment s in M, a world
wEW, any forrnulae ae, any m-ary relation symbol rEKR and any m-tuple ofterms in K t,
t, satisfy the following conditions:
(j) Q.i,(r(ti, ..., ta)) UMVS(r(tl, ..., ta)) 1 iff I15(t11)> E VR(w,r);
(ii) QM,S(Vxa) = 1 iff, for ail dED(w), Qf.5[xdy(c) = 1;
(iii) UM,V,5(Vxa) = 1 iff, for alt d€D(w), U1,W,Svdj(a) = 1.
Afirst-order Qk-valuation Q in 9 and afirst-order U k-valuation U in 9 have as parameters a
propositional n-modei M, a world w of M, assignment s in M and a formula a of.
Definition 5.4.17. Let 9 be an n-modal Iogic basis. The quant(fier cctioms 2 in £ is the set
composed by ail formulae of3 satisfy’ing the following schema of formula:
Q: Vxa(x) —+ a(t), where the substitution of t forx is admissible
Definition 5.4.18. The first-order paranormal modal logic K71 is the first-order modal system <9?,
Q’, f, > where 9? = <{!,?}, {!}> is the paranormal modal logic basis, Q’ is the first-order Q,
modal valuation in 99, f is the set of ail frames and
=
U A U N M U K? U
20
fitting (1993), p. 422.
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where Zp are the positive classical axioms in L, Z the paranormal classical axioms in L7, N the
non-positive additional classical axioms in L., , the paranormal modal axioms in L?, ZK? the K7
axioms in £7 and Z the quantifier axioms in L?.
Theorem 5.4.20. K’,’ is sound and complete (that is, for any A,BCL? and ŒEL?, A-:-B H-K,? CL iff
A-:-B K1? n.)
About K7’-theorems and K?’-valid formulae, things work exactly like in propositional
paranormal modal Iogic K?: ail theorems from 5.3.2 to 5.3.8 restated in terms of K7’ and L are
valid. More generaily, and that is a quite trivial point, the differences between K? and K?’ start only
when we consider quantified formulae. A not so straightforward observation is that, both from a
proof-theoretical and from a semantic point of view, the differences between K7 and K7’ are
equivalent to the differences between the propositional and first-order cases of normal modal logic
K. More generally, we can say that, given a specific propositioni paranormal modal logic P7, the
way it ïs extended into first-order paranormal modal logic P7’ is exactly the sanie as the way
propositional normal modal logic P is extended into first-order normal modal logic P’. Therefore,
given the amount of literature about the connections between (normal) propositional and first-order
modal logic, we will proceed without elaborating further on the first-order features of K71.
An important aspect of first-order modal logic concems how one will deal with the designation
ofterms in the several worlds. As far as we are concemed, we are considering only monotonie and
rigid first-order models. This means first that every constant symbol e and function symbolfname
the same things no matter what plausible world we are considering and second that everything that
exists in a given world also exists in any world accessible from it. from a proof-theoretical point of
view, this is the sort of model we obtain when we extend propositional modal logic into first-order
modal logic through the simplest way: by adding axiom Q and generalization mie. In this
formulation, even though the converse Barcan formula holds (1x —* VxD), the so-called
Barcan formula (Vxfln —> DVxn) does flot. However, when we consider logics with symmetric
frames such as S5 and B, both Barcan formulae are valid. The justification for choosing this
specific way of extending K7 in K-” rests on the sarne point ofthe preceding paragraph. Since it is
not our purpose to get into first-order details such as teclinical and philosophical discussions about
the way quantifiers should be treated, for flic sake of completeness we just picked up the simptest
way of extending propositional paranormal modal logic into first-order paranormal modal logic.
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5.4.2 MuÏti-normal Modal Logic
What we cail multi-normal modal logic is any normal, in the traditional sense, modal togic that
contains both normal and paranormal modalities. It therefore includes modal systems of arity
greater than or equal to 2. For the sake of simplicity, we will consider here only the simplest case
where there exist two pairs of dual modal operators, one normal and the other paranormal.
Definition 5.4.19. The multi-normal modal togic basis $?o is the pair <{LG.!,?},{fl,!}>. D and
<D are used in a pre-fixed notation and ! and ? are used in a post-fixed notation. Given a language
3, we refer to the modal logic language based on 3 and 9?o by 3.
In multi-normal modal logic, ! and ? are the paranormal modal operators and D and <D the
normal ones. Therefore, the same negation operator —i will behave sometimes as a modality
dependent paranormal negation and sometimes as a (modal) classical one.
Definition 5.4.20. Let 3 be a language. A multi-normal modal Q-valuation Q in 3 and a mttÏti
normal modal Z5-vatuation U?O in 3, which will also be referred to as the multi-normat max-min
modal valuations in 3, are, respectiveiy, a Q2-modal valuation in 3 and 9 and a U2-modaÏ
valitation in 3 and 9 which, given a 2-model M = <W,RO,R?,v>, a world weW and any two
formulae Œ,f3e3? and possibiy other parameters, satisl’ the following conditions:
(i) (øa) 1 iff, for some w’eW such that wR0w’, Q?oM,w’,...(a) = 1;
(ii) Z3 (<D’cL) = I iff for some w’EW such that wR>w
, U?M,w’, .(Œ) 1;
(iii) ?OM,w, ...(DŒ) = I tff, for ail w’eW such that wR0w’, Q?OM,W, (Œ) 1;
(iv) J?GM,W....(DŒ) = 1 if, for ail w’EW such that wR0w’, J?LW’,...(Œ) 1.
A model of multi-normal modal logic is then a 2-model M with two accessibility relations
where one is used to evaluate ? and !-marked formulae and the other to evaluate D and -marked
ones.
Definition 5.4.21. Thefirst-order mutti-normal modal Q-valuation is the modal valuation Q91
which is both a flrst-order Q->-modai valuation in and a multi-normal modal Q-valuation in L.
Definition 5.4.22. Let be a language and a e-modal togic basis. The negation necessity
axioms in is the set composed by ail formulae of satisfying the following schema of
formula:
NN: Ecc-----,cL
Axiom NN is needed in muhi-normal modal logic in order to set the normal behavior of
(and, consequently, of ci.)
Definition 5.4.23. The first-order multi-normai modal logic K7K is the first-order 2-modal system
<9?o, 2?o’, f, > where = <{J,o,!,?},{D,!}> is the multi-normal modal logic basis, 1?01 is
the fist-order multi-normal modal fi-valuation, f is the set of ail 2-frames and
=
U A N MU K? ÇJ NPU K U U
where are the positive classical axioms in £o, A the paranormal classical axioms in £, N
the non-positive additional classical axioms in £, M the paranormal modal axioms in £70, K?
the K? axioms in £7c, NP the possibility-necessity axioms in £?c,, K the K axioms in £90, the
quantifier axioms in £ and E the negation necessity axioms fl £.
Theorem 5.4.2 1. K?K is sound and complete.
K?K is the most basic first-order multi-normal modal system and, strictly speaking, does flot
assign any “complete” meaning to its modal symbols. If we want to take u and 0 along with their
traditional meanings of necessity and possibility, and! and? as meaning our skeptical piausibility
and credulous plausibility, it seems that at least the axiom schema above should be added to K7K.
Definition 5.4.24. Let be a language and 970 the mufti-normal modal logic basis. The
possibi1i1y-platsibitity axioms pp in is the set composed by ail formulae of satisfy’ing the
following schema of formula:
PP: Da—>a!
Intuitively, PP means that if cc is necessary, then it is also skeptically plausible. From P? we
can derive c? —> 0cc, winch means that if cc is possible, then it is (credulously) plausible. From a
semantic point cf view, tins implies taking only those frames <W,R,,R7> which, for each w,w’gW.
if wR(w’, then wR’.v. Calling R:(w) {w’ I Rw’ the SCt cf possible worids accessible from W
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and R?(w) = {w’ I wR?w’} the set of plausible worlds accessible from w, we have that for each
world weW, every plausible world (of w) is also one of a plausible world (of w), but flot the
converse.
Definition 5.4.25. Let <97G, T?, be first-order mufti-modal togic K?K. The first
order multi-normal modal logic PPK7K is the first-order 2-modal system <370, Q701, fpP ZKK
pp>, where Fpp is the set of all 2-frames <W,Ro,R?> which, for each w,w’eW, if wR0w’, then
wR.7w’ (we cali the members of Fpp PP-frames). and are the possibility-plattsibility axioms in
Theorem 5.4.22. PPK7K is sound and complete.
Theorem 5.4.23. The following schemas of relations between sets of formulas and formula are
correct.
{Ua} HPPK?KŒ! {a} PPK?KcL!
{a?} HPPK?K Œ {Œ’?} PPK?K
According to this interpretation ofour modal symbols, PPK?K can be said to be the most basic
logic of plausibility and possibility. From it, many logics such as PPB?S4 and PPS5?S5 can be
defined. In the next chapter, we will use a specific extension of PPK?K to build our togic of
plausibility. While we will stiil of course interpret ! and ? as our skeptical plausibitity and
credulous ptausibility, D will be taken as meaning episternological certainty rather than necessity.
CHAPTER 6
A NEW APPROACH TO THE LOGIC 0F
INDUCTION AND PLAUSIBILITY
In tins chapter we will continue the formai exposition started in the previous chapter and lay down
our solution for the concept explication problem of induction and plausibility. We vi1l follow the
ldnd of explication delineated in the previous chapter and, rather than presenting a sole inductive
system as ow- induction explicatum, introduce several logics of induction, which, taken together,
will be our explication of the notion of induction. By doing tins we will also be providing what we
have cailed a purely descriptive logic of induction. Ail that vili be done in Sections 6.1 and 6.3. In
Section 6.2 we adopt a less general approach and present one of the paranormal modal logics
introduced in the previous chapter as our specific explication of the notion of plausibility. It will be
tins logic what wiil play the role of the logic of piausibility of the descriptive logics of induction we
will introduce in Section 6.3. Finally, in Section 6.4 we pick one of these inductive logics and try to
formalize some models of confirmation found in the literature of philosophy of science, including
the so-called hypothetico-deductive model.
6.1 The Logic of Induction
In tins section we will effectively make use of the basic ftamework introduced in Chapter 5 and lay
down in a formai way what we have called a descriptive logic of induction (or simpiy a logic of
induction.) We will try to foilow the same sort of general approach outlined in the previous chapter
and present our inductive logic in such a way that most of its elements will be taken as parameters
(rather than fixed for good.) As a consequence of that, what will corne up from tins exposition will
flot be, strictly speaking, a logic of induction as we have defmed in Chapter 4, but, we may say, a
restatement of tins definition inside a particular logicomathematical framework. In other words,
through such logicomathematicai notation we shail set in a precise way the components winch fonn
a logic of induction as well as how they are supposed to interact with one another. In the same way
that we have presented the whoie ciass ofparanonnal modal logics as an explication of the notion of
plausibility, tins inductive logic schema wilf be taken as our general induction expÏicandtmi. The
exposition of structures that satisfy tins schema and consequently can be taken as specific solutions
forthe concept explication problem of induction will be donc in Section 6.3.
6.1.1 The Inductive Language and Indttctive-ModaÏ Langucige
Definition 6.1.1. Let Z3 be a language. The inductive tanguage - built over 3 is defrned as
follows:
(j) If cte3 is such that it contains no one of the logical symbols of. then an>;
(ii) If is a monadic logical symbol of 3 along with one of its non-logical complernents, if
there is any, and then (a)e;
(iii) If is a dyadic logical symbol of3 and a,f3e3, then (cc
(iv) If a,f3,(pE-, then(cc ‘- f3
(y) Nothing else belongs to
We say that <-,> is a pair of triadic Iogical symbols of formulae built with the help of
these symbols, such as cc
>- f3 cp, for example, are read as “u inductively implies f3 unless cp.”
They are trivially meant to capture the notion of inductive implication introduced in Chapter 4. The
inspiration for its form cornes from the analysis of default logics we have made in that chapter. u,
winch is calied the antecedent of the inductive implication, represents what Reiter cails the
prerequisite of the default; f3, winch will be called the consequent of the implication, plays the role
of Reiter’s consequent; and p, winch is named the exception of the inductive implication,
corresponds to the negation of the semi-normal part of Reiter’s default or the exception part of
Pequeno’s generalization. From now on we will refer to these formulae as inductive implications.
For the sake of clarity, we vill refer to ail other formulae which are not inductive implications as
ordina?yformutae
As we have started explaining in Chapter 4, the conception of inductive implication in terms of
antecedent, consequent and exception has important consequences for the notion of evidence. As we
have mentioned in Chapter 2, traditionally the notion of evidence has been conceived in such a way
that e’s inductively supporting h depends exclusively on the logical form of e and h and has nothing
to do with the knowledge situation at hand. What will depend on the knowledge situation is whether
or not we will 5e able to infer the plausibility of h from the truthfttlness of e, winch will flot, it must
be said, affect the relation of evidential support that is supposed 10 exist between e and h. In our
case, since we have decicled to take the description cf the exception as an essential part cf the task
of speciring that e gives evidential support to h. the knowledge situation will be transforrned into a
third pararneter of the relation of inductive support. Tins is so because in chier for n to be an
evidence for f3 (or to inductivelv implv (3) as specified in fomula n (3 o, the knowlcdc
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situation must be such that (p is flot taie in it. Otherwise, despite the tmthftilness of a and a > f3
(p, we are flot entitled to attribute any sort of inductive connection between Œ and f3. A trivial
consequence ofthis is that there vill be no such tbing as a sentence e being, due to its logical form
or whatever, an evidence for h: e might be taken as evidence for h but only when a specific
knowledge situation is considered.
Another aspect of considering the exception condition as part of the logical form of inductive
implications concems the necessity of having an extemai or purely mechanical account of inductive
support. We have said in Chapter 4 that in order to deal with inductive inferences in a purely
descriptive way we have to somehow “jump” the inside aspect of the relation of evidentiai support
and consider oniy the extemal process according to winch a piece of evidence inductively implies
the piausibility of the hypothesis. In a nutshell, we have to deal exclusively with the probiem of
inductive detachment. As we have observed in Chapter 2, in order to properiy detach a hypothesis
from its evidences, it is necessary that some sort of total evidence condition be satisfied. Afier ail,
the purpose of such conditions is exactly to guarantee that the relation of inductive support will
produce its “inferential fruits,” that is to say, the plausibility of the hypothesis. Therefore, if we
want to embody in such relation (or perhaps to reduce it to) the mentioned fruit, we have to consider
the conditions winch must be satisfied (or, equivalently, the state of affairs winch cannot flot be
satisfied) for the hypothesis to 5e properly detached from the evidences. Ail tins shah 5e formally
stated in Subsection 6.1.3, when we lay down our definition of the notion of extension.
A very important difference between our approach and the nonmonotonic formalisms so far
exposed is that in our language the inductive connectives play the same role as ail other iogicai
symbols. One should remember that in the nonmonotonic iogics we have examined, defaults (or
generalizations) can be built only from ordinary formulae and neyer from other defaulis. Also, there
is no possibility in those logics to interact defaults and formuiae with the help of standard logicai
connectives. In our tum, due to the very way is constructed. it is possible to have inductive
implications appearing as the consequent, antecedent or exception of another inductive implication
(a l (f3 l- (p 7) , (f3 I>- (p 2) > and 4 I’- (f3 - p 2), respectiveiy.) It is also
possible, with the help of the other logical symbols available, to have inductive implications and
ordinary formulae interacting with each other. For example, the foliowing strings are weli-formed
formulae: CLA((p 2. f3),(Œ f3 p)—*(f3—(f3 2)),a - (at(f3 cp 2)) > ( y (
f3 —na)). As we have agreed in Chapter 4, this is the sort of representational rnechanism we
need to build calculi of inductive implication and models of confirmation.
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Definition 6.1.2. Let be a language and 9 = <O’, O”> a modal logic basis. The indttctive ,nodat
language is the modal language based on and 9.
The above definition sets the sort of language our logic of induction will be based on: a modal
language built over an inductive language. In the case where 9 is a e-modal logic basis for
example, we will be able to constmct sentences like Da f3 <D>p or a y (f3 I>- C]cp ‘- 4)). As we
will sec later, we will also account for the important aspect of allowing epistemological constraints
on the components of inductive implications. For instance, if 9 is a ?-modal logic basis too and? is
taken as a formalization of the notion of inductive plausibility, then it is natural to require the
consequents of ail inductive implications to be of the form ct?. Similarly, if besides interpreting a?
as “CL is plausible” we take Da as meaning “a is certain,” then it vill be possible to fonrialize the
defmition of induction presented in Chapter 2 according to which induction is the class of
ampliative inferences which lead from certainty to piausibility: we have just to require ail inductive
implications to be of the form E:Jct I>- f3? cp.
Definition 6.1.3. Let be a language, 9 = <O’, O’> a modal logic basis, and a,f3e-. two
formulae. We define the following abbreviations in Z:
(i) ŒP=defCLPJ
(ii) CL f3=defT a f3;
(iii) CL°TŒ<±
Defrnition 6.1.4. Let be a language, 9 = <O’, O”> a modal logic basis, OeO’ a modal operator
and 4) an inductive implication (4)e3>.3 and 4) is O-fre&.
6.1.2 The Logic ofPlausibility and the Indttctive-Flausible Language
Definition 6.1.5. Let be a language and A* = <9, u . . .u m> an axiomatic n-modal system
based on such that Z are the A1 axioms in
,
the A axioms in , ..., and m the Am axioms
in
.
The psettdo-indttctive modal calctthts A* based on and A* is the axiomatic n-modal
system <9, U .
. U rn> based on ., where are the A1 axioms in 3, the A2 axioms in
and m the A, axioms in
In the case where L a ?-mcdal logic basis, this deinition then complemenN deflniticn 5.3.2.
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Given a specific modal logic, a pseudo-inductive modal calculus is simply an extension ofsuch
logic (we cail it a -exte;ision) in which inductive implications are added to the language and
treated as atomic formulae. Given 3.’s ability to represent constraints about inductive
implications2, a pseudo-inductive modal calculus provides us the deductive apparatus needed to
represent what we have called calculus of inductive implication and model of confirmation. The
term “pseudo-inductive” indicates that the calculus in question is deductive rather than inductive
but nevertheless contains and reasons (deductively) about inductive implications.
Definition 6.1.6. Let A be a set. We define (A) as the power set of the set of ail finite sequences
made out of the elements of A.
Definition 6.1.7. Let 3 be a language. Apseudo-inductive logic ofplattsibitity t4i based on 3 is a
quadruple <,
,
O, G> where A* = <, > is a pseudo-inductive modal calculus based on 3, with
= <O G”>, and (G’) are two sets of modal operators called, respectively, the inductive
plausibitity modal operators and the basic tntth modal opel-ators. We also say that j is based on
A*.
The reason for classifying tp as a pseudo-inductive logic is the same as why we have taken A*
a pseudo-inductive modal calculus. In contrast to A* however, 4 has what we have called
inductive plausibility modal operators and basic truth modal operators. They are meant to allow us
to set constraints on the logical form of inductive implications as we have mentioned above. As one
might expect, the inductive plausibility modal operators are intent to represent the plausible,
reftitable formulae inferred through inductive implications. In order to be distinguished from
deductively obtained formulae, the consequent part of inductive implications vill be necessarily
marked with such modalities. The basic tmth modal operators in their tum are meant to represent
these irrefutable, deductively obtained formulae winch will represent, we may say, the most basic
“type of tmth” we will deal tvith. for instance, if we really want to go deep into the idea that
induction is in essence an epistemological notion and has no direct connection with ontological
concepts such as the notion of tmth, then it will be paradoxical to allow statements such as “a is
true” to occur in our inductive theories in general and in the antecedent part of inductive
implications in particular. One way to sort tins out is to require eveîyforrnttla to be rnarked with a
modal operator meant to represent a sort of basic epistemological tnith. In the situation we have just
2 Such as, for example. the inductive implication transitivitv axiom: , (( y) (ct y)).
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considered above, this would be done by taking as meaning “is certain that” as the sole inember
ofO.
As its name indicates, the pseudo-inductive logic of plausibility i contains the component of
the logic of induction which we have named togic ofptausibility. It is however flot identical to it.
Given a pseudo-inductive logic ofplausibility qi = <,
,
O, O> based on , the modal system
A* which A* = <, > is based Ofl is what could be more fairly taken as the logic of plausibility,
for it is, we may say, the core of the logical machineiy responsible for reasoning about plausible
facts. A* and p would be better taken as sorts of extended logics of plausibility able to reason
(monotonically) about plausible facts obtained through inductive implications as well as about
inductive implications themselves. h is interesting to observe that we can classif, A* and A* as
logics of plausibility only due to thefr being part of 14). That is to say, only because of the
interpretation we have given to the members of O, and their intent use is that we can daim A* to be
at least in principle able to reason about inductively obtained formulae and consequently entitled to
be classified as a formalization of the notion ofplausibility.
The reason for defining O, and O as sets of sequences of modal operators and flot simply as a
sets of modal operators is that besides primitive operators, we want also to allow derived operators
(winch may contain more than one primitive modal operator) to be taken as inductive plausibility
modal operators and basic tmth modal operators. for instance, in the next section we will introduce
a sort of credulous plausibility composed by! and? (u? def u!?) winch lias some advantages over
the primitive symbol ? and consequently may be worthy of being used as an inductive plausibility
modal operator.
Another important consequence of having O, and O is that since formulae marked with O’s
operators will correspond to nonmonotonically inferred formulae, by the use of inductive
implications we will be able to make explicit the refutable aspect of plausible formulae we have
mentioned in Chapter 2. There we have said that what effectively distinguishes certain statements
from plausible ones is that while the first is irrefutable and very hard to be given up, the second is
intrinsically refùtable, defeasible and therefore susceptible to be reconsidered. If for example we
take O = {?} and G = {Ei}, L meaning “it is certain that,” then the mentioned distinction will
become evident: ‘hile in order for “certain formulae” to be recondered we have to manually alter
the theory, formulae of the form u? are automatically reconsidered as soon as some incompatibility
with the inductive implications that introduced thom arises. This will he fonnally described beÏow
in dofinition 6.I.11.
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The exact way which inductive plausibility modal operators and basic tntth modal operators are
used is shown below.
Definition 6.1.8. Let i be a language, 9 <O’,O”> a modal logic basis and Oa(O’) a set of
modal operators. The notion of O-forrnttÏa is defmed as follows:
(j) If ŒE9 and O = 0, then a is a O-formula;
(ii) If Œfl and OnO, then 9Œ is a O-formula3;
(iii) Nothing else is a O-formula.
Definition 6.1.9. Let be a language, 9 = <O’,O”> a modal logic basis and O,Oe (O’) two sets
of modal operators. The notions of OO-indttctive formula and OO-formttla are defmed as
follows:
(i) If n is a Or-formula, then ct is a OO-inductive formula;
(ii) If aa>.9 is a OO-inductive formulae, then CL A f3, ccv f3, cc —> f3 and Vxcc are also OO
inductive formulae;
(iii) If cce is a Or-formula, then cc is a OO-formula;
(iv) T is a OO-formula and ± is a OO-inductive formula;
(y) If cc,f3EZ are OO-formulae, then CL A f3, CLV f3, cc — f3, —cc and Vxcc are also OO
formulae;
(vi) If cce.3 is a OO-formula, isa OO-inductive formula and pe>- is such that
it is either a OO-formula or a OO-inductive formula, then cc
“- f3 cp is both a
formula and a OO-inductive formula;
(vii) Nothing else is a OO-formula or a OO-inductive formula.
As we have said above, the purpose of inductive plausibility modal operators and basic tmth
modal operators is to restrict the form of inductive implications and ordinary formulae in such a
way that our epistemological constraints will be satisfied. Tins is effectively materialized by the
notions of p-inductive-plausible language and 4-theory, to be presented below. As we will sec
right afier that in Subsection 6.1.3, only Ip-theories will be allowed to use qYs inductive inferential
mechanism4.
Here 9cc is the resuli of appiving O to cc in such a way that the notations of ail operators which compose O
are taken into account. For instance, ifO = ?, then 9cc (Ecc)?; if9 = then 9cc
Rerardino O, our policv dors flot of course applv to inductive imolications thernselves. If we consider
nested inductive implications, that is, inductive implications with other inductive implications as their
consequent, we will be interested in distinguishin onlv the ConseqLlent ot die inneniiost inductive
1 6
Definition 6.1.10. Let be a language and q) = <3,
,
e, O> a pseudo-inductive logic of
plausibility based on 3. The l..p-inductive-plausibte tangttage U) is defined as follows: if >-s is a
closed GGL-formula5, then ŒEp. We caTi any set AcEp a q)-theoy.
As the name indicates, given a pseudo-inductive Iogic of plausibility q), the corresponding q)-
inductive-plausible language 3p tvill play the role of the inductive-plausible language of the logic
of induction q) vi1l be related to.
6.1.3 The Relation oflndttctive Consequence
Definition 6.1.11. Let 5e a language, q) = <9,
,
O, O> a pseudo-inductive logic of
plausibility based on 3 and M = <9, >, with 9 = <O’,O”>, and Ac a q)-theory. The frmnction
W,A, which assigns to each set of formulae a set of fomiulae Yq,A(S).it-.9, is defined as
follows. Let SciZit. be a set of formulae ofZ3-0. YLP,A(S) is the smallest set satisfying the following
conditions:
(i) AcEïpA(S);
(ii) If ïtpA(S) HA* CL then CLEY14)A(S)
(iii) If cc ‘- f3 weYp,A(S), anY,A(S), cpES and—f3ES6, then f3eY4),A(S).
Definition 6.1.12. Let be a language, q) = <3,
,
e, e> a pseudo-inductive logic of
plausibility based on Z, A0 a q)-theory and Ec a set oC formulae. E is a q)-inductive
extension of A iffEYLpA(E).
Defmitions 6.1.11 and 6.1.12 follow the same style of extension definition of default Iogics
exposed by us in Chapter 4. As such, they contain the core of inductive Ïogic’s component which
we have named relation of indttctive consequence. Indeed, given a pseudo-inductive iogic of
induction q) and a q)-theoiy A possibly containing formulae of the form cc f3 p, the raison
d’être of an q)-inductive extension of A is to he a maximal consistent set of ail inductive
implications and flot the inductive implications themselves. Front now on when explaining aspects cf ourQ svstem, we will rnost cf the time forget about these so-called nested indj.:tive implications and consider only
basic inductive implications (that is, inductive implications cc J3 cp such that f3 is an ordinai formula.).
Here closedfiwmula is taken, as usuallv, as formulac (be it ordinarv fommlae or inductive implications) with
no frec variable.
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consequences that may be obtained from A. from this notion of 41-inductive extension we define
what shah be our inductive iogic’s relation of inductive consequence.
Definition 6.1.13. Let be a language, 41 = <, , O, ®> a pseudo-inductive logic of
plausibihity based on , Ac>.3 a 41-theory and a formulae. cx is a 41-s-inductive
conseqttence of A (in symbois: A HP cx) iff, for ail 41-inductive extensions E of A, cxeE. We call
H a 41-relation ofinductive consequence, in this case a skeptical one.
Definition 6.1.14. Let be a language, 41 <, , O, O> a pseudo-inductive iogic of
plausibihty based on , Ac>.0 a 41-theory and cxe3>. a formulae. cx is a 41-c-inductive
consequence of A (in symbols: A HP cx) iff, for at ieast one 41-inductive extension E of A, acE.
We cail HCP a 41-relation ofinductive consequence, in tins case a credulous one.
We are here defining the notion of inductive consequence according to both skeptical and
credulous positions. As we have seen in Chapter 4, the necessity of defining such relation according
either to a skepticai approach or to a credulous one is due to the lack of guarantee that every defauit
theory will have only one extension. Since we are foilowing a general path where several sorts of
logics of induction couid be represented7, we leave room for the possibility of having inductive
logics with either a skeptical or a credulous relation of inductive consequence. From now on in tins
section we wilh use the symboi HP to speak generally about FSW and HP.
About the technicalities of our formulation, we first observe that in order to represent default
statements such as “typically bfrds fly” we do not need to consider schemas of defauits (like Reiter
does.) Rather, we just act as if we were representing an universal statement in ciassical logic and
use the universal quantifier V along with an open formula, in tins case an inductive implication. For
example, if we were to represent the just mentioned default statement we wouid take V in
conjunction with bird(x) - flies(x) and get the universal inductive implication Vx(bird(x) ‘-
flies(x)). for the conclusion of flies(b) for sorne b winch has the property ofbeing a bird, supposing
that the pseudo-inductive modal caiculus A* winch 41 is based on has axiom Q (Vxa(x) —> cx(t)),
then autornaticaHy ail instances of “typicahly birds fly” would be taken into account at the time of
calculating the extension. Tins is of course due to 41’s being able ta reason deductivety not only
6 is like described in definition 5.2.9.
Dcfault 1oic for example is obtained bv L:ing = <9g,
,
0, 0>. where A0’ = <, > is the pseudo
inductive modal calculus based on the caloulus cf trivial rnod2l 1oic (thot is, classicat louic.)
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about plausible formulae but also about inductive implications. As we have already observed, tins is
one of the main innovations of our approach: we can reason deductively about inductive
implications in exactly the same way as we reason about ordinary formulae.
Second, following Pequeno’s approach we make the test of consistency of the consequent inside
the very definition of extension. Because of that we do not have to consider it among the exceptions
of the inductive implication. Ibis, we must concede, is a quite natural and desirable thing. About
the exceptions to the daim that u inductively implies f3, one that viil appear in ail cases,
independently of the form of u and f3, is —f3. Therefore, nothing more natural than flot requfring —f3
to be informed at every time we write an inductive implication; and making the test of the
consistency of the consequent compulsory for ail inductive implications. As we have mentioned in
Chapter 4, another consequence of proceeding in this way is that we wiIl flot allow the
representation of so-called abnormal defaults, which are quite counterintuitive and one of the main
sources ofanomalous extensions.
Third, given a particular pseudo-inductive logic ofplausibllity 14, the relation of inference H
will be in fact non tmth-preserving or nonmonotonic: even though we may have A HP u, it is not
necessarily the case that A u B H u for any set B. Take, for instance, A = {. ‘- f3 (p, 7.}, u f3
and B = {p}. Trivially in tins case A —P u but A u B bt-’P cc. 0f course tins feature concems only
inductive implications. If the set of premises A does flot contain any formula of the form u f3
(p, then A HP u entails A u B H u for any set of formulae B.
Finally, considering what can be expressed with the help of 4.)’s language, our relation of
inductive conclusion automatically satisfies what we have called total evidence condition.
According to the general interpretation we have given to Camap’s requirement of total evidence,
since e may be an evidence for h when taken in isolation but against or neutral to it when taken in
conjunction with e’, ail available information should be taken into account at the time of saying
whether or not e inductively confirms h. following the way an extension is defined in default logic,
in order for the inductive consequent f3 to be taken as a i.-inductive consequence of A, the checks
concerning f3 itself, the antecedent and the exception of the inductive implication which f3 belongs
to are made from a global perspective, in connection with ail inductive and deductive consequences
ofA (item (ii) of defmition 6.1.11).
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For the same of simplicity, we have considered in the definition of H only the so-calÏed global
premises. We show below the version ofdefinitions 6.1.11, 6.1.12, 6.1.13 and 6.1.14 which also
takes into account the local premises.
Definition 6.1.15. Let 3 be a language, .p = <.
,
G, O> a pseudo-inductive logic of
plausibility based on S and A* = <9, >, with 9 = <O’,O>, and A,Bc3>- two i.p-theories. We
define the function ïi),AB: (3-) —* (3-) as follows. Let Sc:3- be a set of formulae of3.
‘W,A,B(S) = YLPA,B(S) U Y’LpAB(S) is the smallest set satisfying the following conditions:
(j) AYGw,A,B(S) and 3Lq,5(s);
(ii) If Y°LPA,B(S) 0 H* cL then ŒEYp(s);
(iii) If YGqJ,,8(S) ± Y’p,p,8(S) H1 a and c ï°p,n(S) then cLEY8(S);
(iv) If a yLAR(s) aeYpAn(S), pS and —f3S, then !3eYLAB(S);
(y) If ‘- 3 fpGq8(S), cLeY1JA8(S), pES and —f3ES, then f3EYGLPAB(S).
Definition 6.1.16. Let 3 be a language, 4J = <9, , O> a pseudo-inductive logic of plausibility
based on 3, A,Bc3 two 41-theories and E3>- a set offormulae. E is a I..p-extension of A and B
iff E=ï,A,B(E).
Definition 6.1.17. Let S be a language, i.p = <9, , O> a pseudo-inductive logic of plausibility
based on 3, A,Bc3 two 4.-theories and c3>-5 a formulae. a is a L.l.)-inditctive consequence of A
and B (in symbols: A±B H-W cL) iff, for every (at least one) ip-inductive extension E of A, cLE.
6.1.4 The Logic ofInduction
Definition 6.1.18. Let S be a language. A logic of induction (or inductive logic) based on S is a
triple <i4), Sp, H> where i.p is a pseudo-inductive logic of plausibility based on 3, S the i4)-
inductive-plausible language and H a .p-re1ation of inductive consequence.
We may sometimes refer to i.p, Sp and H, respectively, as ‘s togic of induction (in symbols:
i4i), ‘s inductive-plausible language (in symbols: 3) and Ç’s relation of inductive consequence
(in symbols: Ht.)
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Definition 6.1.19. Let 3 be a language, Ç <14J, 3p, H> a togic of induction based on 3, Tç3 a
set of formulae called inductive axioms, Ac3q. a set formulae and c34i formula. Œ is a T-c
inductive consequence of A (in symbols: A HT cL) iff TuA H cL. We cali the pair Ç’ <, T> an
applied logic ojinduction and H1 the Ç’-relation of inductive consequence (in symbols:
It should be noted that we are flot follotving strictly the inductive logic’s structure presented in
subsection 4.1.2. Rather than being a quadruple composed by a logic of plausibility, an inductive-
plausible language, a relation of inductive consequence and a calculus of inductive implication, a
logic of induction Z is a triple composed only by the first three components. The reason for that is a
technical one. Since we have based ‘s inferential relation on i.p, the aspects concerned with the
calculus of inductive implication will be btiilt over this structtire. In other tvords, what we have
called the axioms of the caictilus of inductive implication will be represented through a set of
inductive axioms T belonging to 3p and the calculus itself vill be the resultant applied inductive
Iogic as defined above. This makes even more sense if we cons ider that through set T we cati
represent many things besides a calculus of inductive implication, such as a model of confirmation
or some axioms of 14) which cannot be represented deductively. Moreover, this approach makes
explicit the independent character that a calculus of inductive implication is supposed to have, being
aiways possible that the same T be used long with several different pseudo-inductive logics of
plausibility sharing the same 3, modal logic basis and modal operators. If however one wishes to
stick to the old definition, he can take the quadruple <i4), 3, T> and define it as our actual
inductive logic.
Now that we have finally arrived at a complete characterization of what a descriptive logic of
induction is supposed to be, a short summary may be appropriate. First we have an inductive
language 3. which, by considering a modal logic basis <O O> will be transformed into an
inductive modal language We then take a modal calculus A* based on 3 and and expand it
in such a way as to obtain what we calE a pseudo-inductive modal calculus A*, that is, an extension
of A* able to reason deductively about inductive implications. By considering the epistemological
restrictions one wish to impose on inductive implications with the help of some modal operators of
we then obtain a pseudo-inductive logic ofplausibility t4). When considered inside 14), A is taken
as the catculzts of plausibility of our logic of induction. The tanguage 3tp resultant from the
appliance of the restrictions specifled by ‘p plays the part of the indttctive-plausible language. By
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taking only sets of forrnulae belonging to we then define with the help of the notion of 4-
inductive extension the relation of inductive consequence of OUf inductive logic (which can be donc
either skeptically or credulously.) Finally, by considering a specific set of inductive implications
belonging to p, we can apply our logic of induction to obtain, among other things, a caÏctdus of
inductive implication.
Before fmishing tins section we have to note that a logic of induction Z does flot in fact give any
indication ofhow to confu-m a hypothesis from a piece of evidence. The sole purpose of is to allow
one to represent tbrough inductive inferences the way he thinks things are to be concluded
inductively from others. The responsibility of coming up with ratio nal inductive patters of inference
belongs to the knowledge engineer who will make use of Z. We have tried to put in our definition of
Ç only what we think to be the essential aspects a descriptive logic of induction should deal with,
namely the logical form of inductive implications, the need (or, we may say, the possibility) of
distinguishing inductively obtained ordinary formulae from deductively obtained ones and the way
inductive conclusions are calculated. Given these, let us say, universal aspects of a descriptive logic
of induction, by providing a pseudo-inductive logic of plausibility along with some inductive
implication axioms one may get a specific logic of induction useful in a particular range of
applications.
6.2 The Logic ofPïausibility and Certainty
6.2.1 The Logic ofSkeptical Flausibitity and Credutous Flausibility
In tins section we will introduce our specific solution to the concept explication problem of
plausibility, winch will also play the part of the logic of plausibility of the inductive logics we shail
present in the next section. We will refer to such system as the logic of skeptical ptattsibility and
credulousplausibiÏity or simply the logic oftwoptausibilitv notions (LP2, for short.)
LP2 is a multi-normal modal logic in the style of those introduced in Section 5.4 with two pairs
of dual operators: the paranormal modalities t and ? and the no;nal modalities D and . As we
have mentioned at the end of Section 5.4, while cc! and n? will as usual be interpreted as “n is
skepticalÏy plausible” (or “cc is accepted”) and cc is creduiously plausible,” respectively, Dct and
0cc vill be taken as meaning “cc is certain” and “cc is episternologically possible,” respectively.
Taking ah fonnulae as instances of sorne sort of hypothesi. we would say Ihat while cc! and CL?
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mean, respectively, “a is an accepted hypothesis” and “a is a plausible hypothesis,” Oct and Oct
mean “ct is a certain hypothesis” and “a is an epistemologically possible hypothesis,” respectively.
The reason why certainty and epistemological possibility are formalized through normal and flot
through paranormal modalities is quite obvious: in contrast to plausibility, we analyze the certainty
of a statement from a sole point of view. If we take, for example, each possible world as being a
world compatible with ail facts the agent in question knows, then to know a means simply that a is
true in ail such compatible worlds. Being true in at least one ofthese worlds does not represent a
new sort of knowiedge. It means simply that the statement in question is not known to be false, bttt
simply, from the agent’s epistemological point ofview, a possible truth.
An important point related to the meaning of ail sorts of formulae in general and non-modal
formulae in particular concerns the place they vill appear in the relation of deductibility or logical
consequence. We recall that the relations of dedtictibility and logical consequence have two sets of
premises: the so-cailed global premises and the local premises. from a proof-theoretical point of
view, the difference between them is that oniy those formulae obtained exclusively with the help of
the global premises will be able to make use ofthe necessitation rules N ta I Oa) and N? (a / a!.)8
from the viewpoint of epistemic modal logic, this distinction is important because whether a
formula a belongs to the set of global premises or to the set of local premises will determine its
ultimate meaning. More specifically, while an arbitrary formula a belonging to the set of global
premises A can be said to mean “a is true” or “a is a true hypothesis”, a formttlae f3 belonging to
the set B of local premises means simply “f3 is a hypothesis.”9 The rationale behind this reading can
be seen both from a proof-theoretical as well as from a semantic point of view. Concerning the
global premise a, since ct is a true hypothesis, we sure can daim it to be skeptically plausible (a!)
as well as to be certain about its truth (Da). This stands in contrast to the local hypothesis f3, which,
being absent of any sort of modal qualification, does not entitie us to lay down any epistemological
daim about it. Also, the fact that we can semantically conclude Oct and cd from a, which is dtie to
ail models taken into account being exactly those which satisfy ct (that is, a is true in ail their
worlds), reflects the idea that a is being taken as a true hypothesis and not just as a certain or
accepted one. In its turn, f3 helps to select, out ofthe multitude ofworlds belonging to some ofthese
models, the individual worlds that will be used to evaluate It therefore functions like a local,
See definitions 5.2.20, 5.2.24 and 5.2.28.
Incidentally, this interpretation of non-modal formulae in terms of truthfiuiness is the standard one in
epistemic modal logic. See Gabbay et aI (1995).
‘° See definjtions 5.2.19 and 5.2.20.
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hypothetical premise vhose truth is guaranteed not in ail, but only in a few possible worlds of the
model in question.
The need of considering the notion of certainty has aÏready been ernphasized in Chapter 2. In
the same way that induction ieads from certainty to plausible, uncertain knowledge, deduction Ieads
from certainty to certainty. They are like the opposite of each other: while certain knowledge is
something safe, irrefutable, plausible knowledge is intrinsically defeasible and reftitable. In fact, we
have somewhere pointed out that the susceptibiiity of being refuted or given up is one of the
distinguishing features of the notion of plausibffity. Formally, this will be made precise by requiring
the consequent of inductive implications to be marked with some plausibility operator (through the
O component of the pseudo-inductive logic of plausibility that will make use of LP2.) In this way,
at the same time that we impart refutability unto plausible facts, we also provide the positive,
rational side the notion of plausibility is supposed to have. 0f course this will be donc only when
we have at hand a logic of induction Ç which makes use of a pseudo-inductive logic of plausibility
.p made out of LP2. As far as the deductive, logic of plausibility component is concemed, such sort
of characterization of plausibility in ternis of its refutable aspect is of course flot possible. However,
if we have at hand a characterization of certain, irrefutable facts, by establishing the relations that
are supposed to exist between certain hypotheses and plausible ones we can in principle obtain a
satisfactory account of what uncertain, reftitable facts are. Moreover, in the same Chapter 2 we have
proposed a definition of induction according to which inductive arguments are those inferences
which lead not from tmth premises to plausible conclusions, but from certain statements to
plausible and therefore uncertain ones. This lias to do with our decision of taking induction as
primarily concemed with knowledge of tmth rather than with tnith itself. Therefore, if vie want to
fiully represent this epistemological feature of induction vie have to have some way to represent flot
only plausible facts, but also certain, irrefutable hypotheses as welllt. Furthermore, by allotving LP2
to represent certain facts we provide a framework where inductive inferences are aiways analyzed
from an epistemological perspective, for, from a proof-theoretical point of view, even non-modal
truc formulae and non-modal hypothetical ones are so only due to their connection with the
certainty operator.
Definition 6.2.1. Let 1 be a language and a e-modal logic basis. The D axioms in o is the
sel composed by ail fonnulae of satisfying the following schema of formula:
D: —ct
As ‘.ve vi1l see in th next sctic. suoh cLncption oHndcticn sh!1 he fornaIizecI by setting O = {?i and
Definition 6.2.2. Let 3 be a language and a O-modal logic basis. The B cixioms B in 5 is the
set composed by ail formulae of 33 satist’ing the following schema of formula:
B: a—*EIOŒ
Definition 6.2.3. Let 3 be a language and a o-modal logic basis. The 4 cvdoms in 33 is the
set composed by ail formulac of 3 satisfying the following schema of formula:
4: DJa—*Dci
Definition 6.2.4. Let <k,, f, Z1> be the first-order multi-normal modal iogic PPK?K.
The (first-order) logic of skeptical plausibility and credulous piausibility (or simpiy LP2) is the first
order 2-modal system <?o, 2?ol, fLp2, ZLP2> where FcpcFpp is the set of ail idealized 2-frames
<W,Ro,R?> beionging to Fp such that R0 is symmetric and transitive and R? is symmetric (we cali
the members of TLp2 LP2-frames), and LP2 = u D? u B? L] J B u î, where D? are the D?
axioms in £?o, B? the B? axioms in £?o, D the D axioms in £?o, the B axioms in £?0 and
the 4 axioms in ?0.
6.2.2 On the Axiomatic ofL?2
As one can see, LP2 is the first-order 2-modal system PPK?KB?DB?B4. The axiomatic 2-modal
system <?o, ELP2> based on , which we represent by the symbol CP2, is called the LP2 catcutus of
pÏausibitity. For the sake of comprehensibility, we write below ail axioms and inference mies of
cP1.
Positive Ctassicat Axioms
Pi: a—>(f3-->a)
P2: (ci—>(p))—*((ci—*3)—*(ci—>p))
P3: CLAf3—>a
P4: ŒAfi—*f3
P5: a—>W—>ŒAf3)
P6: a-+av
P7: -ccvf3
P8:
Paranormal Ctassical Axioms
Ai: (ci —> [3) —> ((u. —>
—[3) — —u.) wherein [3 is ?-free and u is !-free
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A2: —CL —> (cc —> f3) wherein cc is ?-free
A3: cc y —, wherein cc is !-free
Non-positive Additional Classical Axioms
Ni: -i(cc—>f3)+->(ŒA-if3)
N2: -,(ccAf3)-*(--iccv-if3)
N3: -i(cs. y f3) -* (—,cc A —43)
N4: —i—,cc-cc
N5: ((cc—*f3)—>cc)—>cc
Paranormal Modal Axioms
Ki: cc?((cc)!)
K2: (-cc)L<-->--i(cc!)
K3: (—iŒ)? <—> —i(Œ?)
K?: (ccf3)!(cc!—>f3!)
D?: cc!—÷cc?
B?: a—*cc?!
Normal Modal Axioms
NP: Oa1->-D-cc
K: D(cc—*f3)—>(Dcc-*LJf3)
NN: -Ecc+->-D-cc
D: cicc—>Gcc
B: cc—>cc
4: Occ—*1Dcc
Miilti-normal Modal Axioms
PP: Ucc—>a!
First-order Axioms
Q: Vxcc(x) —* cc(t) wherein the substitution of t forx is admissible
Ri tics oflnference
M?: cc—>.f3,cc/f3
G: cc —> f3! cc — Vxf3 wherein x has no free occurrences in cc
N: cc/Ecc
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c N: alu!
We have already cornmented the axioms of paranormal modal logic K (Pl-P$, Al-A3, Nl-N5,
K1-K3, K), the modal axioms of normal modal logic K (NP, K) and the multi-normal axiom NN. D
and D? guarantee, respectiveïy, that what is certain is also epistemoÏogically possible and what is
skeptically plausible is also credulous plausible. B and B? say, respectively, that if CL ‘s a tiite or an
unqualified hypothesis, then it is certain that u is epistemologically possible and it is skeptically
plausible that u is credulously plausible. The reasonableness of these principles is seif-evident in
the case where u is a true hypothesis. Conceming the local, unqualified hypothesis case, B and B?
state a sort of minimal rationality principle about the hypotheses we can consider. Even though the
hypotheses we lay down may be neither plausible nor epistemologically possible, they must be 50
from a second-order point of view. 4 is a sort of principle of positive introspection: if we know that
u, then we know that we know that u. From B and 4 we deduce 5, —JEu —> D—Du, which is a
principle of negative introspection: if we are not certain about u, then we are certain that we are not
certain about u. PP, which could be fairly called here PC or the plausibility-certainty axiom, states
that if u is certain then il is also an accepted hypothesis. From it, along with MP and KI, we
conclude u? —> ‘au, that is, if u is (credulously) plausible, then it is epistemologically possible.
The reason why we have excluded axioms T (Eu —* u) and T? (u! —* u) is that they represent a
ldnd of principle of epistemological arrogance undesirable in the case of both certainty and
skeptical plausibihty. Taking u as meaning “u is truc,” while T means that if we are certain that u
is truc then it is true, T? means that accepting u as truc entails that it is true. On similar grounds, T?
and T carmot be accepted if we take u as representing an unqualified hypothesis. While from T?
along with Ki we conclude u —* u?, which means that every conceivable hypothesis is
automatically a plausible one, from T we derive u —÷ —E----u, winch means that every conceivable
hypothesis is an irrevocable one or, in other words, that from a hypothesis u, winch we may have
conceived quite arbitrarily, it follows that we will neyer be able to be certain about its negation —‘u.
4? (u! — u!!) was not included on account of the desirableness of allowing gradations of credulous
plausibility (T? along with Xl entails u?? — u?), from which it is possible to develop a quantitative
theory of plausibility.
LP- is not only an epis[emic logic but also an atitoemistemic Ïogic. Due ta axiom 4 (Eu —>
EEu) and theorem 5 (—Eu —* EEu), we are aware of those facts which we known, as well as of
those which we do ont know. N does the same job but onlv in comeotion with truc formulae: from
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the fact that a is truc (and Œ can be of any foi-m) it foliows that we know that it is truc. Like 4 and 5,
N is a sort of positive autoepistemic priiiciple: we are alwavs positiveiy aware of those statements
we take as taie. But how about those statements whose truth we have no hint about? Suppose that
Th(A) is ail we can conclude from knowledge situation A. By our positive autoepistemic principle
then, for each aeTh(A), we wili have that we know that a (c:1a) But how about those statements f3
which do not belong to Th(A)? Restricting ourseives to knowiedge situation A, it is reasonabie that
for ail f3 such that f3ETh(A) we conclude —1E]f3. This is what we could caH a negative autoepisternic
principte. It is triviaily a non-monotonic aile: if from A we conciude —if3, from A u {f3} the same
inference could not be donc. Consequentiy, it cannot be formalized inside a pureiy deductive iogic
such as LP2. Only when we start presenting our logics of induction in Section 6.3 is that we wiil be
able to have a fully autoepistemic logic ofplausibility’2.
Theorem 6.2.1. LP2 is sound and complete.
Theorem 6.2.2. The following schemas of relations between sets of formulas and formula are
correct.
{DŒ} HLP2 a!
{Œ!} HLP2 cL?
{Œ?} H LP2 <
According to theorem 6.2.2 then, we have the following hierarchy: Ca HLp2 cd HLP2 a? HLp2
oa, which means that a’s being certain entails that a is an accepted hypothesis, which entails that
a is credulously plausible, which in its tuai entails that cc is epistemoiogicaliy possible. In other
words, certainty imphes acceptability, which imphes plausibility, which implies possibihty.
6.2.3 On the Sernantics ofLP2
Regarding the semantics of LP2, we first note that, given a LP2-frame <W,Ro,R?> and a world
weW, the sets R0(w) = {w’ I wRGw’} and R7(w) = {w’ wRv’} represent, respectively, what we
may cail the epistemologically possible worlds of w and theplatisible worlds of w. This was already
outlined in Section 5.4. The relations R and R correspond, respectively, to what we may cail the
certainty accessibi!itv relation and the plausihiiity accessibility relation. Second, these LP-frames
belong to the class of P2-frarnes, that is, 2-frarnes <W,R2,R?> such that, for each w,w’eW, if
12 For more about atltoepi3temic iocirs sec Konolice (1994).
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wR0w’ then wRw’. Ihis means that, given a world of reference w, every plausible world of w is
also an episternologically possible world of w (in symbols: Ro(w) Ro(w)). As we have seen in
Chapter 5, from a proof-theoretical point view this property corresponds to axiom P (ccc — n!.)
Besides this, every LP-ftame is also a idealized 2-frame, that is to say, for every weW, there is at
least one w’W and at least one w”eW such that wR(.w’ and wRw”. This is proof-theoretically
obtained by axioms D and D0. Finally, while R0 is a symmetric and transitive relation, R? is orily a
symmetric one, which corresponds, respectively, to axioms B and 4 and axiom B:’.
from this explanation of the semantic elements of LP2 one can better understand our daim that
the modal operators t and? formalize or explicate the notions of skeptical plausibility and credulous
plausibility, respectively. As we have said in Chapter 2, as a result of accepting inductive
conclusions as plausible or pragrnatically probable hypothesis and induction itself as that sort of
inference whose premises, in certain circumstances, serve as evidences for its conclusion, “n is
plausible” was taken as the same as “there are evidences for n.” Whether we are talking about the
skeptical or about the credulous plausibility will be made precise by the strength of what we are
calling evidence: while “n is skeptically plausible” means “there are strong evidences for n”, “n is
credulously plausible” means “there are weak evidences for n.” Now the crucial point is how our
semantic formulation relates to this notion of evidence. According to the traditional sense of the
term “evidence,” we would say that each plausible world where n is true indicates, we may say, the
existence of plain evidences for the tmthfulness of n. It would be more or less as if through some
class of mechanisms for evaluating sentences we get different world pictures of what is truc and
false. Considering that there must be some rationale behind the way according to winch each one of
these mechanisms an-ive at their worldviews, the fact that n is truc in one of these worldviews
entitles us to believe that there is some sort of plain evidence for n (based on winch the mechanism
in question decided to include it in its worldview.) Now, the indication that there exists tins sort of
evidence may itself be taken as an evidence, of a second-order we may say, for the truthfulness of
n. In other words, the veiy fact that there is a specific world view where n is taie, which vas
rationally produced with the help of plain evidences, can itself be considered as an evidence for n,
for it sure leads us to believe in its plausibility in the sarne way that the plain evidences when
rationally analvzed do. This is what our plausible worlds are intent to 5e. And if we decide to really
adopt this second-order meaning of evidence. n’s being taie in at least one of such worldviews will
signii that there are evidences for n, but only of a weak type, for n might 5e taie in ah worldviews
at hand, winch wou!d mean that we had a sen cf strong evidence for the taithftilness of cc
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One important feature of this way of explicating the notion(s) of plausibility is that we do not
give details about what the mechanisms which generate the plausible worlds are. They can be
several experts trying to evaluate according to thefr own criteria the tmthftflness of a specific set of
propositions, but also several competing theories nying to accouHt for the same range of physical
phenomena or the different ways an annalist can look at a specific situation. The important aspect
captured by our formai model concems what we have called plurality approach to piausibility, or in
other words, the idea that the distinguishing feature of the notion of plausibility is the necessity to
refer to a plurality of ways to achieve some specific goal. What these ways and their corresponding
goals are do not matter to the level of investigation we are doing here: only at the time of applying
the logic to solve some specific problem is that we will consider a particular mechanism for
generating plausible worlds.
Instead of an arbitrary choice, the decision of letting the mentioned mechanisms undefined is a
crucial aspect of our project of developing a pragmatical account of induction and plausibility. As
said in Chapter 2, in order not to go through justificatory issues we have decided to adopt what we
have called an extensional or pragrnatical approach to induction. According to this approach,
inductive inference is simply that class of ampliative inferences that in a particular period cf time is
used in some practical situations and accepted as sound by a certain commurilty of people.
Accordingly, the notion of rationality itself, which must be present as the positive side of inductive
inferences, will also be taken pragmatically: instead of being defined through some intensional
criterion, rational will be what people of a particular community in a particular period of time take
as so. That is precisely what our formal semantic model captures. From the strongest point of view,
the plausible and consequently the rational is the pragmatical consensus among a particular class of
entities. And again, what these entities are is less important for our general approach: the significant
point is that from a pluraiity ofviews about a specific subject matter we arrive at something we can
quite fafrly cail plausible, pragmatically probable or rationally acceptable13. Only because of that is
that we can daim to have given some sort of account for the rationality of inductive conclusions
(without also having tried to give an answer to Hume’s problem of justification) as well as
answered Hempel’s challenge of developing a purely logical analysis of the notion of acceptability
independent of any sort of contemplated goal.
It is werthy to note that this (skeptical) wav ofdefïning the notion cf pragmatical probabilitv is very similar
to Newton da Costa’s formalizaton ofwhat he callspragmatic truth. Despite technical details, one cf the main
differences betweenhis approach and ours is thatwhile in his case the same idea cf pluralitv ofviews is there,
there is ro stress on the positive side cf what we are cal1in plausible worlds: besides being possible,
compatible \vorlds, piasible v.’orlds should aise he the result of some praomatical method of trth-assessing
(in ouï case, a specific set cf inductive implications.) Sec da Costa et al (l99).
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6.2.4 On LF2 FÏattsibiÏity
An important result achieved by our formalization concems the controversy around the lottery
paradox and the conjunction principle. We have already sketched infonnally in Chapter 3 (and
formally but in flot very much detail in Chapter 4) how the consideration of two plausibility notions
could bring this controversy to an end. The whole point centers around the strength of the support
given by the body of evidence to the two hypotheses to be conjoint. In the case of credulously
plausible facts, the support given by the evidences is weak, fragile we may say. It is as if, by
adopting a credulous position, we were committing ourselves to the hypothesis in question in sucli a
way that we are allowed to take mutually contradictory hypotheses as plausible without
compromising the self-consistency of our body of evidence. However, at the same time that this is
so, some special care is needed at the moment of dealing with such mutually contradictory plausible
hypotheses. Since the support given to cx and f3, for example, is weak, the fact that cx is plausible and
f3 is plausible does not allow us to take Œ A f3 as equally plausible, for since such plausible
judgments may have used the mentioned flexibility of the credulous position to support mutually
contradictory hypotheses, to take cx A f3 as wealdy plausible may imply an actual collapse of our
logical theory.
On the other hand, if cc and f3 are skeptically plausible, the support given to them by the body of
evidences is strong, safe. It is as if we were very strongly conmiitted to the hypotheses expressed by
cx and f3. This of course has the consequence that we will be comrnitted in the same strong way to cx
A f3, but also that we will not be able to support mutually contradictory hypotheses without
compromising our own intemal consistency. Then we will have a picture where we can allow
mutually contradictory hypotheses (such as the ones of the Ïottery paradox) to be each one of them
separately plausible without having any self-contradictoiy hypothesis as plausible as well as to
maintain the conjunction principle with respect to a stronger sort of plausibility. This, as we have
seen, is formally obtained by the very way we semantically defined the notions of skeptical
plausibility and credulous plausibility: whiÏe cx! A f3! —* (cx A f3)! is the case, cx? A f3? —* (cx A f3)?
is not a valid schema ofLP2.
While this way of doing things manages quite well a controversy apparently without solution, it
leaves a very important problem without answer. As we explained above, in the case of cx? and
(—iŒ)? it is clear that we should flot allow the conjunctior. principle to work. But how about two
fomaulae cx and f3 which are flot inconsistent with each other? Clearlv, if cx and f3 are not
incompatible, the fact that there are weak evidences for cx and there are weak evidences for f3 should
imply that there are weak evidences for cxt f3. The danger of conjoining weakiy plausible
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hypotheses has to do onÏy with the mutually contradictory hypotheses case. Therefore, if a and f3
are flot inconsistent with each other, the following prineiple shouÏd be valid: Œ? A f3? —* (a A f3)?.
The obvious problem is that this principle caimot be obtained monotonically. Let A be a set of
formulae and a, f3 two formulae such that Œ and f3 are mutually consistent with respect to A, that is
to say, {a,f3}uA bL ±. Applying the mentioned principle, tve wilI have that {a,f3}uA H a? A f3? —>
(ct A f3)?. But now consider A augmented by formula a —> —43. Since Œ and f3 are not mutually
consistent with respect to Au{Œ -4
—43}, the relation {a,f3}u.Au{a — —,f3} H a? A f3? — (Œ A f3)?
is not valid, despite the fact that {Œ,f3}UA H cc? A f3? —* (a A f3)? is stili valid. Our solution, to be
detailed in the next section, consists in introducing tins principle as a nonmonotornc inference.
More specifically, we vil1 take the following formula as an inductive axiom of one of the applied
logics of induction to be introduced in the next section: u? A f3? (u A f3)?14.
Another important feature of our framework concems the criticisms vie have made at the
beginning of Section 2.3 against the probability calculus. There we have talked about the idea
defended by those who use the probability calculus to formalize inductive probability that deduction
and induction are distinguished from one another only by the degree of evidential support given to
the conclusion by the premises: conceming the nature of such support, they are for ail intents and
purposes indistinguishable from each other. Our position is that tins is manifestly mistaken. We
have given two practical examples to support tins: the way that confirmed hypotheses are conjoined
in the probability caïculus and the additive character of negation in such system.
In order to see how our Iogic deals with tins point, compare the way we are representing certain,
irrefutable facts with the way we are representing plausible, refutable ones. Despite the connection
that exists between these two sorts ofhypotheses (Dcx —* u! or u? —* eu), both notions are defined
with the help of quite different ontological resources. In contrast to the probability calculus, here
certainty is flot a particular case of plausibility: the highest degree of plausibility does flot
correspond to certainty, and the lowest degree ofplausibility does flot correspond to epistemological
impossibility. It is also to easy that LP2 is not plagued by the problem of conjunction of probable
hypotheses. In contrast to the probability caïculus, there is no decrease of plausibility when we put
two plausible hypotheses together: as we have mentioned above, u! A f3! - (u A f3)! is atheorem of
LP2. Concerning?, even though u? A f3? —> (u A f3)? is flot a theorem of LP2, as we have rnentioned,
tl’soimh - we can ohzain a similar axiom that satisfies both our intuitions as weli as the formai
constraints ofsuch piausibility conjunctive principle.
11 Anothor point tht vi1i havc to vait for th nxt section concems the problem ve have ner.ttoned in
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Regarding the problem of additive character of negation, the whole point is that besicles
considering the improbability or incredibility of A, we need also to deal with the probability or
credibility of—1A, which, as shown by the law p(A) + p(—iA) 1, is incompatible with the way the
probability calculus deals with negation. In a qualitative approach like ours, the iaw p(A) + p(—1A) =
1 would correspond to a version of the excluded middle principle according to which,
independently of the body of evidence at hand, we would always 5e sure about either the
piausibiÏity of cx or the plausibility of not cx. This does not mean however that a plausibility system
in which sentence “cx is plausible or flot (cx is plausible)” is not valid vi11 solve the problem. In
order for “cx is plausible or flot (cx is plausible)” flot to be valid, we need just to have an instance of
cx able to make “cx is plausible or flot (cx is plausible)” false. But here what we want is a little bit
different: we want “cx is plausible or not (cx is plausible)” to 5e aprioristicaily false for ail non
tautological and non-contradictory formulae cx. Only in this way is that we will make sure that it
wiIl neyer be possible to make such sort of aprioristic daims about the piausibility of sentences. We
will call this principle the contraiyptausibiÏity excluded middteprinciple15.
Trivially, this principle is satisfied by our skeptical operator!: for any non-tautoiogical and non
contradictory formula cx, cx! y (—,cx)! (as well as cx! y —(cx!)) is flot valid in LP2. It is worthy to note
that the principle represented by law p(A) + p(—A) 1, which is quite acceptable if we take p(—iA)
as meaning the improbability of A, holds in LP2 when we take instead of the extemal negation —:
cx! y —(cx!) is a theorem of LP2. Conceming?, however, things are not so straightforward. As it can
be easily seen, ? does flot satisfy the contraiy plausibility excluded middle principle: even though
cx? y (—cx)? and cx? y —(a?) are not theorems of LP2, for most formulae (pE?O(name1y those to
which axiom A3 can 5e applied), schema p? y (—1(p)? is LP2-valid. It is as if it does flot matter the
quality or quantity of the body of evidence or even if (p is related to it, we wiIl aiways have that
either p or —p is plausible. The same applies to —S: cx? y (—cx)? is a theorem ofLP2.
An important conclusion one may draw from this is that paracompleteness as we have
infonnaily defined is not enough for a plausibility modality to satis1i our intuitions conceming the
excluded middle principle. As exemplified by the behavior of?, there may be a paracomplete
operator that, as such, does flot satisfy the excluded middle principle but nevertheless disrespects
the inverse plausibihty excluded rniddle principle. But we may wonder, is this way of defining
paracomplete modalities reasonable? We know that cx? y —(u?) is flot theorem onlv because u may
contain some instance of!: for ail other sorts of «s, u.? V —(cc?) is LP2 valid. Ihis means that? can
Chapter 3 about the effor-prone feature ofinducti’e reasonine.
b The reason for the terin “contrar” vi11 hecorne clear later.
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be ciassified as a paracompiete operator only because of the possibility 0f using it along with a tmly
paracomplete modality in the same formula. Sirnilariy for Only due to ?‘s properties is that —(OE!
A —(&)) is not a LP2-theorem. Consequently, ! may be entitled to be ciassified as a paraconsistent
operator not due to ! itself, but to the possibility of using it along with ?. Given ail this, we can
fairly say that some other definition of paracompleteness and paraconsistency applied to modalities
is in need here. Since the whole motivation of this discussion is the satisfaction or flot of the
contrary plausibiiity excluded middle principle, we tvili restrict ourselves to intra-logical accounts
of paracompleteness and paraconsistency, which are based on the excluded middle and non-
contradiction principles, respectively16
We start by suggesting that perhaps the notions of paracomplete modality and paraconsistent
modality are primordially concemed with the satisfaction of what we may cali the contraries of the
non-contradiction and middle excluded principies, respectiveiy, rather than with the non-satisfaction
of the principles themselves. Let 9 be a modal operator and a negation symbol. What we cali the
O-middle excluded principle and the - O-non-contradiction principle may be represented,
respectively, by the statements “for ail formulae a, Œ9 y - (ŒO) is the case” and “for ail fonnulae a,
(Œ9 A
- (a9)) is the case.” In this way, the contrary of the - O-excluded middle principie and the
contrary of the - O-non-contradiction principie is, respectively, “for ail non-tautologicai and non
contradictory formulae a, ctO y - (ŒO) is not (aprioristicaily) tme” and “for ail non-tautological and
non-contradictory formulae Œ, - (c.tO A - (a9)) is not (aprioristically) true.” We then say that O is
paracomplete in relation to if and only if the contrary of the O-excluded middie principie is
satisfied, and paraconsistent in relation to if and only if the contrary of the O-non-contradiction
principle is satisfied. In this way, h is clear that only? is paraconsistent in relation to - and only! is
paracomplete in relation to — The theorem beiow states such resuit.
Theorem 6.2.3. Let cLec be such that ht-LP2 cc and b-Lp2 —CC. The following formulae are not LP2
theorems:
y —i(cc!) —(CL? A -(u2))
It should 5e noted however that unlike the above schemas of formulae, the contrary plausibility
excluded middle principle is not about the plausibility of ci. and the implausibility of ci., but about
the plausibility of cc and the plausibility ofnot cc. It looks more hke what we have called conceptual
paracompleteness (Chapters 4 and 5) than the formai paracomoleteness we have defir1ed ahove. 0f
course, if we express the contrai-y’ plausibiiity excluded rniddle principle in terms cf — these two
An example ofan extra-loaicai accouai. cfparicomp1eteaess anJ paracûnsistencv ‘vas iven in Section 3.3,
when we have dtined the tiotions ofparaoornplete and par onsisent lcgics.
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notions ofparacompleteness will be equivalent: n! y —(n!) -> n! ‘.‘ (—‘a)!. Regarding things are a
littie bit different. Since n! y —(n!) is logically distinct from n! y (—n)!, we need to lay down
another pair of notions similar to the pair O-excluded middle principle - e-non-contradiction
principie which reflects tins conceptual character of the contrary piausibility excluded middle
principle. Let O be a modal operator and a negation symbol. We call the statements “for ail
formulae n, nO y Ç n)9 is the case” and “for ah fonnulae, (nO A Ç n)9),” respectively, the
conceptual O-middle excluded principle and the conceptual - O-non-contradiction principle. The
contraries of these notions are defined in the same way as their non-conceptual counterparts. We
then say that O is conceptuaily paracomplete in relation to if and only if the contrary of the
conceptual O-excluded middle principle is satisfied, and conceptually paraconsistent in relation to
if and only if the contrary of the conceptual O-non-contradiction principle is satisfied. The
theorems below state the conceptual paracompleteness of ! in relation to and —, and the
conceptual paraconsistency of? in relation to and
Theorem 6.2.4. Let nŒ7, be such that F7-LP2 n and bt-Lp2 —x. The following formulae are flot LP2
theorems:
n! y (-n)! —(ct? A (-na)?)
Theorem 6.2.5. Let ŒE?O be such that bt-Lp2 n and b1-Lp2 —n. The following formulae are flot LP2
theorems1:
n! y (—n)! —(n? A (—n)?)
The lefi-side formulae of the above theorems show that the contrary plausibility excluded
middle principle is indeed satisfied by! in connection with both and
Turning back to ?‘s non-satisfaction of the contraiy plausibility excluded middle principle, or,
according to our new definition, its non-conceptual paracompleteness, this apparent inadequacy can
be justifled by making reference to the strength of the plausibility notion that the credulous
approach is supposed to entail. More specifically, the sort of evidential support required to classify
a formula as credulously plausible may be so weak (in fact the weakest one) that, independently of
the strength of the body of evidence at hand, it aiways transforms, for almost ail formulae n, either
n or - n into a plausible formula (here rnay be both - or
—.) Tins of course makes real sense oniy
when we take into account the epistemologically ideahized character of ouï Iogict8. In the same way
17 It is worthv of mention that we could have defmed the notions of concepmal paracompleteness and
conceptuai paraconsi:encv in relation to in the standard wav. without making use of the contraries of the
excluded midUle and r.oa-con:radictijn principles.
This was alreadv mentioned at the end or Section 3.3.
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that the principle ci / Dci makes sense only when we consider idealized agents who know ail logical
truths, formula ci? y Ç ci)? makes sense only when we consider idealized bodies of evidence. Tins
means that, independently of the agent’s being or flot able to conclude ci? or Ç ci)?, the body of
evidence at hand vi1l aiways gives some sort of support to either ci? or Ç ci)?. It is as if the sorts of
bodies of evidence which wilÏ create our epistemical reality have to keep a minimum of similarity
with the ontological reality: in the same way that in reality either c’ is truc or ci is truc, conceming
the weakest way we may evaluate the plausibility of sentences, indepcndently of our even being
able to inductively inferring ci or ci, it is sure that at least one of them is plausible. This sort of
evidential completeness is reflected in our semantic by the fact that each plausible world bas
attached to itself a compiete propositionai evaluation: for every propositional symbol p, either v(p)
1 or vw(p) = O.
One may object that even though this explanation may be acceptable in the case of ontological
concepts such as the notion oftruth, it is untenable if we are talldng about epistemic concepts which
cieariy involve some sort of constructive process. In contrast to the process of evaluating the truth
of statements, which we may suppose is there independentiy of our knotving it, to classify a
statement as plausible we have to somehow construct the way that goes from the evidences to the
plausibility of the statement at hand. Therefore, it is simply incorrect to assume ci? y Ç ci)? as
aprioristically truc, even if only for some non-tautological and non-contradictory subset of the
logical language. In order to reply to this objection, it vill be usefui to recali the general purpose of
idealization in the probiem of concept explication. When ideaiized objects or idealized situations
are used, the purpose is flot to lay down an exact description of the “conceptual reality” we are
analyzing, but rather to obtain a sort of approximation of il. Even though these idealized objects or
situations do not correspond exactly to the tvay we think things are, through them we can better
understand the essence of such things and, which is perhaps more interesting, by some sort of
refrnement to obtain a more accurate description of the conceptual reality in question. In our case,
for example, through tins “unrealistic” notion of plausibility, winch, because of being idealized, is
also the most basic and weakest sort ofplausibihty we can conceive, we can arrive at a stronger and
“more realistic” notion of credulous plausibility. For instance, we can through the basic operators ?
and ! define a stronger (in the sense of more realistic) notion of credulous plausibility winch, due to
its being conceptually paraconsistent and paracomplete in relation to — and and paraconsistent
and paracomplete in relation to , completely satisfies (we hope) our intuitions conceming the
principles of non-contradiction and excluded middle. What follows below is an atternpt to formalize
such derived notion ofplausihilitv.
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Delmnition 6.2.5. Let be a language, a ?-modal logic basis and a formula. We define
below the derived operator ? which is intent to formalize the notion of credulous-skeptical
plausibility:
ct? =det CL!?
In a very trivial way then, we obtain an operator that incorporates at the same time the
properties of paraconsistency and paracompleteness. If we use our expert plurality-oriented model
for example, we vill have that, in order for a to be credulously-skeptically plausible to a certain
expert w, it will have necessarily to be an accepted hypothesis to at least one of the experts who w
has trust in (which, naming such expert w’, means that CL has to be truc to ah experts who w’ has
trust in.) In this case, accepting the consensus between several experts as more relevant or stronger
that the opinion of only one expert, then? will be a stronger son of plausibility than?. However,
since R? is not transitive, the set of reliable experts of w’ is flot contained in the set of reliable
experts of w, where wR?w’. Therefore, if one takes the opinion of one reliable expert as more
relevant than the consensus among several experts who are, in the opinion of this very rehiable
expert, equally reliable, then ? will be weaker than?. To this we can add that while CL? can be read
as “h is plausible that CL is a truc hypothesis”, CL? means “it is plausible that CL is an accepted
hypothesis,” which evidences that ? is indeed a weaker sort of plausibility. The theorems below
state both sorts of paraconsistency and paracompleteness of? in relation to —, and its conceptual
paraconsistency and paracompleteness in relation to
Theorem 6.2.6. Let CLE?O be such that b1-Lp2 CL and hLLP? —iCL. The following formulae are not LP2
theorems:
CL? y -i(CL?) -i(CL? A -i(CL?))
CL? y (-,CL)? —(CL? A (—iCL)?)
Theorem 6.2.7. Let CLE? be such that bt-LP2 CL and 71-Lp2 —‘a. The following formulae are not LP2
theorems:
CL? y (—CL)? A (-Sa)?)
In order to better lay down the properties of?, we define au operator intent to fonnalize the
notion of skeptical-skeptical plausibility.
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Definition 6.2.6. Let be a language, a ?-rnodal logic basis and aa3 a formula. We defrne
below the derived operator ! which is intent to formalize the notion of skepticaÏ-skepticaÏ
plausibiÏitv:
( defCt.!
Theorem 6.2.8. Ail formulae of ?Q that satisfy one of the foflowing schemas of formula are LP2-
theorems (and consequently LP2-valid.)
(-,a)? -> -,Qx?) (a — f3)! —* (a? —> f3?)
(Œ?vf3?)—(Œvf3)? (ŒAf3)?-+(Œ?Af3?)
(Œ —> 3)? —* (a! —> 3?) a! —* Œ?
6.3 The Logic of Induction and its Applications
In this section we will deal with some instances of the inductive logic schema we have introduced
in Section 6.1. Even though we will aiways utilize the same pseudo-inductive modal calculus,
namely the ‘--extension of LP2, we will introduce here what we think to be the most interesting
logics of induction that can be obtained out of such pseudo-inductive modal calculus. Each one of
them wilI correspond to a different philosophy of induction and plausibility. Consequently, they can
also be taken as different solutions to the concept explication problem of induction. Through these
logics of induction, we vi1l also try to show how some of the problems raised in the course of the
previous chapters and sections can be solved inside the general induction explicatum we have
presented in Section 6.1. Ail this will of course point also to the fruitfulness and representative
power of our approach.
Definition 6.3.1. Let CP2 = <9o, S> (based on ) be LP2 calculus of plausibility. We cail the
pseudo-inductive modal calculus based on L and CP2 the psettdo-inductive LP2 calcttltts of
plattsibitity, which we represent by the symbol CP2.-.
C?2>- is the --extension of L?2 we have mentioned above. As we have said, it will serve as the
basis for ail systems of induction we vill present in this section.
It is \vorrhv to note tbat aIl this analysis we mode about the paracompleteness and paraoensistencv of?,
and ? apalies not onlv t LP:, but ta ail paranormal modal logis.
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6.3.1 A Bctsic Logic ofhzcluction
Defrnition 6.3.2. Let CP2>. = <9w, > 5e the pseudo-inductive LP calculus of plausibility. The
basic plausible togic ‘1)? is the pseudo-inductive logic ofplausibility <9?o,>-,{?},Ø>.
Definition 6.3.3. The basic logic of induction Z is the logic of induction <4h, HP’>, where
il-)? is the basic plausible logic, £u is ‘1?’s inductive-plausible language and HC’P° is the credulous
‘.P?-relation of inductive consequence.
P? and formalize the basic philosophy of induction we have sketched in chapters 2, 3 and 4
according to which the main epistemological feature of inductive inferences is that they “produce”
credulousiy plausible hypotheses. This is done by requiring the consequent of inductive
implications to be marked with the plausibility operator ?. A very important point implied by this
restriction concems the meaning of formulae of the form a ‘- 3 cp. In Section 6.1 we have
interpreted such formulae as meaning “a inductively implies J3 unless (p.” Now that (3 is necessarily
a ?-marked formula or an inductive implication that ultimately leads to a ?-marked formula, there
wili 5e, according to our philosophy of induction and piausibility, an effective relation of
confirmation between a and X or, we may say, between c and (3, for (3 will ultimately lead to the
formulae with which a is so related. Therefore, in the case of we can fairly say that formulae
ofthe form a
- (3 (p mean “a (weakly) confirms (3unless ,,20
Within ? we can lay down some inductive axioms that will help us to solve some of the
problems we have mentioned previously. These axioms will be used to form what we have called in
Section 6.1 an applied logic of induction.
Definition 6.3.4. Let 3 be a language and 14) = <9, , O, et> a pseudo-inductive logic of
plausibihty based on 3 wherein ?EO. The plausibility conjttnction axioms ?A in 3p is the set
composed by ail formulae of 3p satisfying the following schema of formula:
20A point we camiot afford to mention concems our decision of taking 4’s credulous relation of inductive
consequence ftP as ‘s relation of inductive consequence. The reason for that lias to do with the credulous
purpose alread embodied in Ç0 by t’s inductive plausibilirv modal operator set. Since some I4)rtheories
may have more than one extension, if we had used i.’s skeptical relation of inductive consequence we would
be forced to reiect some inductive conclusions and conseciuemlv go aoainst 14’s policv of’ heing tolerant in
the matter ofjudgi: the plausibilitv ofstatements.
1S5
CA: cc? A f3? ‘- (cc A f3)?
As we have mentioned in the last section, axiom CA will be responsible for conjoining
credulously plausible hypotheses in the case where they are flot mutually contradictory. This, as we
have seen, is a necessaiy step if we are to have a satisfactory explication of the notion of
plausibility. We notice that cc? A f3? ‘- (cc A f3)? is an abbreviation for cc? A f3? > (cc A f3)?
Therefore, the only situations able to block the use of C,,. are those in which —(cc A f3) is the case, or,
in other words, in which the conjunction of cc and f3 implies th trivialization of the theory. By
managing things in this way, C?,. puis the last touches on the controversy around the conjunction
principle and the lotteiy paradox we have been taiking about since Chapter 3.
Definition 6.3.5. Let Z be a language and ip = <,
,
O, G> a pseudo-inductive Iogic of
plausibility based on 3 wherein ?eO. The negative auto-epistemic axioms NA in 3p is the set
composed by ail formulae of i3p satisfying the following schema of formula:
NA: ((—tDCL)?)°
NA is the axiom which will transform into a truly autoepistemic logic of plausibility. Note
that ((—Da)?)° is an abbreviation for T - (—Dcc)? ±. Therefore, independently of the
knowledge situation at hand, if it does flot contain —((—Du)?) we will be able to infer
nonmonotonically that —rJcc is plausible. The purpose of this is of course to make explicit that our
agent does not Imow about the tmthfulness of those fonnulae whose certainty cannot be inferred
from his knowledge base. In the cases where Dcc does flot belong to the logical theory, that is to
say, u is flot known, (—Du)? will be the case. We have afready explained why such autoemistemic
inference bas to be represented nonmonotonically through an inductive implication. One may be
thinking that because what we conclude through NA is (—Dcc)? and not —Dcc, NA does flot in fact
perform the task we are claiming it performs. Not quite so. Since u? —* cc (which is obtained from
P?, Ki and u —D—u), from (—Dcc)? we get <O>—Dcc. From that, along with NP, we get
—--Du, which is equivalent to —DDcc. Since —DDcc —> —,Ua, we have then that —Da21.
21 Sorne ofthese theorems tvill be proved in a s rated appenciix.
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Defrnition 6.3.6. Let be a language and i.p = <,
,
O, Ø> a pseudo-inductive iogic of
plausibiiity based on wherein ?eO. The introspective inductive axioms 1? in is the set
composed by ail fommiae of satisfying the following schema ut formula:
I?: a1? A ... A a? l- (—i(Ci A ... A an))? J3?, wherein a1,.., a and f3 are dfferent
basic formulae
Axiom L tries to forrnahze what we have called in Chapter 3 introspective inductive reasoning,
or the awareness of the error-prone feature of inductive reasoning. As have explained there, since
inductive conclusions may 5e mistaken even when its premises are truc (something the very past
use of such sort of inference has shown), any fais account of inductive reasoning should have an
axiom saying that, independently of the circumstances tve are working on, it is plausible that one of
the beliefs we now take as rational is false. foliowing the suggestion we have given in the
mentioned chapter, L formalizes that by saying that if n basic fomiuÏae22 are plausible, then it is also
plausible that some of them are false (or, as we wrote, that the negation of their conjunction is
plausible.) The exception part of L is intent to guarantee that no plausible atomic formula will be
out of the conjunction a1? A ... A a11?: if tins is the case, then the induction implication at hand
cannot be used.
Defrnition 6.3.7. The auto-epistemic introspective Ïogic of induction ‘Çi is the applied logic of
induction <9 ICAI>, where is the basic logic of induction and TCAI = ?A U NA U , where ?A
are the plausibility conjunction axioms in £, NA the negative auto-epistemic axioms in and
I? the introspective inductive axioms in p.
6.3.2 Calculating Skeptically Plausible Hypotheses
A veiy important point we have not mentioned so far concems the way according to which
skeptically plausible facts will 5e introduced. Independently of the philosophical guidelines we
adopt, one must agree that such skeptically plausible hypotheses are to be inferred in the same
nonmonotonic way as weakly plausible ones. Tins means that we vill have to extend ‘.2? in such a
way as to allow ! -marked fonnulae to be present in the consequent of inductive implications as well
as to find out how !-marked formulae will be obtained inside the corresponding logic of induction
22 In Chapter 5 we ha’. e detined n basic fnmi!s as n aorni2 via or n neoaion cf an atornic fcnnctla.
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Definition 6.3.8. Let CP2
=
> be the pseudo-inductive LP2 calculus of plausibility. The
skepticaï-credulottsplattsibÏe Ïogic (or simpiy s-c plausible logic) is the pseudo-inductive logic
ofplausibility <,-,{?,!},Ø>.
Definition 6.3.9. The skeptical-credutous togic ofindttction .! is the logic of induction <4), £p?!,
where i.p is the skeptical-credulous plausible logic, f41)?! is i.?!’s inductive-plausible
language and H’P is the credulous 1.?!-relation of inductive consequence.
As one would expect, ! allows both sorts of plausible statements to be inductively inferred
through inductive implications. Since is supposed to embody both credulous and skeptical
approaches, there was no philosophically determinant reason for having taken the credulous ‘.p
relation of inductive consequence instead of the skeptical one. Concerning the point of how to
obtain !-marked fonnulae, the most straightforward solution wouid be to let our system user to
specify in the form of !-consequent inductive implications (u >- [3 (p) bis ovin mies for inferring
strongly plausible facts. In the same way that a descriptive logic of induction is flot supposed to say
when a piece of evidence weakly confirms a hypothesis, it is also not supposed to say when a
hypothesis is strongly confu-med by a piece of evidence: ail it has to do is to set the basic
representational tools one needs to represent such strong plausibility mies of inference. from a
formai point of view, tins means that the formulae which vill effectiveiy introduce the skepticaliy
plausible hypothesis will be contained in the set A which vili make use of Ç?!’s relation of inductive
consequence.
While this looks ail right, we know that, from a semantic point of view, the notions of skeptical
plausibility and credulous plausibility are connected in such a way that skeptically plausible facts
are obtained from a specific set of creduiously plausible ones. In ail examples we have considered
so far, the notion of acceptability has been explained as that consensus one obtains when a
hypothesis is taken as plausible from ail different viewpoints. Therefore, at the same time that we
should allow the user to set skepticaily plausible inductive implications, it seems reasonable also to
expect that the logic of induction itself sets in the form of a special set of inductive axioms a logical
way through winch skeptically plausible hypotheses are obtained from credulously plausible ones.
The fonn of such inductive axioms will of course depend on the philosophy of induction we
want of formalize witliin for instance, if we adopt a very’ simple sort of confirmation by
enumeration phulosophv, u viil be taken as acceDted only afer it bas got enough weak
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confirmation. It is as if, by observing one black raven we tum the hypothesis “ail ravens arc black”
into a very weaidy plausible one; by observing another one we increase a littie bit its degrec of
plausibility; and so and so forth, until that, affer have observed a certain number of black ravens,
say n, we raise the hypothesis in question to the status of ai accepted or strongly plausible
statement. In order to fomialize that, wc need of course to somehow quantify how much a
hypothcsis vas wealdy conflrmed or, in the context of taking wcak confirmation and credulous
plausibility as the same, how weakly plausible a hypothesis is.
The most straightforward way to do that inside LP2 is to count in how many plausible worlds a
hypothesis is true. If CL is true in at least one plausible world we write cc?1; if it is truc in at least two
plausible worlds we tvrite cc?2 ... until it is truc in at least n plausible worlds, in the case we write
cc? or cc!. What follows is an attempt to set within LP2 such quantified notion of plausibility along
with the notion of acceptability entailed by it.
Definition 6.3.10. Let 3 be a language, = <O O”> a ?-modal logic basis, and cc,f3e33 two
formulae. We define the following abbreviations in 3:
(i) cc?1 =def CL?;
(ii) cc?2 def (cc A q)? A (CL A —1q)?, where q is an arbitraiy atomic formula of 33;
(iii) cc? def (CL A li A q)? A ... A (CL A A q)? A (CL A Pi A —1q)? A ... A (CL A Pm A
where = k+1 m = 2k, k>O, CL?m (CL A pi)? A ... A (cc A PmY? and q is an arbitrary atomic
formula of 33 which do not occur in Pi;
(iv) cc? def (CL A pi)? A ... A (cc A Pn)?, where 2kI>n>2k and (cc A pi)? A ... A (CL A
Pn)? A (cc A Pn+i)?.
cc? may be understood as meaning “the degree ofplausibility cf cc is n.” As we have mentioned
above, such meaning is achieved by counting in how many plausible worlds cc is truc, winch is
performed with the help of the classical feature of plausible worlds. Given an atomic formula q, we
know that q and —iq cannot 5e truc at the same time in world w. Therefore, if (cc A q)? and (cc A
—1q)? are truc, then the plausible worlds winch make these two formulae truc cannot be the same.
Consequently, cc is necessarily truc in at least two worlds. Similarly, givcn an atomic formula p
distinct from q, (cc A q A p)? A (cc A —qq A p)? A (cc A q A —p)? means that cc is truc in at lcast thrcc
worlds, (cc A q A p)? t (cc A —q A p)? A (cc /\ q A —ip)? t\ (cc A —iq)? that cc is truc in at least four
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worids, and so on and so forth. The way this nurnericai (credulous) notion of plausibility is used to
obtain the skeptical plausibility is shown below23.
Definitîon 6.3.11. Let 3 be a language, ‘..p = <,
,
®, et> a pseudo-inductive logic of
piausibihty based on wherein {?,!}ciG and nl is natural number. The n-nurnericaÏ acceptabititv
OXIOJflS !n in 3tp is the set composed by ail formuiae of 3tp satisfying the following schema of
formula:
!: a? - a! (—ia)?
The reason why we have decided to represent ! as an inductive implication and flot deductiveiy
through —* has to do with the nature of acceptance in the context of a confirmation by enumeration
philosophy. As one can see, the above way of obtaining skepticaily plausible hypotheses is very
similar to the way many probabiiists define the notion of acceptabiiity (as we have seen in Chapter
3): ail one has to do is to pick a number and use it as the threshold level of acceptance according to
which wealdy plausible hypotheses will be transformed into strongly plausible ones. The obvious
problem with this approach is that even afler having taken the hypothesis “all ravens are black” (let
us cali it H) as accepted (due to the observation of n black ravens, let us say), we viil have stili to
consider the defeasibie nature of accepted hypotheses. What we mean is that “H is accepted” can be
falsified even afler getting the status of an accepted hypothesis. In the case where H! is faisified
tbrough the observation of one non-black raven, there vill be no problem at ah, for the very weak
instances of “H is plausible” will be reconsidered. But how about if we have a weaker falsification
where —1H is discovered to be (weakiy of strongly) plausible? In this case, if we write a? — a!
instead of !7, H! vill not be defeated and probabiy two incompatible extensions will arise. The
important point however concems the soundness of taking H as an accepted hypothesis in the
presence of the plausibility of —H. More specifically, is it reasonable to keep Ht even afler having
discovered that —1H is wealdy plausible, for example?
Mi this has of course to do with the above mentioned error-phone feature of inductive
reasoning. In the same way that we should be aware that our weakly plausible hypotheses may be
faise, we should also consider that our accepted hypotheses may be faisified both from a strong,
tmthflilness way, as well as from a weak, plausible way. Because of that, we have written the
principle in question as an inductive implication and put Ha)? in its exception part. Moreover, by
•in u.? —> a! we would be imposing a quite heavy limitation on the semantic models which
would be taken mb account. More specifically, we wouÏd restriet ourselves only to models M such
23 This ncirnerical skeptical pIausibi1ï coutd aiso be deflned in a sornehow oprosite way: rather than looking
inside the set cf plausible worlds of world w (Rfw)). we couid look at the sets cf plausible worlds cf each
I Ç)
that, for every world it of M, R(w) has exactly n elements. Because ofthat, it would be impossible,
for instance, to have in the same extension a? and (—cc)?. What follows bclow is the definition of
what we can cali the n-numerical logic cf induction.
Definition 6.3.12. Let nl be a natural number. The n-numerical logic of indttction Z is the
applied Iogic cf induction <, where is the skeptical-creduious logic cf induction and
are the n-numerical acceptability axioms in
Another way to “automatically” get skeptically plausible facts from credulously plausible ones
is to use the consistency approach adopted my most AI theorists to defme the skeptical and
credulous approaches te induction. As we have seen in Chapters 3 and 4, the way these approaches
are defined in AI depends on the notion cf extension, understood as a maximal consistent set cf
conclusions obtained deductive-inductively from a specific knowledge situation. As a consequence
of that, what we may cali the criterion of identity cf extensions is based on the existence or not cf
contradictory formulae in the extension: extension E is different from extension E’ iff, for some
formulae (p, (peE and -peE’. Now, if we define skeptically and credulously plausible facts in terms
of extensions, this criterion trivialiy entails that, given a specific set cf extensions, if CL is
credulously plausible and it is not the case that —cc is credulously plausible then ct is skeptically
plausible, and vice-versa.
If we wish to ftilly represent this equivalence between the skeptical and the credulous
plausibility, we will have te deal with a very trick difficulty: the necessity cf representing that (—a)?
is net the case. The solution is to represent haif the equivalence (the one that interests us cf course)
as an inductive implication with (--CL)? as its exception part and the credulous plausibility of ct as its
antecedent. In this way, we will have that if CL? is the case, then CL! can be inductively inferred
unless (—CL)? is the case.
Definition 6.3.13. Let be a language and ) = a pseudo-inductive logic of
plausibility based on i3 wherein {?,!}O. The consistency acceptabiÏity axioms 1!J in p iS the set
composed by ail fcrmulae of satisfying the following schema offormuia:
L: a? - a! (--a)?
rnemhr ofR(w): (j) cL? Œ? and (ii) cc?1 =
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Definition 6.3.14. The consistencv acceptability logic of induction is the applied logic of
induction <?I, Z±>, where Ç7 is the skeptical-credulous logic of induction and are the
consistency acceptability axioms in £p.
It should be noted that despite the consistency acceptability axiom’s motivation’s being, as we
have explained, the way the skeptical and credulous views are understood in AI, the way the term
“extension” was used to explain such axiom is flot identical to the way it is used in definition
6.I.12. from a semantic point of view, the use of the term “extension” in the mentioned explanation
cornes in the context of a specific application of our semantic model where each plausible world,
here calied extension, is identifled soiely on the basis of the trnth-values of atornic formulae. It is
what we may eau an intra-logical use of the term. Trivially then, the satisfaction of the definition of
extension as an inferentiaily maximal consistent set of deductively-inductiveiy obtained formulae
will be achieved only indirectly: while the maximal aspect is obtained in conjunction with a modal
valuation which alÏows us to know the true value of ail non-modal formulae, the inferential aspect
will be obtained by supposing that the plausible world in question is the resuit of some inductive
inferentiai mechanism. In definition 6.1.12 on the other hand, the term “extension” is used with an
extra-logical meaning, where a so-called extension is the end product of the whole inferential
mechanism of applied to a set of formulae A. To sec that there is really a difference, note that if A
H? CL? and A Ht?! (—ux)?, from the intra-logical perspective there will be at least two extensions
(plausible worlds) where a is truc in one and —,cr. is truc in the other. On the other hand, from the
extra-logical perspective, a? and (—Œ)? wiiI belong to the same and possibly the only one
extension. Similariy, while from the internai perspective there is no way of simultaneously dealing
with a! and (—CL)? (which in formai ternis means that no model can satisfy at the same time the two
formulae), from the external perspective such situation is easily treatable by putting the two
formulae in separated extensions.
In order to finish this section, we should mention the role of ail the logics of induction presented
so far in the task of explicating the notion of plausibility. As we have mentioned in Section 6.2,
unless we are able to represent the susceptibility of plausible statements ofbeing refuted or given up
we will not have a satisfactory solution for the concept explication problem of plausibility. Since
this task is an eminently nonmonotonic one, it cannot be donc inside LP2. Therefore, hy allowing us
ta infer ;ionmonotonicaïiv plausible facts throuh inductive implicatio::s. 1aics ‘, , and
CA complernent LP2 in the task of explicating the notion ofplausibility.
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6.3.3 Towards an Episternic Logic ofInduction
In the logics of induction we have been discussing so far, we have used exclusively ? as the
credulous plausibility marker. However, as we have seen in Section 6.2, due to its idealized
character, in special its behavior in connection with the middle excluded principle, a more
“realistic” application may require a stronger (or, if you wish, veaker) plausibility symbol. What
foilows beiow is an attempt to provide such a more “realistic” and consequently epistemologically
sounder logic of induction where? is used instead of? as the inductive plausibility modal operator.
Definition 6.3.15. Let CP2 <,, > be the pseudo-inductive LP2 calculus of plausibility. The
s-basic plausible Ïogic q]? is the pseudo-inductive iogic of plausibiiity <?o, , f!?}, 0>.
Definition 6.3.16. The s-basic Ïogic of indttction Ç? is the logic of induction <14)?,
where q]? is the s-basic plausible logic, is l4)?’s inductive-plausible language and H’4 is the
credulous 14)?-relation of inductive consequence.
About the axioms we have presented in Subsection 6.3.1 to be used along with Ç and build
what we have cailed the auto-epistemic introspective logic of induction, ail of them, from
defmitions 6.3.4 to 6.3.6, can be easily transformed into 14)? axioms by repiacing ? by ?: the
plausibility conjunction axiom wiil become u? A f3? (u A f3)?, ffie negative auto-epistemic
axiom ((—,Dc.c)?)° and the introspective inductive axiom c? A ... A u? - (—(u1 A ... A un))?
f3?. It is worthy to note that axiom C?A could be kept in its ?-form if? were one of the inductive
plausibility modal operators and C?A’S sole purpose were to allow the conjunction of ?-marked
formuiae: from u!? A f3!? we couid inductively get (u! A f3!)?, from which, along with u! A f3! ->
(u A f3)!, we wouid obtain (u A f3)!?. Another important point is that, aldn to ((—iOn)?)°, ((—[]cc)?)°
will also produce the intended result of concluding —cc: from u? —> <>u we get u?! —+ (cu)!,
from winch, along with (o>u)! —> (>ct)? tve get u?! —> (>u)?. From that, along with (øu)? —>
we get u?! — u. from that, along with (—iEIŒ)!?, we get O O—u that implies —1flu
and, consequently, —u. Similar adjustments can me made in order to obtain stronger versions of
what we called in Subsection 6.3.2 the n-nurnerical logic of induction and the consistency
acceptability logic of induction (in winch cases both operators ! or! may be used.)
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Another feature of the iogics of induction we have presented (? inctuded) is that we have flot
imposed any sort of restriction on the form of ordinary formulae. More specificaiiy, ail pseudo
inductive logics of plausibility we have considered had 0 as their sets of basic truth modal
operators. This means that the most basic daim unit ofthe languages 3p we have analyzed are the
truth of statements. While from a technical viewpoint this does not seem to be any problem — after
ail, we wiil have even more freedom at the time ofwriting our formulae —, from the epistemological
position we have adopted in Chapter 2 it has some troublesome implications.
We recail that in that chapter we have taken induction as primarily concerned with our
limitations ofknowing. This leaded us to the new understanding of accepting induction not as those
inferences which lead from truth premises to plausible conclusions, but as those which iead from
certain statements to ptattsible and therefore uncertain ones. Put differently, induction, as tve
understand it, is something essentially epistemic and cannot, in alt its relevant aspects, be
dissociated from knowledge issues. Now, if our pseudo-inductive iogic of plausibility 4i = ,
G, O> is such that ?eO and O = 0, for example, then the plausible-inductive language of our
logic of induction wilI have formulae ofthe form Œ f3? p (cL and f3 being non-modal formulae),
which can be taken as meaning something like “from the truth of cL, concitide inductively the
piausibiiity of f3, unless cp is true.”
As can be easily seen, this goes against the epistemological phiiosophy of induction we have
just sketched. Since according to this philosophy ail components of an inductive inference should
be about otir knowledge of reality and not about reality itself, from the point ofview of our formai
framework we wiii have that ail components of an inductive implication should have some
epistemic modal operator attached to it. Going a littie bit deeper, we can say that since our purpose
is to provide a theory able to perform inductive inferences and since this will be achieved by
making inductive implications (formed, as we have agreed, exclusively with the help of epistemic
formulae) and ordinary formulae to interact, it does not make sense to allow ordinary formuiae to be
ofany other sort than likewise epistemic. That is to say’, since the whole purpose of our endeavor is
to account for a sort of inference whose raison d’être is exactly our failure to dispose of precise and
complete information, it is at ieast incoherent to suppose that it (the failure) affects solely inductive
implications. Put differently, having a really comprehensive account of the plausible or imperfect
but at the same time epistemologically sound reasoning implies having to take ail formulae as being
primarity concemed with the same sort of imprecision that makes inductive inferences into a
plausible subject matter.
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In our mathematical framework, what ail that means is that the set of basic truth modal
operators O should consist of a set composed exclusively of epistemological operators. What
follows below is an attempt to formally materialize such philosophical guidelines.
Definition 6.3.17. Let CP2>- = <9?o, r>-> be the pseudo-inductive LP2 catcutus ofplausibility. The
epistemic plausible logic i.p is the pseudo-inductive logic of ptausibility <7,E.,{E?,fl!},{U}>.
Definitïon 6.3.18. The epistemic logic 0f induction ? is the iogic of induction <4..c?. £q,
PD?> where t?i is the epistemic plausible logic, £qJcy7 15 i4’s inductive-plausible language and
HSP is the skeptical 14)E,-reiation of inductive consequence.
? formalizes the philosophy of induction tve have sketched in Chapter 2 and recapitulated
some unes above. By equating e with {D}, we make sure that ail otir daims wili be about our
knowledge of the trtith, and not abotit trtitb itself Rather than claiming that the earth is flat, for
example, we viil be able just to daim that we know that the earth is flat. It is as if, due to the
limitations ofour knowledge acquiring abilities, in order for a daim to be acceptable as meaningftil
it should neyer refers to reality itseif, but always to the way which reality appears to be to us.
can therefore be taken as a sort ofa logic ofappearance wherein flot oniy epistemological daims are
ailowed, but aiso no sort ofnon-epistemological daim is tolerated.
An important consequence ofthis radical epistemological commitment is that ail daims we are
able to represent inside such a strictly epistemological logic wili have a sort of paracomplete
behavior. This is a point we have flot mentioned before, but if we adopt a “realistic” epistemologicai
point ofview, given a formaI ianguage there vill be trivialiy many statements of which we do
flot have any sort ofknowledge about. For many statements ofsuch language, tve simply will flot be
abie to daim neither that they are true nor that they are faise. This of course means that what we
may cali the certainty middle exciuded principie — “u is certain or —CL is certain” — should flot be
vaiid in a truly epistemic logic of certainty. As a consequence of that, the logicai machineiy that
will reason about these daims necessarily bas to be a paracompiete one. This is achieved by Ç by
the aiready mentioned conceptual paracompleteness of O in LP2. This is formalty described in the
theorem below;
Theorem 6.3.1. If ŒE?O is such that b-Lp2 u and 51LP’ —iu, then Du y D(—u) is flot L?2 theorem.
If is such that [f L\p’ u and LP2 —u, then Du V D(—u) is not L?2 theorem.
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The reason why we have taken O = {D?, D!} is twofold. Ffrst, by taldng El? and D! instead of
? and ! we act in accordance with the strictly epistemological philosophy of induction we have been
taiking about: rather than speaking about the plausibility of Œ’S being true, we speak about the
plausibility of it’s being certain. Second, by using the derived plausibiiity symbol D? instead of?,
we automatically satisfyr what we have cailed in Section 6.2 the contrary piausibiiity excluded
middle principle: representing (DŒ)? as a?0 and (DŒ)! as we have the following theorems.
Theorem 6.3.2. Let aetc be such that b-Lp, a and htLp2 —cc. The foilowing formuiae are not LP2
theorems:
c y (-,ct)!c (cc? A (—a)?1)
Theorem 6.3.3. Let ŒE?, be such that F1-[p2 c and The foilowing formulae are flot LP2
theorems:
y (.a)!0 A (-fL)?)
It worthy to note that despite our having committed ourselves to a certain number of Iogical
principles conceming the notions of plausibiiity and certainty, namely the ones incorporated by LP2,
we have stili at our disposai a considerabie variety of representational systems of induction that can
be made out of it. Therefore, the iogics of induction as weii and the applied iogics of induction we
have introduced here should be seen more as an illustration of the fruitfulness and representative
power of our framework than a definitive position of ours about what a proper system of induction
is supposed to be. In fact, this bas been one of the main guideiines of this work. Rather than
proposing a definitive approach to induction and plausibiiity, we intend to show how some AI
techniques may be extremeiy fruitful in clarifying the notions of induction and piausibility.
6.4 An Application in the PhiÏosophy of Science
In this section we wiil consider how the inductive logics introduced in the iast section can
be of some help in the problem of confirmation of hypotheses and theories in the
philosophy of science. We will focus on Hempei’s conditions of adequacy and the
hypothetico-deductive method. Even though we wiii make use exclusively of Z in the
formalization of these models, the applied iogics of induction to be presented here could
have been made out of any one of the logics of induction we have introduced in the last
section. \Ve picked justbecause it is the simplest of cli.
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C 6.4.1 Hempet ‘s Calcuhis ofInductive Implication
The logics of induction we have considered so far are flot exactly what we have called a calculus of
inductive implication. Rather, the T components of the appiied logics of induction introduced in
Subsections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2 are simple representations ofsome properties we wish? and ! ta passes
which carmot be represented through a deductive calculus. On the other hand, a calculus of
inductive implication is meant ta set the logicai cannons which inductive implications are supposed
to obey. As an example of such cannons, we have spoken about inductive implication’s supposed
transitivity property. What will follow in this subsection is an attempt to extend Z in such a way as
ta obtain something worthy of being calted a caiculus of inductive implication.
In Chapter 3 we have tallced about the conditions laid down by Cari Hempel winch any
defmition of confirmation is supposed to satisfy2t. By definition of confirmation Hempel meant any
way of saying whether or not e confirms or inductively supports h, for any pair of sentences e-h.
Since the end product of a model of confirmation is, among other things, a set of statements of the
form “e inductively supports h,” Hempel’s conditions can be said to define the logical restrictions
winch these statements are supposed to obey. Consequently, forgetting about the way these
statements are generated, they can also be taken as the basis of a calculus of inductive confirmation.
We Ïist below the conditions winch Hempel accepts as sound25:
O. Generat Appticabitity condition: a defmition of confirmation should be applicable to the
confirmation of statements of any logical form, producing then confirmation statements
formed by statements of any form;
I. Entaitrnent condition: if statement a entails (that is, logically implies) statement f3, then f3
should be confirmed by cg
II. Consequence condition: if statement a confirms statement f3 and f3 logically implies
statement (p, then CL should also confirm (p;
III. Eqtdvalence condition: if statement a confinus statement f3 and f3 is logically equivalent
ta cp, then a should also confirm (p;
IV. Weak Consistency condition: if statement a confinus statement f3 and a is flot self
contradictory, then CL and f3 should be logically compatible;
IV’. Strong Consistency condition: if statement CL confinns statements f3 and (p and Œ is flot
self-contradictory, then f3 and f9 should be logicaliy compatible.
24 Hempel (1945). for a discussion on Hempel’s conditions sec Scheffler (1963) part II, Skins (1966), Hesse
(1970) and Hanzn (1971).
As shah sec below. Hempel lays down some othec conditions which he rejecis as unacceptably problernatic.
\ have liere sIihdv rnodifiod the wav Hempel oriinal1v presented bis conditions.
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We first observe that the part of condition O which interests us is automatically satisfied by Z:
taking cx - 13? as meaning “cx confirms 13,” it is clear that cx and f3 can be of any logical form.
Second, conditions IV and IV’ are, respectively, conditions 8.31 and 8.32 which we have discussed
in Chapter 3. Considering then what we have concluded in that chapter, IV’ is not to be
incorporated into a calculus of inductive implication formalized within ? (although it could 5e
incorporated into a logic of induction whose pseudo-inductive logic of plausibility 14] :, Os,,
were such that O, = {! }, for example). 0f course this is truc only when confirmation statements
ofthe form “cx confunis 13” are represented by cx ‘- f3?. If we take cx 13 as meaning “cx confirms 13”
then condition IV’ vi11 be automatically satisfied: since every 13 in this case wili be a formula of the
form p?, if cx
‘- 13 and cx ?, then 13 and ? wili aiways be compatible with each other.
We shah now show how these conditions, with the exception of O and IV’, can be represented
inside £. We shouid however remind that by doing that, we are not taking the side ofHempel and
defending the reasonableness or even the tenability of his conditions. Rather, our purpose is just to
show how our fomialism can vety easily incorporate something worthy of being called a calculus of
inductive implication.
Defluition 6.4.1. Let be a language and i.p = <, , e, et> a pseudo-inductive logic of
plausibility based on wherein ?eO. The Hempet confirmation axioms H in is the set
composed by ail formulae of satisfying the following schemas of formula:
L-: (cx
—> 13) —> (cx ‘- 13?) Entailment
IL..: (cx ‘- 13?)
—÷ ((13 —> (p) —* (cx ‘- (p?)) Consequence
IIL.: (cx ‘- 13?)
—> ((13 -* (p) —* (cx (p?)) Eqttivatence
(cx >- 13?) —* ((cx A 13—> ±) —> ±) Weakconsistency
About this formulation of Hempel’s conditions, we just observe that we have represented the
weak consistency condition through an axiom that basicahly tums any theory containing a formulae
of the forrn cx ‘- 13? where cx and 13 are mutuahly contradictory into an inconsistent one.
Now, some philosophers have tried to extend this iist by propwing additional conditions which
seem to be in accordance with Hempel’s idea. We skip the informai presentation and lay down
below some of these conditions represented in our formai inductive language.
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Deflnition 6.4.2. Let be a language and = <, , O, G> a pseudo-inductive logic of
plausibility based on wherein ?EO. The Hempel additional conjirmation axioms H in p is the
set composed by ail formulae of3p satisfying the foliowing schemas of formula:
V>-: (cc - f3?) —* ((cc <-+ (p) —> (Qp - f3?)) Inverse Eqttivalence
VI>-: (cc I>- f3?)
—> ((f3 ‘- (p?) —> (cc >- cp?)) Transitivity
V>. is a sort of inverse of III>. which applies the equivalence principle present in III>. to the
evidences rather than to the hypothesis. VI>. is the transitivity principle we have afready
mentioned26. Together with I>., VI>. implies what we can eau the material-inductive transitivity or
simply inverse consequence condition. (cc —* f3) —> ((f3 > p?) —* (cci> (p?)). Now can we put these
axioms together to define what we call the Hempel logic of induction.
Defrnition 6.4.3. The Hempel togic of induction ÇH is the applied logic of induction <?, TH>,
where Z? is the basic logic of induction and TH = H u EH’, where are the Hempel confirmation
(E axioms in £tp? and H’ the Hempel additional confirmation axioms in 727•
The role of axioms I>.-VI>. in the above-defined logic of induction evidences a very important
difference between Hempel’s project and ours. The whole purpose of Hempel’s laying down Ris
conditions of adequacy was to set the basic features winch a good definition of confirmation, or in
our terminology, a good model of confirmation is supposed to possess. And it is quite remarkable
how Hempel tried to achieve tins. Rather than directiy addressing the internai mechanism winch
determines whether or not hypothesis h is confirmed by evidence e, he addressed the “output” ofthe
model: if the set of confirmation statements produced by a model of confirmation is such that it
satisfies ail the conditions, then the model in question can be taken as a good definition of
confirmation. Now, in the case of ZH there is no such thing as models of confirmation to be
evaiuated. The purpose of axioms I>--VI>. is what we can eau an axiomatic one: at the same time
that they stipulate some properties we wish our confirmation statements to have, they also set the
reasoning canons winch any confirmation statement to be represented inside shah 1 follow; (cc
26 formulations of V>- and VI>- have appeared, for instance, in Scheffler (1963) md Rosse (1970),
respectively.
27 Since II>- can be obtained from VI>- and 1>- and III>- from II>-, they (11>- and III>-) did flot have in fact to ho
present in ‘S axiornatization. It isjust for the same ofciaritv cf presentation that we take thom into accoun:
as welI.
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O J3?, f3 - (p?} HH CL (p?, {a ‘- f3?, f3 -> (p} H cc - (p? and so on and so forth. Therefore we cal!
a calculus of confirmation.
As perhaps one may have already noticed, there is a littie problem with axioms L- and U>-. Due
to the properties of the material implication, these axioms do flot actually achieve the goal they are
designed to achieve. Take for example axiom L-. Clearly enough, I>-’s purpose is to represent the
intuitive principle according to which if cc entails f3, then cc also confirms f3. But suppose that f3 is a
tautology. Trivially, for any formula a, cc —> f3. Then, by axiom II>- we will have that any formula
whatsoever confirms a tautology f3. Besides the question whether it is meaningful a tautology’s
being confirmed by a formula, the problem with this is that by L- two formula which are flot in any
imaginable way inductively connected with each other will be such that one gives evidential support
to the other. Similarly, if cc is a contradiction, we have that CL —> f3 for any formula f3 and, by b-, that
any formula is confirmed by a contradictoiy formula. IL- and the derived principle which we have
called inverse consequence condition have got the same sort ofproblem.
Even though these problems cannot be sorted out inside a purely classical framework, they can
be easily solved if we take full advantage of the representational apparatus provided by P? While
stili making use of material implication, we just represent the above-mentioned principles as
inductive implications and consider the anomalous cases in their exception parts:
L-: (af3)(af3?)((a->L)v(T-*f3))
II>-: (f3 —> (p) ((cc f3?) (cc (p?)) (T — (p)
What follows below is an amended version ofHempel’s logic of induction.
Definition 6.4.4. Let be a language and = <,
,
O, O> a pseudo-inductive logic of
plausibility based on wherein ?eO. The Hempel+ confirmation axioms in is the set
composed by ah formulae of satisfring the following schemas of formula:
I>-: (cc
—> f3) - (cc h>- f3?) ((cc —+ L) y (T — f3)) Entailment
II>-: (f3 —* (p) h>- ((cc h>- f3?) — (cc h>- (p?)) (T —* cp) Consequence
III>-: (cc h> f3?)
— ((f3 (p) — (cc h>- cp?)) Ecjtiivatence
IV>-: (cc h>- f3?) —> ((cc A f3 — L) —* L) Weak consistencv
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Due to I>.’s being represented as an inductive implication with an exception condition, the
inverse consequence principle, which itself must have an exception condition to block the cases
where a is a tautology, cannot any more be obtained from I>. and VI>-. We therefore have to take
such principle as an axiom of our amended Hempel logic of induction. Also, since our new version
of I>. exciudes any tautological or contradictory formulae, we vi1l have that for those formulae the
principle according to which any formula confirms itself, which we may cali inclusion principle,
will flot be hold28. Therefore, it too wili have to be included in oui new Hempel logic.
Definition 6.4.5. Let be a language and ip = <, , G, O> a pseudo-inductive logic of
plausibility based on 3 wherein ?eG. The Hempet+ additional confirmation axioms in p is
the set composed by ail formuiae ofp satisfying the following schema of formula:
VII1-: (Œ —> f3)
‘- ((f3 ‘- (p?) —> (Œ >- p?)) (a —* J.) Inverse Consequence
VIII>.: c - a? Inclusion
Definition 6.4.6. The HempeÏ+ togic of induction H± is the applied logic of induction <Z.’, T+>,
where is the basic logic of induction and TH÷ = H÷ U H’ H+ where are the Hempel+
confirmation axioms in £, H’ the Hempel additional confirmation axioms in £ and H+ the
Hempel+ additional confirmation axioms in 4729•
6.4.2 A bduction anti Hypothetico-Deductivism
As we have said in Chapter 4, the task of the calculus of inductive implication or calculus of
confirmation is to set the mies according to which confirmation statements shouid be related to each
other, or the mies according to which derived confirmation statements are to be obtained from prior
ones. This, we should acknowledge, is what ail axioms of Ç1÷ do. Ail with the exception of b-30.
Since I>. is has as its antecedent a material implication statement and as its consequent an inductive
implication, it is in an important sense an instntction about how to derive confirmation statements
out of something else than inductive implications. It ftmctions then like a criterion to obtain the 50-
23 The same hoids for II>- and III>-: II>- cannot any more he derived from VI>- and L- and III>- cannot any more
be derived from II>-. We postpone to the future the task of developing a complete calculus of inductive
implication with ail logical relations that are supposed to exist between , and —*.
In Silvestre & Pequeno (2005) we have presented n version of the applied logics of induction introduced
here whore the exception pan 0f the inductive implications is considered.
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called prior confirmation statements. This means that besides being a calculus of confirmation, H
also embodies in its axiomatic what we have named a model of confirmation.
The model of confirmation contained in Z. belongs to a class of definitions of confirmation
which try to derive a relation of inductive support from some special instance of the deductive
entailment relation. In the case of I, this from-deduction-to-induction confirmation mechanism is
obtained by saying that if ci entails f3 (and neither ci is contradiction nor f3 is a tautology), then ci
confirms f3. It should be said nevertheless that this is not exactly what we expect from a definition
of confirmation. $ince induction inferences are supposed to be ampliative and non tmth-preserving,
by just setting material implication as a special case of confirmation we do not provide any sort of
genuinely inductive relation of evidential support.
In the same section of Hempel’s “Studies in the Logic of Confirmation” where conditions I-IV
are introduced, there is mention of a condition which may serve as a starting point for a tmly model
of confirmation:
IX. Converse Consequence condition: if statement ci confirms statement f3 and statement (
logically implies f3, then cc confirons cp31.
Even though VU stili derives confirmation statements from confirmation statements, accepting
what we have called the inclusion principle (which is a consequence of Hempel ‘s formulation of the
entailment condition) will entail the following additional condition:
X. Converse Fntaitment condition: if statement ci logically implies statement f3, then f3
coiffirms ci.
Trivially enough, DC and X are a formulation of the reasoning pattem known as abduction: if ci
logically entails f3 and f3 is true, then conclude ci. In our formalism, this abduction model of
confirmation could be formalized through the following two axioms:
IX>.: (ci - f3?) — ((p
—* f3) —> (ci ‘- cp?)) Converse Conseqttence
X>.: (ci —> f3) —> (f3 > ci?) Converse Entaitment
Now mie may think that we can just add these two axioms to the Hempel+ logic of induction
and obtain a sort of Hempelian Abductive model of confirmation. Not quite so. As Hempel and
° And perhaps II>. and VII>. toc.
31 Instance of such principle can be found in the confirmation of Newton’s mechanics through the
confirmation of Kepler’s laws ofplaneiary motion: observation cf the orbit of Mars conftrm Keplars laws of
planetaiy motion; Newton’s laws of mechanios entail Keplers laws cf planetarv motions; erzo, observations
ofthe orbit cf Mars confinnNetvton’s laws cfmechanics.
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others have shown, IX and X lead to very counterintuitive resuits when taken along with Hempel’s
previous conditions. Consider for example the Stark effect (Se) which is known to confirm quantum
mechanics (Qm). Trivially, Qm in conjunction with, let us say, the metaphysical principle known as
physicalism according to which matter and energy are the cause of everything that exists (Ph)
logically implies Qm. Then, since Se confirms Qm and Qm A Ph —* Qm, by IX we will have the
conclusion that the Stark effect confirms the conjunction of quantum mechanics and physicalism.
Now, given that Se confirms Qm A Ph and Qm A Ph —> Ph, by II we will have the even more
unacceptable conclusion that the Stark effect gives evidential support to such a metaphysical
principle as physicalism. In fact, it will confirm flot only Ph, but any statement expressible in the
language at hand. Things get stiil worse when we consider X. While IX allows us to make such sort
of daim only in connection with statements which serve as evidence for some hypothesis, X leads
to the conclusion that any pair of statement e-h whatsoever is such that e conflrms h32. In our
notation we would have that since CL A f3 —> a, by X a - (CL A f3)?. But since a A f3 —> f3, by II- we
have a ‘- f3?.
The same unwanted conclusion could be derived if we consider disjunctive statements rather
than conjunctive ones. Since c — CL y f3, by I we have that CL confirms CL y f3. But since f3 —> CL V f3,
by DC we have that CL confirms f33. Similarly, by X we have that CL y f3 confirms f3. Since by I CL
confirms CL y f3, by the transitivity condition we have that ct confirms f3. We will cali these two
sources of anomaly in the use of IX and X in conjunction with I and II, respectively, the conjunctive
and disjunctive problems ofabduction.
Because of these problems, Hempel rejected this converse consequence condition along with
the definition of confirmation which brought it into the discussion: the prediction-criterion of
confirmation. This prediction-criterion of confirmation is nothing less than a formulation of the so
called Hypothetico-Deductive (or simply H-D) model of confirmation, whose importance for the
contemporaiy theory of science is such that some philosophers went so far as claiming it to be the
official “scientist’s philosophy of science.”34 Due to that, it may 5e worthy to take a doser look at
the H-D model and how it is connected with the problems we have mentioned so far. Below we
show Hempel’s formulation of the H-D model35.
Let h be a hypothesis and B a class ofobservational statements. B is said to confirm h if B can
be divided into two mutually exclusive subclasses B’ and B” such that B” is not ernpty and
32 Sec Hempel (1945), Hesse (1970), Hanen (1971) and Le Morvan (1999).
Sec Skyrms (1966) and Brodv (1968).
Lipton (1991).
Hempel (1945). Sec aise Hempel (1966), Merril (1979) and Earrnan & S2lrnon (1992).
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every sentence of B” can be logically deduced from B’ in conjunction with h, but flot from 3’
alone.
Considering statements instead of sets of statements and flot taking the observational nature of
the members cf B into account we have as follows:
e confirms h if
(j) He-e’Ae”
(ii) {e’ A h} H e”
(iii) {e’} - e” 36
As one might expect, this definition of confirmation satisfies condition IX. Also, if we take e’
T we will have that if h H e, then e confirms h. Therefore, condition X is also satisfied. But here
this submodel of H-D, which we may cali the abdttction modet ofconfirmation, is flot different from
our formulation of condition X. We therefore see how a principle in the style cf Hempel’s
conditions can be used either as a condition to be satisfied by a model cf confirmations or as a
model cf confirmation itself.
It is flot very difficuh te see why the H-D model is so appealing. According to it, a hypothesis
or theory is supported when it, along with some other statements, deductively entails some observed
statement. Take the big-bang theory cf the origin cf the universe for example. Obviously the
statements which compose this theory caimot be directly observed. However, along with other
statements the big bang theory entails that we ought to find ourselves today traveling though a
uniform background radiation, like the ripples lefi by a rock falling into a pond. Now it seems
almost self-evident that the fact that we do now observe this radiation (or effects of it) should
somehow count as a good reason for us to take the big bang theory as a plausible hypothesis.
Therefore a theory or hypothesis, even though appealing to unobservable entities or processes, is
supported or confirmed by its successful predictions.
There have been a couple cf different formulations cf the H-D model. R. Braithwaite, for
example, takes it as something lilce our condition X, identifiing thus hypothetico-deductivism with
abduction37. More recently, in his famous bock “Theory and Evidence” Clark Glymour has
discussed a version cf the H-D model33 which due to the spreading cf Glymour’s criticisms was
flic conditions that B’ and B” be two rnutually exclusive classes and B” be nonempty (which is equivalent
to requirine e” flot to be a tautologv) are automatïcallv satisfled by (iii).
Braithwaite (1953). Sec Grimes (1990).
Glvmour (1930a).
204
responsible for a remarkable proliferation of new formulations of the H-D method39. Glymour’s
formulation goes as follows:
e confirrns h with respect to a theory T if
(i) h A T is consistent
(ii) {hAT}He
(iii) {T} b’- e
Besides the test of cons istency between h and T, the main difference here is that e’s confirming h
will depend always on some background theoiy T.
Now, Glymour have pointed out three main problems with this formulation ofthe H-D model.
According to him, these problems lead to the inevitable concitision that the H-D method is
hopelessly untenable40. The first difficutty he finds stems from the fact that a conseqtience of a
given theory cannot be confirrned with respect to that theory (condition (iii)); it can only be
confirmed with respect to sorne subtheory. This might flot be troublesorne, for as long as the
stibtheory conjoined with the hypothesis is logically equivalent to the original theory, we should be
able to use the subtheory for H-D confirmation. Despite the intuitive appeal ofthis reasoning, it is
inadequate. Glymour points ottt that if we adhere to this rationale, any true evidential conseqtience
of T confirms almost any hypothesis in theory T with respect to sorne subtheory. for if {T} H e,
{T} H h, and {h —> T} FI- e, then according to condition (i)-(iii), e confirms h with respect to
subtheory h —* T. The second difficulty involves the problem that according to conditions (i)-(iii),
any true piece of evidence confirms atmost any sentence with respect to some true theory. This
fol tows from the fact that if e is any true and flot valid statement, conditions (i)-(iii) are satisfied by
letting T e —> h and h equal any staternent that does flot imply —e and that is flot a consequence of
—e41. Finally, he points out that if T, h and e satisfy conditions (i)-(iii), then T, (h A A) and e also
satisfy these conditions for any A that is consistent with h A T. Therefore, if e confirms h with
respect to T, then e wiJl also confirm h A A with respect to T.
One is perhaps wondering what is the relation between these problems and the ones we have
shown in connection with conditions IX and X. In a nutshett, they alI corne from the irrelevance
feature of classical entailment, be it in the form of the inferential relation H or in the form of the
material implication connective42. When, for instance, we say that if Œ entails f3 then f3 confirms CL,
Horwich (1983), Giere (1984), Waters (1987), Grimes (1990) and Gemes (1993),just to mention a few.
40 Glymour (19$Oa). See also Glymour (1980b).
Glymour mentions only the latter condition. But if h implied —e, then T A h would not be consistent. See
Waters (1987).
42 Some few philosophers have afready pointed this out. See for instance Waters (1987).
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we expect that ail parts of ct are necessary for the derivation of f3 and therefore deductively
connected with it. Now, if c and f3 are such connected and we conjoin (p to a, triviaiiy f3 is logicaily
entaiied by ( A CL but (p plays no role at ail in the derivation of f3 from CL A (p. Therefore we are not
in any way ready to say that CL A cp confirrns f3, even though a alone does. The sarne thing happens
when we take the disjunction of f3 and p. Ml the incompatibility between IX and X and Hernpel’s
former conditions as weil as the problems we have identified with axioms B. and II>. corne frorn this
irrelevance feature of classical entailment.
Concerning Glymour’s criticisrns, for the third one it is clear that its cause is classical
entailment irrelevance. Afier ail, it is just a reformulation of the first sort of conjunction problem of
abduction we have shown in terms of the H-D model itself. For the first problem, e confirms h with
respect to H —> T because h —÷ T and H are consistent, {(h — T) A h} H e and {h —> T} H e. But
notice that (h —> T) A h is equivalent to (—1h A h) y (T A h), which in tum is equivalent to T A h.
$ince therefore {T} H e, the relation {(h —> T) A h} H e is not, we may say, a relevant one. For the
second one, we have that e confirms h with respect to h —> e because h —* e and h are consistent, {(h
—> e) A h} H e and h —* e H e. But again (h —> e) A h is equivalent to (—1h A h) y (e A h) which in
tum is equivalent to e A h. Since e H e, the relation {(h —* e) A h} H e is flot a relevant one. It is
worthy to notice that the problems with conditions I and II that forced us to reformulate axioms B.
and II. are also due to ciassical entailment irrelevance, for a —* J.. and T —+ f3 sure do flot satisfy
our relevance entailment criterion.
Now the crucial question: is our framework able to properly represent these abductive or
hypothetico-deductivist models of confirmation in such a way that the mentioned problems viil flot
arise? As shown by what we have discussed in the previous paragraphs, ail problems which
phiiosophers have for decades attributed to the H-D model in its several formulations are
due flot the H-D model itself, but to the framework in which these formulations have been
described43. The H-D model, by its very nature, requires some sort ofrelevance entailment
relation, for if we estabhsh a confirmation relation between e’ A e” and h from the basic
fact that {e’ A h} H e”, the minimum we can expect is that ail parts of {e’ A h} will be
needed to infer ail parts of e”. Therefore. since the classical relation of entailment does not
incorporate such sort of relevance behavior, it is understandable why describing the H-D
model inside classical logic is so much troublesorne.
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Even though the deductive logic we are using (LP2) along with our Iogics of induction does flot
have such sort of relevant entailment relation, with the help of our inductive connectives and the
intuition behind the H-D model we are able to simulate an inductive implication and therefore have
a proper representation of the hypothetico-deductive model of confirmation.
Definition 6.4.7. Let 3 be a language, a ?-modal logic basis and u,f3e>-. any two formuiae of
We define the following abbreviations in >:
(i) u
‘r> P (u —* f3) y (f3 —* u)
(ii) CL>f3=defPCL?
(iii) CLf3=def(CL>P)A(Œf3)
(iv) u f3 def (u t f3) -
u <r f3 is a simple abbreviation meaning that u and f3 are “implicationally connected” to each
other. u > f3 is an alternative way of writing u ‘- f3? which will be of some help in our task of
representing the abductive method of confirmation. u t> f3 can be read as “u is confirmed by f3.” u
f3 is intent to represent a situation where u reievantiy impiies f3. It depends directiy on what we
have caiied abduction model of confirmation: if u (relevantly) impiies f3, then f3 confirms u. That is
to say, supposing that we have such a model, if f3 confirms u and u —+ f3, then u relevantly implies
f3. Finally, u f3 represents a situation where u and f3 are such that, due to the iack of a relevant
entailment connection between u and f3, u cannot be confirmed by f3 through the abduction model44.
We show beiow the basic axioms which wiii make use of these abbreviations.
Definition 6.4.8. Let Z% be a language and a ?-modai logic basis. The abduction axioms EAb in
is the set composed by ail formulae of>-a satisfying one of the foiiowing schemas offormuia:
X>: (u—f3)f3)(uf3)
Abi: ((uu’Au”)A(u’f3))-(uf3)((u”f3)v(u’ u”))
Ab2: ((f3 -> f3’ y f3”) A (u f3’)) (u f3) ((u f3”) y (f3” <r> f3’))
The purpose of the above axioms is basically to define what we have been cailing
abductive confirmation. X>, which is a more sophisticated formulation of condition X, sets
Sec Water (1987).
Recail that in LP2 I? Sec the Appendu “Proofofihecrerns.”
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the basic abductive criterion according to which formula ci confinns formula f3: if u —> [3
then u is confirmed by [3. However, as we have seen, material implication does flot embody
the relevant aspects required by an abductive model of confirmation: sometimes even
though u — (3, due to «s flot being relevantly connected with (3, u is flot confirmed by ci. It
is the goal of the exception part of X, u (3, to biock these non-relevance cases and
therefore prevent ci> (3from heing concluded from u —> (3.These non-relevance cases are
formally defined by axioms Ahi and Ab2, which basically take into account the
conjunction and disjunctive problems of ahduction which we have discussed at the
begiiming ofthis subsection.
Abi says that if ci is equivalent to the conjunction of u’ and ci”, and u’ relevantly
impiies (3,then to conjoin ci’ and ci” and write ci’ A ci” —> (3will be a trivialization with no
relevance content. Therefore ci (3. 0f course there are exceptions to this. The first one is
ci” relevantly impiying (3, in which case ci’ A ci” should be confirmed by (3 (which wiÏi be
obtained by using ci’ A ci” —> (3 along with X.) Also, if ci’ —> ci” or ci” — ci’ then ci (3
should flot be the case, for if ci’ — ci” then ci’ will be equivaient to ci’ A ci”, and if ci” —>
ci’, by transitivity ci” —* (3 and therefore ci> (3.Hence, ci’ A ci> (3.One could think that
this second part of ci’ <> ci” was flot needed at ail, for, since ci” > (3 (which is obtained hy
using X> aiong with ci” —> (3,) the situation was already contemplated by the inductive
implication Ah2. However, taking Ahi without ci” —> ci’ in its exception part, and ci” —> u’
and ci’ (3 as vaiid formulae (which impiies ci” —> ci’ A ci”) entails a conflict between X
and Ahi: by using Ahi first and concluding ci” (3(which could be done because we have
not used yet x. to conclude ci”> (3and be able to block Ahi) we will not be able to use X
and conciude ci” > (3. Therefore two extensions would arise. In order to prevent that, we
have to consider u” —* u’ in the very exception part ofAhi.
For Ab2 the reasoning is almost the same. If (3 is equivalent to the disjunction of (3’ and
(3”, and u relevantly implies (3’, then to write u — (3’ y (3” means to go against our
relevance pnnciple, for (3” plays no role at ail in the derivation of f3’ y (3” from u. Therefore
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u f3. About the exceptions, we have first that if u relevantly implies f3” then u should be
confirmed by f3’ y f3”. Also, if f3” —> f3’ or f3’ —+ f3” then cx f3 should flot be the case, for if
f3” — f3’ then f3’ will be equivalent to f3’ y f3”, and if f3’ —* f3” then by transitivity u —> f3”
and therefore u t> f3”. Hence cx t> f3’ y f3”. About the objection that it is flot necessary to
consider f3’—> f3” as an exception, taking Ab2 without f3’ — f3” in its exception, and f3’ —>
f3” and u f3’ as valid formulae (which implies f3” —> f3’ y f3”) entaHs a conflict between
X- and Ab2: by using Ab2 first and concluding u f3” (which could be done because we
have flot used yet X- to conclude u t> f3” and 5e abie to block Ab2) we will not 5e able to
use X and conciude u> f3”. Therefore two extensions would arise.
It is easy to see that tins formulation of the abduction model of confirmation is flot plagued by
the relevance problems we have been talldng about here. Beiow we have what we can cali the
abduction logic of induction.
Definition 6.4.9. The abduction logic of induction ÇHAb is the appiied logic of induction <,
Ab>, where Ç7 is the basic logic of induction and Ab the abduction axioms in £.
With the help of these abduction axioms we can have a compiete Hempelian iogic of induction
winch formalizes ail conditions I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VII, IX and X. Notice that since we now dispose
of a relevance implication, axioms I>-, II- and VI- can be formalized without making use of the
exception part. Due to that, axiom VIH- (inclusion) does flot have to be included in this new
formalization.
Oefinition 6.4.10. Let be a language and t.p = <,
,
Or,, O> a pseudo-inductive logic of
piausibility based on wherein ?eO. The HempcÏ confirmation axioms in is the set
composed by ail formuiae of satisfring the following schemas of formula:
Ii.: (u f3) > (u ‘- f3?) EntaiÏment
II: (f3 (p) >- ((ci > f3?) (ci - tp7)) Consequence
III.>: (ci - f3?) —* ((f3 > y) —* (ci - (p?)) Eqttilc1teïlce
IV: (ci ‘- f3?) —> ((ci A f3 —> I) —> ±) JI’ak consistencv
\JI-: (ci f3) - ((f3 >- y?) —* (ci - y?)) Iiversc Consequence
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IX.: (u f3?)
—+ ((p f3) —> (ci. ‘- cp?)) Converse Consequence
Definition 6.4.11. The Hempel-abduction logic ofindttction HAb is the applied logic of induction
<Z, THb>, where Z is the basic logic of induction and TAb u u Ab where ZH are the
Hempel confirmation axioms in H’ the Hempel additional confirmation? axioms in £p and
ZAb the abduction axioms in
With these abduction axioms at hand we can also define a relevance-probiem-free H-D model.
Definition 6.4.12. Let 3 be a language and a ?-modal logic basis. The H-D cixioms HD in
is the set composed by ail formulae of>-3 satisfying the following schema of formula:
H-D: ((f3 -* f3’ A f3”) A (u A f3’-> f3”)) (f3 u?) (u A f3’ f3”) y (T -* u))
We are using the formulation proposed by Hempel which we have shown at the beginning of
tins subsection: If f3 is composed by two statements f3’ and f3” and f3” can be iogicaliy deducted
from f3’ in conjunction with u, then u is confirmed by f3. There will be two kinds of exceptions to
o tins mie. The first obviously are situations where u A f3’ does flot relevantly impiy f3”. The second
are cases where u is a tautology. The reason for this second sort of exception is that since f3’ -> T A
f3’, we do flot want to take T A f3’ —> f3” as an irrelevant implication. Therefore T A f3’ f3” wil not
be the case. But we are also flot ready to say that f3’ A f3” confirm T. The only alternative then is to
consider tins case as a separated exception. Concerning Hempel’s three conditions, we note that the
thfrd one ({e’} F- e”, which wouid be represented in our notation by introducing f3’ —> f3” in the
exception part of H-D) is already contemplated by u A f3’ f3”.
Definition 6.4.13. The H-D logic of induction is the applied logic of induction <Ç, THD>,
where t’, is the basic iogic of induction and TWD Ab u HD, where Ab are the abduction axioms
in £qj? and EH-D the H-D axioms in £,jy,.
One tinng we shouid mention about ail the iogics of induction we have introduced in this
section concerns the status of taie and false staternents. Take for example. As we have said, u’
—> u” in the exception part ofAbi takes into account the cases where ci.’ +—* u’ A u”. This of course
includes a situation where u” —> T, for ci.’ —> T and u’ —> Œ’ A T. Bcit now consider a set of
fonnulae A and a formula w such that A Hr w. Due to X, we wilI have that A HrAh ? (. A
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(p)? for any formula , or stiil that A Hrb Pa (\lx(Px) A (p)? for eveiy propositional symbol P
(which seem to be standard cases of non-relevance anomalous confirmation.) But A Heb Pa ‘-
(Vx(Px) A cp)? is the case because Ahi was not able to infer Vx(Px) A ( Pa, which happened
because Vx(Px) —> (p, which in its tum is the case because A Hrb (p. That is to say, from the point
of view of A, ( is such that ‘‘x(Px) is equivalent to ‘/x(Px) A p or, in other words, statements p
such that A Hrb cp have the same status as tautologies.
In contrast to what one may be thinking, this feature ofb is flot bad at ah. The abduction and
H-D models of confirmation operate on statements which are deductively connected to each other:
if c —> f3, then f3 > CL?. If we allow such deductiveIy connected statements to be only the ones
provided by the axiomatic of b, then the range of application of our logic wihl decrease
enormousiy. Consider a situation where we want to evaluate the plausibihity of a hypothesis h on the
basis of some experimental resuil e which makes use of principles of a highly accepted theory T
whose confirmation is simply not part of our business. Now, the situation is such that e is logically
entailed by the conjunction of h and T but not by h alone. Then, unless we take theory T as tme, we
will not be able to get a confirmatory relation between e and h (since T Ftb h —+ e, we vili have
that T Hrb e ‘- h?, which is quite similar to Glymour’s formulation according to winch e confirms
h with respect to some background theory T.) But since T is taken as tme, its presence in any
formula will be simply innocuous. Moreover, there are no formai logical devices presently available
to us to distinguish, from the logical language point of view, between true formulae and tautologies
(that is to say, once we have set a set A to make use of our inferential relation H, there is no way we
can find ont whether a such that A H a is tme to A or due to the logical laws of F-.)
o
CHÀPTER 7
Conclusion
In this thesis we have addressed the problem of explicating the notions of induction and
plausibility. As a final resuit of our endeavors, we came up with a class of formai systems of
induction and plausibility, the explicata of our analysis, which made use of some formai devices
traditionally related to AI’s research on the formalization of commonsense reasoning. More
specifically, we have picked one of the most wide spread nonmonotonic logics — default logic —
and after finding out to what extent it could be considered as an inductive logic in the philosophicai
sense as weli as which sort of adjustments should be made to transform it into such logic, we
extended it in such a way as to obtain what we have called a representative logic of induction. The
use of a nonmonotonic iogic is this context was especially relevant because our approach to the
concept explication problem of induction involved what we have called a purely descriptive
approach to induction: as far as we know, ail nonmonotonic formalisms can be said to be free from
the justificatory problems that undermined the Carnapian project of building a iogic of induction.
The explicative potver of our default Iogic of induction can be said to rest basicaily on its
representation of the iogicai form of inductive implication sentences, which are the core of our
account of inductive inferences, along with the formai mechanism used to “detach” the consequent
ofsuch inductive implications from its antecedent and exception parts.
-
0f fundamental importance for our enterprise was the awareness of the importance of the
notion ofplausibility for any descriptive account of induction in generai and of its double aspect as
a paraconsistent and paracomplete notion in particular. This brings us to the second component of
our representative logic of induction: a paraconsistent and paracomplete modal logic (named by us
paranormal modal logic) intended to formalize the concepts ofskepticai and credulous plausibility
and to act in conjunction with our extended default logic in order to represent the conclusions
obtained with the help of inductive implications. The explicative power of this paranormal modal
logic is basically derived from the axiomatic and semantic resources traditionalty used in
philosophical Iogic to explicate “modal notions” such as the concepts of necessity and possibility.
At the same that the axioms and logical theorems make explicit some key formai properties of
plausible sentences, the semantics tells us what these sentences actually mean. About this latter, it
should be said that by incorporating what we have called plurality approach to plausibiiity and
unclosing the paraconsistent and paracompiete behaviors of? and !, our semantics provided a quite
satisfactory explication of the notions of skeptical and credulous pÏausibility. This is especialty
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important because due to the connection between inductive inferences and plausibility, the
explicative power of the logic of plausibility that composes a specific logic of induction is
automatically transferred to the clarification ofthe notion of induction itself.
Besides having contributed to the clarification ofthe concepts of induction and plausibility, otir
work can be said to be have contributed to the fields of philosophy and AI as follows. First, it
provided a genuinely descriptive approach to induction. Second, besides showing a relevant
connection between the fields of nonmonotonic logic and inductive iogic, it demonstrated how
these two fields can practicaliy benefit from each other. More specifically, it demonstrated how the
philosophical insights concerning inductive inferences can be useful to better understand the nature
and limitations of default logic, and how this latter can be used to perform the task of a logic of
induction. Third, as a result of our endeavors to explicate the notion of plausibility, we came up
with an entireiy new sort of modal logic — paranormal modal logic —, which we believe might be of
sorne relevance both from the purely technical and practical point of view, along with a
philosophically sound motivation for it. Finally, we have showed hotv our system can be tised in
the formalization of a traditional probiem in philosophy of science, namely the problem of
confirmation of hypotheses through Hempel’s conditions of adequacy and the abductive and
hypothetico-deductive modeis.
About the shortcomings of the content of the thesis, we should first mention that the formai
treatment given to the monotonic and nonmonotonic parts of our system were not symmetric.
Undoubtedly, we did flot provide a minimally complete analysis of the formai features ofour
extension ofdefault logic. Also, as vie have pointed out, vie did not develop a complete calculus of
inductive implication akin to the calculus of materiai implication contained in classical logic. To
this we should add that we did not offer any sort of semantic analysis of inductive implication
sentences. Ail this should be done by us in the near future. Also, it should be said that the
philosophical analysis of induction and plausibility provided in chapters 2 and 3 is far from
deserving being classified as a philosophy of induction and plausibility. As we have pointed out in
chapter 1, the purpose of such chapters xvas to make clear what would be formally explicated in the
next chapters. 0f course that in order to do that vie had to engage ourselves in some sort of
philosophical analysis ofwhatthe concepts of induction and plausibility mean.
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O APPENDIX
PROOF 0F THEOREMS
In tins appendix we will show the proof of the theorems mentioned in Chapters 5 and 6. In the
following section we lay down some introductory followed by the lemmas that will be used in the
proofs of some theorems. Sections A.2 and A.3 present the proofs of theorems of Chapters 5 and 6,
respectively.
A. 1 Lemmas, Definitions and PreÏiminary Remarks
In proving the theorems of chapters 5 and 6 and auxiliary lemmas, we vill have sometimes to
mention another theorem whose proof is shown only later on in the text. It must be noted
nevertheless that this is just a matter of order of presentation, being clear that no sort of circularity
is involved. Due to space limitations, another policy we tvill adopt is to show in detail only the key
O proofs. For those theorems whose proofs are trivial or follow a pattem already explained,
we will
only give an indication of how the proof can be constntcted. Other important remark is that we wiIl,
in our proofs, veiy ofien make use of well-established resuits of symbolic logic without showing the
respective proofs.
When showing derivations in axiomatic-related theorems (or lemmas), we will adopt some
conventions. Let us explain them with the help of an example: the derivation of the relation H-K? —CC
1. -p->(p-*f3) A2
2. p—*(--ip—.f3) P(l)l
3. pt—p—>3 P(3)2
4. (n -* ±) -> ((± -* f3) -* (n - f3)) P(2)
5. (1 —* f3) -> ((n ->1) -* (ct -> f3)) P(l) 4
6. (cc—>.L)—(ct—*f3) MP4,5
A2 on une i means that
—p —÷ (p — f3) is an instance of axiom A2. P(2) on the right-side of une 4
means that (n —> ±) —* ((I —> —* (n
— f3)) is an instance ofs;ema of formulac (orthe schema
of relation of the form HK n) called P(2). P(I) 1 on the richt-side of une 2 means that from an
xi’
O instance of relation P(l) along with formula ofline 1 we can derive p —* (—p —* 13). If we wished todetail tins procedure, we would have something like that:
1.
-p-p-f3) A2
2.
—p —> (p —> 13) HK p — (—ip —> 13) instance ofP(1)
3. (—p —> f3) since 1 and 2, therefore 3
For the sake of compactness, we skip these detailed steps and show only the final resuit. MP 4,5 on
une 6 justifies the presence of (a —>±) —> (a —* 13) by saying that it is the resuit of applying modus
ponens (MP) to the formulae of unes 4 and 5 (that is, it satisfies items (ii).b or (iii).b of definition
5.2.24.) We adopt a similar procedure when other inference mies such as necessitation are involved.
For the sake of readability, we omit the definition in which axiom A2 appears as weil as the lemmas
to which the schemas of relation P(1) and P(2) belong to.
It is also worthy of mention that for axioms or schemas of formula whose form is Œ 13 (winch
is an abbreviation of Œ
—÷ 13 A 13 —> ci), we may sometimes refer to them by writing only one side of
the implication, skipping in tins way the steps that go from ci
— 13 A 13 — ci to ci —> 13 or 13 — ci.
Lemma A.1. The following schemas of relations between sets of formulae and formula are
correct’:
P(l): Œ—*(f3—>(p)FK?f3—*(ci—>(p)
P(2): ci—>f3,f3--->(PHK?ci—>(P
F-K? (ci-+f3)—*((f3)—*(ci—>p))2
P(3): ci*(f3—>p)HK?ciAf3-+p
P(4): ci—>(f3 p),(p—>X HK7ci-+(f3—>)
P(5): HK?ci—*ci
P(6): ci—+f3,(p—>PHK?ci—>((p—>(13A4))
P(7): ci—>(f3p),-+(p)HK?(ciA)A(f3vX)—>(p
P($): ci—*f3,Œv(pH?f3vp
P(9): civf3HK?(ci—>(p)-->f3vcp
P(lO):
G for the sake cf simplici’, when writing schemas cf relation we will omit the set-delimiting brackets. In this
way, rather than writing {a.13} H (p, we vill simply write u.J3 H (p.
— In our derieati:ns, we vill refer to the “implicativè’’ anti inferential’ farms 0f theorern P(2) through tha
sema index.
XIII
P(11): Œ+(P),Il—*(p)HK?ŒA--*(f3v?.—>(p)
P(12): HK?(aAp)3(Œ—*j3)A(Œ—>(p)
P(13): (a)—,--HK?(Œ)-+((Œ—>4)—>(p)
P(14): Œ-f3HK?ŒV(p--*13V(p
P(15): HK?(Œ)—>(CpAC—*cpAf3)
P(16): (Œ)—((Œp)—)HK?(Œ3A(p)—>
P(17): Œ—>f3,+(PHK?ŒVP-+f3V(p
P(18): ŒVf3HK?f3VŒ
P(19): ŒVP,(PVHK?(ŒAP)V(13V t)
P(20): a, f3 f-K? A f3
P(21): Œ—*f3,HK?ŒAp—*f3A4
Proof. Ail these schemas of relation hold in positive propositional classical logic (P1-P$+MP)3, that
is, classical logic without negation. Since K? is a conservative extension of positive classical logic,
the derivations of these schemas of relations from P1-P8+MP can be taken without any
modification as derivations in K?4. As a consequence of this, these schemas are valid also in any
paranormal modal logic.U
Definition A.1. Let cp be a schema of formula ofsome language and p an atomic formula ofJJ.
We define function p as follows:
(i) p(p)p;
(ii) If p —cx, then p(p) =
(iii) If cp a f3, then p(cL f3) = p(cL) p(f3), where ‘ {A, y,
—÷}.
Definition A.2. Let A be a set of schemas of formula of some language . p(A) = {p(Œ) I ŒEA}.
Lemma A.2. If the schema of relation A H u is correct (where f- is the relation of deduction of
propositional classical logic), then the schema of relation p(A) f-K? p(u) is also correct.
Proof: In order to prove this lemma, we need to show that, given a specific axiomatics for classical
logic A + MP, where A is a set of schemas of formula, aIl schemas of formula of p(A) are valid in
K7. Let us consider the axiomatic for classical iogic PI-PI 1+MP5. Since the schemas of formula Pi-
Definitions 5.2.22 and 5.2.24.
The derivation 0f many ofthese schemas of relation is available in Detlovs & Podnieks (2004).
Defrnitions 5.2.22, 5.2.24 and 5.3.16.
P8 have no occurrence of the negation symbol and since they belong to axiomatic of K, the
schemas of formula p(P1), ..., p(P8) are automatically valid in K. It rests then to consider schemas
P9-P1 1, that is to say, to show that the schemas of forrnulae p(P9), p(P10) and p(P1 1) are also valid
inK:
p(P9): (p(Œ)
—
p(f3)) —> ((p(a) — —p(f3)) —> —p(u))
p(P10): --p(u) —> (p(cL) — p(f3))
p(P11): p(a) y
In order to do that, we have just to prove that the following schemas of formulae are valid in K7:
P9’: (ct—*f3)—*((a—>--f3)-->--a)
P10’: —cc—-*(cc—*f3)
P1i ŒV—Œ
Below we have the derivation of each one of these schemas of fonnulae:
P9’:(u—>f3)—*((u—>--J3)-÷-u)
1. (+(3±))-*)-(a--L)) Pi
2. -*((a-*(f3--±))->(a-÷±)) P(1)1
Q Pl0’:a(af3)p(f3))
1. -p->(p->f3) A2
2. p—>(--ip—*f3) P(1)1
3. ±—*J3 P(3)2
4. (u-> )->)->(a->f3)) P(2)
5. (J)-((a->±)->(a-*f3)) P(l)4
6. (a—>±)-.*(u—>f3) MP3,5
In order to present the derivation of p(Pii), we need the following theorems:
Auxi: F-K? (u —> f3) —> (—43 —> —cc)
Aux2: HK?—a —> u
In classical logic, (u —> f3) —* (—43 —> —iu) is deduced from Pi, P2, P9 and MP. Therefore, in order
to proue F-K? (u —> f3) —> (—f3 —÷ —u) we must just rewrite the derivation of (u —> f3) —> (—43 —* —u)
in classical locdc replacing P9 bv its - version P9’, whih we have just proved above. Below we
show the derivatiori of—--a — u.
1. —ip—*(p—>a) A2
2. p>(pa) P(I) Ï
xv
3. .i—*cc P(3)2
4. ((u—*±)-->u)--*u
5. ((u)—*±)—>((Ju)—*((u—>±)—>cc)) P(2)
6. (± — u) —> (((u —> ±) —> ±) — ((u —* ±) —> u)) P(1) 5
7. ((u —> I) — I) —* ((u —> ±) —> u) MP 3,6
8. ((u—*1)—*..L)--.u P(2)4,7
Pli’: u v—u
1. u—>uv—u P6
2. —u—*uv—u P7
3. (u — u y —u) —* (—(u y —u) — —u) Auxi
4. —(u y —u) —> —u MP 1,3
5. (—u—uv—u)—(—(uv—u)—--—u) Auxi
6. —(u y —u) —> ——u MP 2,5
7. (—(u y —u) —> —u) —> ((—(u y —u) —÷ ——u) — ——(u y —u)) P9’
G 8. (—(u y —u) ——u) ——(u y —u) MP 4,7
9. ——(av—u) MP6,$
10. ——(uv—u)—(uv—u) Aux2
11.uv—u MP9,l0.
Lemma A.3. The following schemas of relation between sets of fonnulae and formula are correct:
—(1): HK? (u
- f3) -> ((u —> —f3) -> —u)
—(2): b-K? —u —> (u —* f3)
—(3): HK?uv—u
—(4): b-K? (—u -* f3) <-* (—f3 -* u)
—(5): HK?—(u—f3)+-->uA—f3
—(6): b-Ko uAf3)>uVf3
—(7): b- K? —(u y f3) —u A —f3
—(8): uvf3b-K---u—>f3
H u y f3 (—u f3)
—(9): HK.—-u--u
xvi
——(10): H K’? (u —> f3) +-* (—-f3 —> —u)
Proof. If we replace by -, ail these schemas of relation will be vaiid in classical logic. From
lemma A.2 then, we have that they are valid in K-’. •
Lemma A.4. The following schemas of relation between sets of formulae and formula are correct:
K(l): u—>PHK?u?—*f3?
K(2): HK? (u!) <-> (—u)?
K(3): H-K’ (u —* f3)! —> (u? —* f3?)
K(4): u
—> f3 K? u! —> f3!
K(5): F-K? —(u?) <—> (—u)!
K(6): u —* ((p —, J) F-K? u? —> (p!
—> I)
K(7): F-K? J —* f3
K($): F-K?(-—Œ)? V CL!
Proof. If we apply the inverse of function (1)6 to each one of the schemas of formula that appear in
the above relations, then we will obtain a set of schemas of relation which are valid in normal
modal logic K. It follows then ftom theorem 5.3.14 that the schemas as presented above are ail vaiid
in K7. K(7) is an easy derivation ftom A2 and P(3). I
Lemma A.5. Let M be a mode! and w a world of M. 1f M,w lH u, then M,w H7 1)(u).
Proof. We first note that, regarding , the function U is invoked only when negation formulae are
considered. formulae ofthe form —-u are analyzed without the help offunction U: 21(u —> ±) =
1 iff(u) = 0 or 1 iffÇ1(u) = O. With this remark in mmd, it becomes trivial that
if M,w IH u then M,w Ffl? C1)(u).I
Lemma A.6. Let ŒEL7 and f3ŒL0. A(H(u)) = u and H(A(f3)) f3. Let ACiL? and BcL0. A(H(A))
A and H(A(B)) = B.
Proof. Trivially, A and H are the inverse functions ofeach other. I
Lemma A.7. Let A,BcL0 and ueL0. If A--B F-K u then A(A)-:-A(B) F-K? A(u).
Proof. We are going to prove this theorem by induction on the size of the K-derivation of u from A
and B. Let u1, ..., u be the K-derivation ftom A-1-B to u.
xvii
Base of induction: derivation ofsize 1: a1 a
- Case 1: CL e AuB.
Trivially, A(a) e A(AuB). Therefore, (A)-:- L\(B) F—
- Case 2: a is an axiom of K.
(n order to deal with this case, we have to anatyze the possibility ofa’s being an instance ofeach
one of K’s axiom schemas. for each one of these possibilities, we will show that there is a K
deHvation of A(a), what implies that there exists a K-derivation of A(a) from (A) and A(B)
and therefore that L\(A)--\(3) HK A(). Regarding K’s classical axioms, the cases where a is an
instance of Pl-P$ are trivial, for these schemas of axiom appear in K’s axiomatic without any
modification. Just for the sake of illustration, we show how this anatysis wouÏd be done regarding
axiom schema PI.
P1:a*(p).AaA(4(p)A*(Ap).SinceAp—*(Af3—*A(p)is
an instance ofK’s PI, La is a K?-derivation of Aa.
Now, it tacks to show that if a is an instance of P9, P10, Pli, K or NP, then there is a Kderivation
ofLa.
P9: a (p - f3) -+ ((p —* —43) —* —p). A(Qp
—> f3) —* ((p —> —43) —* —p)) (A(p —* t\f3) —* ((tp
—* —1Vf3)
—> —iVp). We have to prove then that there exists a Kderivation of (p —> Af3) —*
((Ap —> —1Vf3) —> —Vp). in order to do that, vill have to make use ofa result which will be proved
only when we considerthe case where ais an instance of P10 and which we will referto as P10*:
for every f3e%0 there is a K?-derivation of —Vf3 — (Af3 —÷ p), where pe is an arbitrary
formula. Let us do the proof by induction on the size of(p.
Base ofinduction: ( has size 1. (p p. Aa (Ap —* Af3)—>((Acp —> —iVf3)
—* -1Vp) a (Ap
-* zf3) -> ((Ap
-* -Vf3) -* -Vp) (p -* Af3)
—
((p -* -7Vf3) -
1. (p—*q)-->((p—*—q)—>-p) Al
2. (p —* ±) —* —p P(16) t
3. -,Vf3-*(Af3-)L) P10’
4. Af3—÷(—Vf3-->±) P(l)3
5. (p — Af3)
—
((p — —1Vf3)
—> —p) P(13) 2,4
6 Definition 5.3.23.
Hvpothesis oflndttction: Take an arbitraiy formula ( of size n. Suppose that, for fonnulae ofsize
m<n, there is a Ko-derivation of(
—> —* (( —> — We will show that, if this
is the case, there is necessarily a K-derivation of(A(p
—
A3) —> ((\(p —* —1Vf3) — —Sp). Before
considering ail forms p may have, we vill prove the following auxiliary resuit: (A —* A) —*
((A - —,V)-> -,V) H? ( I) _>
Aux: (A4 —* L\3)
-> (( - —1V) - -V) H? (A
-> ±) - -,V
1. (AAJ3)->((A-,Vt3)--,V) Hyp.
2. ( —> sf3) A (A4 —> -1V13) —> —iVc P(3) 1
3. (A4— A13 A-,V)—(A— )A(A - -9V3) P(i2)
4. ( —> f3 A —Vf3) —* —,V4 P(2) 2,3
5. (A —* ±) —> (L —> A3 A —1V) —(2)
6. (A —* ±) —> —7V P(2) 4,5
O
—VD) (Ap!
—> A3) —> ((A’! —* —,V) —> —(V4?)). Since ‘s size is smailer than n, by the
hypothesis of induction we have that there is a K7-derivation of(A —> Af3) —* ((A4
— —1V!3) —>
-V4).
1. (L —> A3) —> ((A — -9V3)
—> -1V) H. Induction7
2. (A
-* ±) -> —1V Aux i
3. (A*±)?—>(-V)? K(1)2
4. (4! —* ±) —> (A4 —> I)? K(2)
5. (Ap!
—÷ ±) — (—V4)? P(2) 3,4
6. (—9V)?—÷—1(Vp?) K3
7. (A!
—* ±) - -1(V?) P(2) 5,6
8. —vp
—> (J3
— ±) P1O*
9. —(--Vf3—>i) P(l)8
“H. Induction.” nieans that die resuit stated before is part of the hvpothesis of induction of the rpective
prood
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0 9. (V ) ((—V rnA) P(13) 6,8
((A A)
Since 2’s size is smaller than n, by the hypothesis of induction we have that there is a K?-derivation
of(A?.
-> 3) - ((A2 — -,Vf3) -* —V?.).
1. (-A — -V) — (A4 A —A2L —> A(t) A -9V2.) P(15)
2. (A. —> 3) -÷ ((A’ —÷ —V3) —* —1V2) H. Induction
3. --9V. Aux2
4. AA?—AA-,V2L MP1,3
5. A A
— —,( - V2.) Ni
6. 4 A —A —> -1(Ap —> VX) P(2) 4,5
7
—> —> A A —(5)
8. ((Ah —> L\2)
—> ±) — —1(A — V?) P(2) 6,7
9. -V3 —* (Af3 — ±) P10*
10. A—(—V3—-±) P(1)9
11. ((A—> L\?)—> —÷(((A—* )—>_,Vf3)_*--i(Ac!—* V2)) P(13) 8,10
-1V3) —* A )) ((A A A) — Af3) —* (((A A A) —* -9Vfl) — -(V A V?)). Since
‘s and ?.‘s sizes are smaller than n, by the hypothesis of induction we have that there is a K?
derivation of (x — A3) -* (( — -V3) —> -9V4) and (A —> J3) —* ((L\. —* -V3) —*
I. (A
—> A13) — ((A4 —> —,V13) —* —,‘) H. Induction
2. -A---,V Auxi
3. (A?. —> A3)
—
((L2.
—
—1V3)
—
—V2) H. Induction
4. —. Aux3
C
5. —Av—A2.—-Vv—1V7, P(17)2,4
6. —(A —> —xc y —..2. —(6)
xxi
7. A A3) —> y _,77 P(2) 5,6
8. —,Vv-,j. ->-(VA V2) N2
9. ((\4 A A)
—> ±) —> —1(V4 A V?) P(2) 7,8
10. —V3 —> (Af3
—> ±) P10
11. AJ3 —> (—1VJ3
—> ±) P(1) 10
12. ((L\4 A L\2) —> L43) —* (((A A A7) —* —1V3) —* —(Vp A V2)) P(13) 9,11
-1Vf3) —> y )) ((A y A2) —* Af3) —> ((( y A2) —* -V) -÷ -1(V y V?)). Since
4’s and ?‘s sizes are smaller than n, by the hypothesis of induction we have that there is a K?
derivation of(A —* 3) — ((A —* -V3) —> -1V) and of(A — A[3)
—
((ifl - -9Vf3) —
1. (A —* AJ3)—* ((A4 — —V)—> —1V) H. Induction
2. ‘-A--9V Auxi
3. (A?. —* AJ3) —> ((A7 —>
—,V13) —* —,V?.) H. Induction
4. -7--*-,V2 Aux3
5. P(21)2,4
6.
7. -(Ap y A2) —* —iV A P(2) 5,6
8. N3
9. ((L4 y L2.) —* ±) —> -1(V4 y V?) P(2) 7,8
10. -1Vf3 —* (Af3
—
I) P10*
11. Af3—÷(—Vf3--*±) P(1)10
12. (( y A2) —* Af3) —> (((A y A2.) —÷ —1V) —> —1(V y V2)) P(13) 9,11
P10 and Pli: In order to prove that there is a K-derivation of An in the cases where n is either an
instance of P10 or an instance of Pli, we need to consider in tha saine proof by induction the two
G mentioned cases. In this circumstance, An has one of the following fos:
n —a
—> (p — fi). An A(—iy — (p — fi)) —“y — (A2 —>
O
As before, we wiII do the proof that by induction on the size ofp.
Base of induction: p lias size 1. fp p. In this case, a lias one of the followi
ng forms:
Aa zp v—V(p Apv-Vpp v—p
In the first case, a is an instance ofA2 and, therefore, itselfa K-derivation of Acc. In t
he second
case, Za is an instance ofA3 and, therefore, itselfa K-derivation of cc
Hypothesis oflnditction: Take an arbitrary formula ( of size n. Suppose that, for any ar
bitrary
formula 4) of size m<n, there is a K..derivation of—74) —÷ (A4) —* 3), where aL is an arbitrary
formula, and of A4) y —1V4). We vill show that, if this is the case, then there is also a Kq-derivation
of—iVp
—* (p —> 3) and of Ap y —ip. Let us first consider ail possible forms p may h
ave in
the case a is an instance of ClO, and afier ail possible forms it may have in the case c is an i
nstance
of Cli.
An).
w a -,Vcp —> (p —> A) V(4)) — (A(D4)) — A) -4)?) — (4)! —> \Ç3).
Since 4)’s size is smaller than n, by the hypothesis of induction we have that there is a K7-derivation
of-V4)— (A ). Let L. A2 A(pA-1p)ApA-iVp pA-ip±.
1. -,V—>(A4)—*±) H.Induction
2. (—1V4))? —* (A4)!
— ±) K(6) 1
3. -7(V4)?) —* (—V4))? K3
4. —1(V4)?) — (A4)!
—> I) P(2) 2,3
5. ±—*A3 K(7)
6. —(V4)?) —* (A4)! — A43) P(4) 4,5
Acc (A A) V(4)) (A(4)) A) (V4)!) (A4)? An).
Since 4)’s size is smaller than n, by the hypothesis of induction we have that there is a K-derivation
of4)-÷(A4)— A?.). Let2.±. A?. A(p/\-p) ApA p pAp.
1.
—4) —> ( —> i) H. Induction
2. A4) — (—V4)
—> I)
P(1) 1
\X Hi
3. A? —* ((-1V)!
—* ±) K(6) 2
4. HV)! — (Àc? —* I) P(1) 3
5. —1(V!)
- HV)! K2
6. —1(V4!)
— (Ap?
—> ±) P(2) 4,5
7. L—>AJ3 K(7)
8. —1(V!)
— (A? — A13) P(4) 6,7
-,. A(c) -Vp -* (Ap -> Af3) -1V(-) -> (i\(-) —* A3) rnA -> -> AJ3).
Since 4’s size is smaller than n, by the hypothesis of induction we have that there is a K?-derivation
of—V -, (A
-
3).
1. —,V—>(A4—* L\J3) H. Induction
2. —> (-9V —> t3) P(1)l
3. -*i N4
O
4. A(-V4—*Af3) P(2)2,3
. A(Œ)Vp—>(Ap—> V(- 2)—>(A( — ?)— A)-(A—* V?)—*
((A4 —> A2) —> Af3). Since 4’s and ‘s sizes are smaller than n, by the hypothesis of induction we
have that there exists a K?-derivation of —V4 — (A —> Aji), —,V2
—> ( —* At) and A y
Let A AA-p)ApA-1Vp pA—p.
1. Ni
2. A y H. Induction
3. (A —* A?) —* (-V4 y A?) P(9) 2
4. —1(A4
—> V2.) — ((A4 — AX) — (Ap A —V?.) A (-V( y A7)) P(6) 1,3
5. —1V4
—> (A4 —* ±) H. Induction
6. A>(-,V-÷±) P(1)5
7. —iV? —> (A2
—> ±) H. Induction
O
S. (A A —S7?.) A (— —> ± P(7) 5,7
9. -(A —* V?.) —* ((A —* A2) —*i) P(4) 4,8
10. — K(7)
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(Q 11. -,(A—> V?)-÷((-- Af3) P(4)9, 10
(A4 A —> J3). Since ‘s and 2’s sizes are smaller than n, by the hypothesis of induction we
have that there exists a K-derivation of—74 —> (A — A[3) and —,V2 —* (A? —> Af3).
1. —1V4 — (A —> Af3) H. Induction
2. —,V?.
-÷ (A2 —* Af3) H. Induction
3. -,V y —1V —* (L A — sf3) P(10) 1,2
4. N2
5. —1(Vp A V7}- (A A A. — AJ3) P(2) 3,4
y . A(a) -iVcp —> (Ap — Af3) -V( y ) —* (L\( y 2L) —* Af3) -1(V4 y V?) —>
(A y —* An). Since 4’s and ‘s sizes are smaller than n, by the hypothesis of induction we
have that there exists a K—derivation of both -V — (4 — AJ3) and —1V2 —* (A. —>
Q 1. —iV4 —> (A4 —> L\3) H. Induction
2. -,V2. —* (L —> A) H. Induction
3. P(Ï1)1,2
4. (V4vVX)-*-1VpA--1V2. N3
5. —1(V4 V2) —÷ (A . —÷ A) P(2) 3,4
P11:apv—p. a(pv-p)A(pv--1V(p.
u4. AŒ L\p y —1V(p A y —1VEhf 4! y —(V?). Since ‘s size is smaller than n, by
the hypothesis of induction we have that there is a K?-derivation of A4 y
1. H. Induction
2. —A4 —> —(8) 1
3. (—A4)?—>HV)? K(1)2
4. (V)?—--1(V?) X3
5. (A4)?—--?) P(2)3,4
6. (—Ac)? y K($)
7. —(V’7) \J P(S) 5,6
:xv
8. A! y P(1 8) 7
d. Aa p y —iVp A y y —1(V!). Since ‘s size is srnallerthan n, by
the hypothesis of induction we have that there is a K7-derivation of A y
1. p—7vp H.induction
2. —A—--1V
—(8)1
3. (—p)!—>(--1V)! K(4)
4. (-,V4)!-*-V!) K2
5. (—A)! —> —(V!) P(2) 3,4
6. (——A))?v(—A)! K(8)
7. \->p
—(9)
8. (—?—>? K(1)7
9. Ap? y (—i4)! P(8) 6,8
G 10. (—4)! y P(18) 9
11. —(V!) y P(8) 5,10
12. L?v—i(V!) P(18) 11
—dL ixct p y —iVp A— y —1V—94 —1V4 y —--1A4. Since 4’s size is smaller than n, by
the hypothesis of induction we have that there is a K7-derivation of z y
1. 4v—V H.Induction
2. A—-,A N4
3. v—1Vp P(8)1,2
4. P(18)3
w —* 2.. AŒ p v-iVp A( —>2.) y —V(4
—> 2)(A
—> A2.) y -9(A—> 72.). Since
‘s and 2.’s sizes are smaller than n, by the hypothesis of induction we have that there exists a
derivation of y ofA2. y V2. and of—1V —> (Ac
—÷ At). Let .t I. Au AEp A —ip)
O
1. A4 V —‘V4 H. Induction
2. A2.v—1V2.. H. Induction
3. .vA?
4. (A A -1V?.j (—1Vp A?)
5. (AAV2)—*-(Ap-* V))
6. -1(A4 —> V.) y (-1V4 y A2)
7. -V4-(A-*±)
8. Ap-(-,Vp->±)
9. ( -> -V) -> ((—,V -* A2) -÷ (A -> A?))
10. (—V -* X) -* (A
-> )
11.
12. — y A —> (A —* A?.) P(2) 10,11
13. (V4vA)v—i(A4—VÀ.) P(18)6
14. (A— A?)v—i(A—* V?.) P(8) 12,13
‘s sizes are smaller than n, we have that there exists a Kderivation of A y —V4 and of A. y
-V2.
1. v-V
2. Av—,V?.
3. (x A?.)v(-1V4v-iVX)
4. (—,V4 y —1VX) y (Ap A A7) P(18) 3
5. N2
6. -1(V A VX) (Ap A A)
7. (AA A.)v-1(VpA V?)
‘s sizes are srnaller than n. we have that there exists a K-derivation of y and of A? y
P(1$) 2
P(19) 1,3
Ni
P(8) 4,5
H. Induction
P(1) 7
P(2)
MP 8,9
o
o
H. Induction
H. Induction
P(19) 1,2
P(8) 4,5
P(18) 6
1. A4v-V
2. -VvZ
H. Induction
P(1S) 1
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3. y H. Induction
4. —VX.vA2 P(18)3
5. P(19)2.4
6. N3
7. —(V4 y y (4 y L) P(8) 5,6
8. (vA)v—(VvV?) P(18)7
K: Œ EJQp
— ) —> (Dcp
—> ). Aa (D(p —* —> ([]p —> ])) (Ap —> —* (Ap! —>
A4!). We have therefore to prove that there exists a K9-derivation of (p —> )! —> (Ap! —>
A!). Since (Ap — A)!
—* (p! —* A4!) is an instance of K9, it itselfis the derivation we are
looking for.
NP: Œ <- -D-p.L\Œ (Op
--ip) L\((p —> —1U--p) A (—U-p—* p))
p) A o) A(p) A(p) A A() A?
-V(--9(p) A —> Ap? p? —> A —> Ap? p? —>
A —(—p)?) —*
1. rnAp N4
2. Ap?—>(-i-iAp)? K(1)1
3. (-—p)? —> -i((-9Ap)?) K3
4. p? —> P(2) 2,3
5. -,-,p-*A(p N4
6. (-—p)? —> K(1) 5
7. —(—1Ap)?) —> (——p)? K3
8. —1((—1Ap)?) —* L\cp? P(2) 6,7
9. Ap? —>
—i(HLp)?) A —> Ap? P(20) 4,8
We therefore have proved that in the case where a is an instance ofone ofthe axioms of K, if A-:-B
F-K Œ then (A)-1-(B) H (Œ). This completes the basis of induction ofourproof. Now we wilI
proceed to consider the case where the size of the K-derivation ofŒ from A and B is greater than 1.
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Hypothesis of induction: Let n>1 be the size of the K-derivation of a from A and B. Suppose that
for K-derivations ofsizes smaller than n the resuit holds. That is to say, if A--B H-K ( and the size
ofthe derivation ofp from A and B is smallerthan n, then A(A)-:-L(B) H-K-1 L((p). Let {a, ...,
be the K-derivation of u from A and B. By definition 5.2.24, u,, u should satisfy one of the
following conditions:
(i) u,, is an axiom of K;
(ii) There are a,a c {a1,
..., a,,}, i.j<n, such that a (X —> u.,,;
(iii) There is u, e{a1,
..., a,,}, i<zj, such that u,, Lia,, and no element of B appears in the
derivation of a
We have just considered the first case when we deait with derivations ofsize 1. Let us now consider
the two other cases.
Case (ii): a u —* a’,. (a) A(a1) —÷ A(a,j. Since the size ofthe K-derivations ofa, and a
from A and 3 are smaller than n, by the hypothesis of induction we have that there is a K?
derivation of A(a1) ftom A) and L(B) and a K?-derivation of A(a) A(a1) —> A(a,,) from
L(A) and A(3). Therefore, taking these two K-derivations together and considering items (ii).c)
and (iii).c) of definition 5.2.24 (MP mie), we conclude that there is a K-derivation of t(a,,) from
A(A) and L(B).
Case (iii): an Lia1. A(a,,) A(a,)!. Since no element of B appears in the K-derivation ofa, from
A and B, we are sure that there is a K-derivation of u from A and 0. Since the size of such
derivation is smaller than n, by the hypothesis of induction we have that there is a K9-derivation of
A(a1) from A(A) and 0. Given this, and taking this K?-derivation along with item (ii).e) of
definition 5.2.24 (rule N), we conclude that that there is a K7-derivation of A(a,,) A(a1)! from
A(A) and L(B).
Lemma A.8. The following schemas of relations between sets of formulas and formula are correct:
KG(1): H-K—la +—a
K<>(2): if H-K u + 3 and H-k p, wherein u occur in (p, then H-K (p[a/3
K0(4): H-K Li-a -* —<>a
K0(5): H-K ‘—a *-> -,Lia
xxix
Proof. K,(2) is the theorem of replacement we know is valid in normal modal logic K, K0(3) is a
classical logic theorem and I((4) and K0(5) are known K’s theo.ms. Conceming K0(1), we think
it is worthv to show its derivation:
K0(1): Hxa+a
1. —>(ct—>±) P10
2. (cL
—* p) —* ((a — -9p) —> —a) P9
3. (a—>I)—>-a K(3)2.
Lemma A.9. Let A,BciLo and aeL. If A-1-B HK9 cc then 11(A)-1-11fB) HK 11(a).
Proof. To prove this theorem, we should follow the same path of the previous proof. If A-1-B
—K7 ,
then there is a K-derivation of cc from A and B. We then have to prove that if this is the case, there
is K-derivation of 11(a) from 11(A) and 11fB).
Base ofindttction: derivation of size 1: cc cc
- Case 1: a e AuB.
Ç) Trivially, 11(a) e11(AuB). Therefore, 11(A)--fl(B) HK 11(a).
- Case 2: a is an axiom of K9.
To deal with this case, we have to analyze the possibility of a’s being an instance of each one of
K’s axiom schemas. for each one of these possibilities, we shah show then that there is a K
derivation of 11(a), what implies that there exists a K-derivation of 11(a) from 11(A) and 11(3) and
therefore that 11(A)-1- 11(B) F-K 11(a). The cases where cc is instance of one of K9’s positive
classical axioms, paranormal classical axioms and non-positive additional classical axioms are
trivial, for these schemas of axiom are valid in K: P1-P8 and Al-A3 belong to the axiomatic of K
and N1-N5 are easily derived from them along with MP (in fact, all of them are theorems of
classical logic). Below we consider the cases where a is an instance of K1-K5 or K and show that,
in these cases, there is a K-derivation of 11(a). In order to simplify our exposition, we prove below
that 11(—y)--HQp):
119
— (p . -9p) -11y
Ki: cc y?
‘,‘
11cc fl(y? ((p)) 11((y? ((y)!)) A (((y)!) y?))
11((y? —> ((fp)!)) A 11 (((y)!)
—> y?)) 11 (y?) 11((Hp)!)) A 11 ((y))) —> H (y?)
xxx
Q fl(()!) A H((cp)!) fl((p?) H9 H((p) A fl(-) ofl
— —Ei--fl(p A —fl--fl(p —> ‘ fhp fl(p -> LH(p
1. —flCp---fl(p K(1)
2. 11fl(p NP
3. 11->--E1flcp K0(2)1,2
4. -u--.H--.fl(p K(1)
5. c’11fl(p K0(2)3,4
K2: a (-p)! -> -i((p!). fia fl((-p)! —* -((p!) A -iQp!) — (—p)!) fl((-p)! —> -Qp!)) A
fl(-(cp!) —> (—p)!) H((—p)!) —> fl(—i(p!)) A fl(-(p!)) —> fl((—p)!) fl(-ip) —> A
—L1 ((p!) — []fl(-(p) C-1H(p -+ ->Hfp A —1<>Hp —* fl—7Hp i-H(p —1<>H(p. Since
[]—Hcp -÷ —oU(p is an instance ofK0(4), il itself is the derivation we are looking for.
1(3: a (—ip)? ÷-> -i((p?). fia fl((-ip)? - -Qp?) A —Qp?) —* (-iCp)?) fl((-p)? —> -i((p?)) A
Q fl(-iQp?) —+ (-ip)?) fl((—p)?) —* H(-i(p?)) A fl(-Qp?)) —* fl((—p)?) 11(—p) —* -1H((p?) A
-H(cp?) - ofl(—p) -H(p -> -CHtp A —H(p —> -H(p -H(p -> -DH(p. Since
—Hp -> —CHip is an instance ofK0(5), it itself is the K-derivation we are looldng for.
K: a ((p —* )! — Qp! —* !). fia fl(Qp —> )! —> (cp! —* !)) HQp — )! —* flQp! —* !)
DHQp—* ) —* (HQp!) — fl(4!)) CJ(H(p —* fI) —> (Ufl(p — C]H4). Since CJ(flp — 114) —
(o flcp —> o fl ) is an instance of K, it itself is the K-derivation we are searching for.
We have proved then that, in the case where a is an instance of one of the axioms of K, if A-:-B
F- a then 11(A)-:- 11(B) F-K 11(a). This completes the basis cf induction of the proof. Let us
examine now the case where the size of the K-derivation of a from A and B is greater than 1.
Hypothesis of induction: Let n>I be the size of the K-derivation ofa from A and B. Suppose that,
for K-derivations ofsizes srnaller than n the resuit holds. That is to say, if A±B F-K? (p and the size
of the derivation of (p from A and B is srnaller than n, then 11(A)-:- 11(3) F-K flQp). Let {a1
cu1} be the K-derivation of a from A and B. 3v definition 5.2.24. a a may have been obtained
in one of the following ways:
(j) a is an axiom of K;
(ii) There are a.cuj n a11}, i.j<n. such that a u —> u:
xxxi
(iii) There is a E {a1. ..., a}, kj, such that a a! and no element of B appears in the
derivation ofa.
We have just considered the first case when we deait with derivations ofsize 1. Let us now consider
the two other cases.
Case (ii): a a —> a. 11(a1) 11(a1) — fl(a). Since the size ofthe K-derivations ofa, and a
from A and B is smaller than 1, by the hypothesis of induction we have that there is a K-derivation
of 11(a1) from 11(A) and 11(8) and a K-derivation of fl(a) H(a,) — 11(a) from 11(A) and
11(8). Therefore, taking these two K-derivations together and considering items (ii).c) and (iii).c) of
definition 5.2.24 (MP rule), we conclude that there is a K-derivation of fl(a) from 11(A) and
11(8).
Case (iii): a a!, 11(a,,) D11a1. Since no element of B appears in the K7-derivation ofa1 from
A and 3, we are sure that there is a K,-derivation of a from A and 0. Since the size of such
derivation is smaller than n, by the hypothesis of induction we have that there is a K-deHvation of
11(a1) from 11(A) and 0. Given this and taking this K-derivation along with (ii).e) of definition
5.2.24 (rule N), we conclude that there is a K-derivation of 11(a) n Ha1 from 11(A) and 11(B)..
Lemma A.1O. Let ŒELG be a formula, M = <W,R,v> a mode! and weW a world of M. M,w IF-pc a
iffM,w H9 L(a) or, equivalently, P1(a) = I iff?l,W((a)) = 1.
Proof. We will prove this lemma by induction on the size ofa.
Base of induction: a p. in this case the resuit trivialiy hoids, for (p)
=
p.
Hypothesis of induction: Let a be an arbitrary formula. Suppose the resuit holds for ail formulae (
ofsize m<n, where n is a’s size. We have to prove that, if this is the case, the resuit also holds for
a. This wilI be done by considering alt possible forms a may have. The onÏy situation which poses
some difficulty is the case where a
—,p. For ail others, the proof is trivial. For the sake of
illustration, we show below the proof for the case where a 0p, and after consider the reaily
interesting case where a
a Dp. Aa Aflp (p)!. If’P,(np) = I, then for ail w’EW such that wRw’ ‘PoM,.(p) = 1.
But since p’s size is smaller than a’s, by the hypothesis of induction we have that, for ail for ail
w’EW such that wRw’, ?M,W’(A(p) = i. Triviaily then, we will have that 1((Ap)!) = I. If
= 1, then, for ail w’eW such that wRw’, ?M,W’(A(p) I. Since p’s size is smaller than
XXX Li
n, by the hypothesis of induction we have that, for ail w’€W such that wRw’, ‘l’c,w’(p) = L
Therefore, PcM (DCp) = 1.
u
—tu. cc —p) —,V(p. We have then to prove that —p) = 1 ifi ?MWV(p) = 1.
That will be clone by induction on the size of (p.
Basis ofInduction: (
=
p. This case is trivial, for Vp = p.
Hypothesis of induction (which, in order to be distinguished from the first hypothesis of induction,
will be refen-ed to as the second hypothesis of induction): Suppose that the resuit hoids for formuiae
ofsize smaller than ‘s size. We wiH show that, if this supposition holds, independentiy of the form
of (p, the general resuit that —p) = 1 iff Q(—Vp) = 1 also hoids. As usuai, we wili
consider ail forms cp may have.
( L14. —1V(p —1VD4 (V4?). 21(—1(V?)) = 1 iffY71,(V4?) = O iff, for at least one
w’EW such that wRw’, U?MW’(V) = O. ‘I’01l(—7Eh) = 1 iff’{’oNl(hP) = O iff, for at least one
w’eW such that wRw’, ‘P.(4) = O. If’(—fl) = 1, then, for at least one w’eW such that
wRw’, = O or, equivalently, ‘P01(—) = 1. Since ‘s size is smaller than p’s, by our
second hypothesis of induction we have that —,V4) = 1. Since f1(—1V) = 1 iff
Zi?M,W’(V1) = O, we have that, for at least one w’eW such that wRw’, Z5?M,W(V4) = O, winch
implies that 27MW(—9(V?)) = 1. If f?M,w(—7(VP?)) 1, then, for at least one w’ aW such that
wRw’, 3?M,W’(VP) = O, or, equivalently, .(—1V) = 1. Since 4’s size is smaller than cp’s, by our
second hypothesis of induction we have that ‘P0t,(—14) = 1. Since ‘P,(—14) 1 iff’P1,(4)
O, we have that, for at least one w’&vV such that wRw’, = O, winch implies that
= 1.
(p c>. —,Vp —,V >4) —(V!). The proof of this case is aimost identicai to the previous
one. We have just to change the occurrences of! by ?, and of D by D, and where it appears the
expression “for at least one” we write “for ail.”
(p -. —iP —1—1A6. 1(—1—,A) = 1 iff ZY,t,HA) = O iff ?M,w(P) = 1.
= 1 ift Pc\(—9) = O itt Yo,(p) 1. If PcM(—1-—) = 1, then ‘Pt,,v() = 1. Since
‘s size is smaller than «s, by the (first) hypothesis of induction, we have that 1.
Therfore, f’\Li—’) = 1. if = i, then we havc Q.,(y) = 1. Since ‘s size is
xxxiii
smaïler than ct’s, by the (first) hypothesis of induction, we have that J) = 1. Therefore,
= 1.
—> ?. iV(i —* ) -1(A —* V2). iw(i(A — V?)) 1 iff — V) = O
iff (A4.) = 1 and = O. ‘f oL(—’QP —* 2)) = 1 iff Poi,(4) —* 2) = O 1ff POM,W(4)) = 1
and = O. If ‘f(—,(4)
—> )) = 1, then 4)) = 1 and = O, which is
equivalent to (4)) = 1 and M(—]) = 1. Since 4)’s size is smaller than a’s, by the (first)
hypothesis of induction we have that t,(4’) = 1, and since 2’s size is smaller than ‘s, by the
second hypothesis of induction we have that Q?M,W(—1V2.) = 1, which is equivalent to i?(V7) =
O. We therefore have 2?M,,V(—F(AfP —> V2)) = 1. If l7Nt,(—1(A4) —* V2)) = 1, then 2oW(A4)) = 1
and 5?MW(V?) = O, wbich is equivalent to Ç1(A4)) = 1 and MW(—1V?..) = 1. Since 4)’s size is
smaller than ci.’s, by the first hypothesis of induction we have that
‘{‘of,v(4)) = 1, and since 2’s size
is smaller than (p, by the second hypothesis of induction we have that ‘f,(—2.) = 1, which is
equivalent to ‘{‘t,W(4)) = 1 and = O. Therefore, ‘f,W(—(4) — 2)) = 1.
( 4) A 2. —1V(4) A ) —1(V4) A V2). (—1(V4) A V7)) = 1 iff (V4) A = O iff
= O and Y?If,W(V) = O. (—4) A )) = 1 iffPM,U(4) A 2) = O iff’ = O and
= O. If’Y01(—1(4) A X)) = 1, then ‘P(4)) = O and ‘fo1,W(X) = O, which is equivalent to
= 1 and ‘+Gt,W(—lX) 1. Since 4)’s and X’s sizes are smaller than ‘s, by the second
hypothesis of induction we have that Q(— V 4)) = 1 and l?Nj,w(1 V X) = 1, which is equivalent to
U?M,(V4)) = O and Ut,(VX) = O. Therefore, —1(V4) A VX)) = 1. Iff?MW(—,(V4) A VX)) =
1, then i?Nf,W(V4)) = O and 3?M,W(VX) = O, winch is equivalent to ,—1V4)) = 1 and
—1VX) = 1. Since 4)’s and 7’s sizes are smaller than (p, by the second hypothesis of induction
we have that ‘f(—4)) = 1 and Pç1(—1X) = 1, which is equivalent to ‘fcr,(4)) = O and ‘PwQ)
= O. Therefore, ‘foM,w((4) A X)) 1.
4) y X. The proof ofthis case is ahnost identical to the previous one. We have just to replace
ail occurrences of A by y and the relevant occurrences of “and’ by “or.”
Lemma A.11. Let anL a formula, M be a model and w a world of M. M,w IHç ci. iff M,w H
fl(u) or, equivalentlv. = 1 iff’f f,\(flu) = 1.
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Proof. The proof of this lemma is almost identical to lemma A.1O’s. Ail we have to do is to
properiy erase the occurrences of and consider ftmction fl along with ‘-li. R
A.2 Theorems from Chapter 5
Theorem 5.3.1. K? is sound and complete (that is, for any A,3cL and CLELo, AbB HK CL iff
A--B K? CL.)
Proof. Let us first prove the lefi-right direction (soundness): for any A,Bc:L? and CLé L?, if A-:-B
F-K? CL then A-:-B =K? CL. Suppose that A-:-B H-Ko CL and A+B 1K? CL. If A--B K? a, by theorem
5.3.19 we have that H(A)-:-fl(B) fl(c). By the soundness theorem of normal modal logic K8,
we have fl(A)--H(B) F-K fl(CL). from that, along with theorem 5.3.17, we have that A-:-B F-K? CL,
which is a contradiction. Therefore, if A-1-B H-K? a then A-1-B K? c. The right-lefl direction
(completeness) is proved through the same reference to normal modal logic K. Suppose that A--B
K? c and A-1-B F-K? cc. If A-1-B F-K? a, by theorem 5.3.17 we have that 11(A)-1- 11(B) F-K 11(a). By
the completeness theorem of normal modal logic K, we have then that 11(A)-1- 11(3) lx fl(CL).
From that, along with theorem 5.3.19, we have that A--B F-K? CL, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, if A-1-B K? CL then A-1-B H-K? CL..
Theorem 5.3.2. Some formulae of L? that satisfy one of the following schemas of formula are flot
K?-theorems (and consequently flot K?-valid.)
(CL—÷f3)—>(CL——43)-+—1CL
—iCL—>(CL—*J3)
—xvcc
—i(CLA-—iCL)
(-3->--,CL)-*(CL-3)
-,CLv3—(CL—3) (CL-*J3)---*--CLv3
(CL->)->--(CLA-3)
-(CLA--,f3)->(a-*J3)
(CL——iU)—>—iCL
Proof. In order to proof this theorem. it suffices to show an instance of each one of these schernas
of formula that is not Ko-valid. (from theoren 5.3.2 it follows that it is also not K?-theorem.)
1-Javing picked such a formula. we need then oniv to show a model M <W,R,v> and a world
$ For the proof cf SOLIflChieSS anJ comploteaess of nomal mo±i! logic K with local and global premises sec
fitting (1993). Sec also Chellas (1930) and Hnghes & Crcs\vell t 1996).
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Q weW such that the formula is flot Q7-satisfied by M at w. Bellow we show, for each one of the
above schemas, the mentioned instance along with the features of the falsifying model. p,qeP are
propositional symbols.
1. wuW such that vw(q) = 1 and there are w’,w”&vV such that
wRw’ and wRw” such that v.(p) = 1 and vç.(p) = O.
weW is such that there are w’,w”eW such that wRw’ and
wRw” and vw(p) 1 and v.tp) O.
The same as 1.
wW such that vw(q) = O and there are w’,w”eW such that
wRw’ and wRw” such that vw’(I) = 1 and vw’{p) = O.
Thesameas 1.
The same as 1.
The same as 4.
The same as 2.
Thesameas L
The same as 4.
Thesameas 1.
The sarne as 2.U
Theorem 5.3.3. Ail formulae of L? that satisfy one of the following schemas of formula, wherein
a and f3 are ?!-free formulae, are K?-theorems (and consequently K?-valid.)
(Œ—f3)—>((Œ—-l3)—-9a)
—(ŒA--—Œ)
(a
-* f3) -> (-,f3 -* -,CL)
—iCL y f3 —> (a —* f3)
(f3)-*-(ŒA-,f3)
(a—>--cx)—>--Œ
Proof. Since ail the above schernas of formula are theorems of classical logic and since ail
of their instances are modality-free, it follows from theorem 5.3.12 that they are K
theorems.
Theorem 5.3.4. AIl formulac of L that satisfy one of the following schemas of formula are K?
theorems (and consequentlv K-valid.)
(u—>f3)—>(cc—>-f3)—*--cL
2. —i(p!)vp!
3. (q—*p?)—*(-(p?)—>--q)
4. —p?)vq->(p?-q)
5. (q—*p?)—-9(qA—1(p?))
6. -,(p?)-÷(p?-->--q)
7. p?)->(p?-q)
8. —(p? A
9. (-(p!) -* -qq) -> (q -* p!)
1O.(p!-*q)---,(p!)vq
11 .—(q A —i(p!)) —* (q —> p!)
l2.(p! -* -(p!))-* (p!)
Q
(-‘f3 -> —Œ) — (u -> f3)
(CL
— f3) —+ —iŒ y f3
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Œ V CL
(Œ)->(--->-Œ) (-tOE->f3)
(cL—3)—>-av13
(Œ)(aA)
(Œa)—-a
Proof. If we apply the inverse of ftinction p9 to each one of the above schemas, we wili obtain a set
of schemas which are valid in ciassical logic. From lemma A.2 then, we have that the schemas as
presented above are ail valid in K7.
Theorem 5.3.5. Ml formulae of L7 that satisfy one of the foliowing schemas of fonnuia are
theorems (and consequently K7-valid.)
(Œ—>f3)!--*(&—÷!) (Œ—*)!—+(a?—f3?)
(ŒAt3)!-Œ!A13! (CLAI3)?—(Œ?Af3?)
Œ!V3!—(ŒV3)! (a?v13?)-*(Œvf3)?
(CL—>J3)?-+(a! —>f3?) (avE3)! —>(Œ! vî3?)
(a!) -* (-a)?\ -(Œ?) (-a)!
G —(a!) y (—CL)? —(CL?) y (—a)!
Proof. If we apply the inverse of function c1 to each one of the above schemas, we will obtain a set
of schemas which are valid in normal modal iogic K. It foliows then from theorem 5.3.14 that the
schemas as presented above are ail valid in K7.
Theorem 5.3.6. The following schemas of relations between sets of formulas and formuia are
correct.
{Œ—>P}HK?(a--+3)! {a—>3}K?(a--*r3)!
{ct
— P} H7 CL! —> 3! {a —> P} K? CL! —> !
{a—>} HK7Œ’?—*j3? {CL—f3} K?CL?-fl?
Proof. Applying the inverse of function C1 to each one of the schemas of formula that appear in the
above relations, then we will obtain a set of schemas of relation which are vahd in normai modal
logic K. From theorem 5.3.14 then, we have that the schernas as presented above are ail vaiid in
K?.
Theorem 5.3.7. Sorne formulac ofL that satisfy une ofthe following schernas offomiula are not
K7-theorems (and consequentÏy not K7-valid.)
Definition A. 1.
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cx? — -1((--1cc)!) cx!
—> -((-cx)?)
-((-,cx)!) —* cx?
-i((—itX)?) —> cx!
-(&) —* (-,cx)?
-(cx?)
—> (-cx)!
(-cx)? —* -1(cx!) (-1cc)! —> -(cx?)
cd y -(cx!) -1(cx! A —cx!))
-(cx? A -(a?)) cx? y -(cx?)
Proof. The procedure to prove this theorem is the same as the one we used to prove theorem
5.3.2. S
Iheorem 5.3.8. Let A,BCL? be two sets of formulae and cx,(peL, two formulae. A-:-Bu{cp} F-K? CL
iffA-:-B F-K? (P —* cx.
Proof. Suppose that A-:-Bu{(P} F—K? cx but A-1-B FI-K? (P —+ cx. If A-:-B ht-K? (p — cx, by theorem
5.3.17, fl(A)-:-H(B) F/-K flQp —> cx) fl((p) —> fl(cx). Then, by the K’s local deduction theorem’°,
we have that fl(A)-:-H(B)]{fl((P)} F/-K fl(cx), what is the same as fl(A)-:-fl(Bu{(P}) FI-K fl(cx).
But then, by theorem 5.3.17 again, we have that A-1-B{(P} FI-K? cx, what is a contradiction.
Therefore, if A-1-Bu{(p) F-K? cx then A-1-B F-K? cp — cx. Suppose now that A-:-B F-K? (P —> cx but
A-:-Bu{(p} FI-K? cx. If A-1-Bu{(P} FI-K? cx, by theorem 5.3.17, fl(A)-1-fl(B{(p}) FI-K H(cx), what is
the same as H(A)-:-fl(B)uflf(p) FI-K fl(cx). Then, by K’s local deduction theorem, fl(A)-:-fl(B)
F/-K fl((p) —H(cx) fl(p —> cx). But by theorem 5.3.17, we have that A-1-B F/-K? cp — cx, what is a
contradiction. Therefore, if A-:-B F-K? (P —> cx then A-1-Bu{(P} F-K? cx. S
Theorem 5.3.9. Let A,BcL0 be two sets of formulae and cx,(PEL? two formulae. A{cp}--B F-K? cx
iff, for some nO, A-1-B{(p!°,(p!’,. . .,p!} F-K? cx.
Proof. The proof of the axiomatic version of K?’s global deduction theorem goes in the same way
as K9’s local deduction theorem. We have just to repeat what we have done in the proof of theorem
5.3.8, but now using K’s global deduction theorem instead ofK’s local theorem. S
Theorem 5.3.10. Let A,BCL? be two sets of formulae and cx,(peL9 two formulae. A-1-Bu{(P} K? cx
iffA-:-B =K? (P —* cx.
Q
________
‘° See Fitting (1993).
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Theorem 5.3.11. Let A,BcL be two sets of formulae and cc,cpL two fonnulae. Aui{p} -1-B u.
iff for some n0, A-:-Bu{ p!°, ,...,p!} u..
Proof. The proofs of theorems 5.3.10 and 5.3.11 go exactly in the same way as the proofs of
theorems 5.3.8 and 5.3.9. We have just to use theorem 5.3.19 instead of theorem 5.3.17 and
consider the semantic version ofK’s local and global deduction theorems. •
Theorem 5.3.12. Let aeL0. If
—c , then HK2 u..
Proof. The easiest way to prove this theorem is to show that, concerning non-modal formulae, the
axiomatic of C is included in the axiomatic of K. This is a trivial resuit, for the positive classical
axioms p in L0 and the non-positive classical axioms c in L0 are automatically included in the set
ofaxioms of K? (definitions 5.3.5 and 5.3.9) •
Theorem 5.3.13. Let aeL0. If c , then =K? C
Proof. If 1=c , then for ail trivial modeis M, M Hp u.. Since M contains only one world w, this
means that u is valid in ail possible classical valuations. Trivially then, being u a non-modal
formula, it will be ‘P-satisfied by M at w, for any model M and world w of M, and therefore K
valid. I
Theorem 5.3.14. Let ci.eL0. If t—K u., then F-K? 1)(cc).
Proof. In order to prove this theorem, we have to show that, for ail axiom-schemas u of K, F-K?
1(u) is a valid schema of relation. Let us do that by induction on the size of the K-derivation cc1,
ci., u we know there exists.
Base of induction: derivation of size 1: u1 u.
In this case, u is an axiom of K. The cases where u is an instance of Pi, ... or P8 are trivial, for
(u) wiIl 5e automatically an axiom of K7. If u is an instance of P9, P10 or Pli, P(u) will be an
instance of P9’, P10’ or Pli’, which, as we have showed in the proof of lenirna A.2, are K
theorems. If u is an instance of NP (C>cc -* —,U--iu.), c1(u) will be an instance of Ki (ci.? ->
—.((a)!)). And, finaily, if u is an instance of K ((u —* f3) —> (11a —> flf3)), 1(u) vi11 be an instance
ofK ((u.—> f3)! —> (ci.! —> f3!)).
H’pothesis ofIndztctio?7: Suppose that the K-derivation of u. is of size n and that the resuit holds for
clerivations ofsize snialler thon n. Let u1, ..., u..,. a u he the rivation of u.. u. presonce in tho
derivation may hejustified in one of the following ways: (j) u.is an axiom of K; (ii) there are i,i<n
such tha: ci aj —> ci. ond (ii1 there is i<n such that u. Ea. We have just considered the fus:
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case. About the second, since the derivation of cx and of cx are of sizes smaller than n, by the
hypothesis of induction we have that there is a K7-derivation of both cD(cx) cI(a —* cx,,) (cx) —*
t13(a,,) and cI(c). Applying modus ponens then, we have that there is a K,-derivation of cT?(a,,).
About the third case, since the derivation of cx is of size smaller than n, by the hypothesis of
induction we have that there is a K?-deHvation of cD(cx. Applying N then, we have that there is a
K,-derivation of(cx,,) (Dcc) (F(cx)!.
Theorem 5.3.15. Let cxeL0. 1f
=K cx, then ‘=K cD(cx).
Proof. If zK cx, then for ail models M and ail worlds w of M, M,w F cx. From lemma A.5, we
have that M,w HO? 1(cx). Consequently, K? D(a). I
Theorem 5.3.16. Let A,Bc±0 andcxGL0. A-1-B F-Kcxiff (A)-1-L(B) — t\(cx).
Proof. By lemma A.7, if A-1-B F-K cx then (A)-1-1\(B) F-K? L\(cc). Suppose that (A)-1-A(B) F-K?
z(a) but A-1-B b’-K cx. If A-1-B h’-K cx, by lemma A.6, we have that fl((A))-1- fl(t(B)) 5tK
fl(\(cx)). By Jemma A.9, we have then that A(A)-1-(B) b-K? A(cx), which is a contradiction.
Therefore, if A(A)-:-A(B) F-K? L(cx)thenA--B F-KŒ.I
Theorem 5.3.17. Let A,BcL, and ŒEL,. A-:-B F-K? cx if 11(A)-:-fl(B) F-K 11(a).
Proof. By lemma A.9, if A-:-B F-K’ cx then 11(A)-1-fl(B) F-K 11(a). Suppose that H(A)-:-11(B) ‘K
11(a) but A-:-B bi-K? cx. If A-1-B I9K? cx, by lemma A.6, we have that c(fl(A))-1- z1(fl(B)) [f K?
A(fl(cx)). By lemma A.7, we have then that fl(A)-:- 11(B) bLK 11(a), which is a contradiction.
Therefore, if 11(A)-:-fl(B) F-K 11(a) then A-:-B F-K?
Theorem 5.3.18. Let A,BELO and cxeL0. A-:-B 1=K cx if (A)-:-A(B) K? -).
Proof. Suppose that A-1-B K cx but A(A)-1-A(B) [fK? A(cx). If L(A)-1-Ls(B) ItK? L(cx), then there
is a model Manda world w of M such that M IF3 L\(4)), for ail A(4))eA(A), M,w Ho? (X), for
ail (.)e A(B), and M,w fl/fl? A(cx). But if M H0? A(4)) for ail (4)) A(A), M,w IHç, /(X) for ail
Q)e A(B) and M,w Io, cx). by lemma AJO we have that M F- 4) for ail 4)A, M,w i[— ?
for ail eB and M,w I5Lp cx. Consequently, A-1-B [fK cx, which is a contradiction. Therefore, if
A-1-B cx, L(A)-1-L(B) =K? A(cx). Suppose now that A(A)-:-A(B) I=K? t\(cx) but A-1-B K cx. If
A-1-B [fK cx then there is a model M and a world w of M such that M IF 4) for ail 4)EA, M,w IHpG
xl
X for ail XeB and M,w W cx. But ifM IF 4) for ail 4)A, M,w F-0 X for ail XcB and M,w Ilhyo
cx, then by lemma A.1O M IF0? L(4)) for ail z(4))Ez(A), M,w HO? L(X) for ail L(X)e(B) and
M,w I0? A(a). Consequently, L(A)-1-z1(B) K? A(cx), which is a contradiction. Therefore, if
A(A)-1-A(B) K? (cx) then A-:-B K Œ.
Theorem 5.3.19. Let A,3cL? and cxeL,. A-1-3 K? cx if 11(A)-:-fl(3) K 11(a).
Proof. The proof of this theorem foliows the same idea of theorem 5.3.18’s. We have just to
properly erase the occurrences of and consider function H along with P as weli as to use lemma
A.ll instead of lemma A.lO. R
Theorem 5.4.1. Let A,BcL, and cxeL. A-1-B F-D? cx ifAu0?--B F-K?Œ.
Proof. Suppose that A-1-B H-D? cx. We can easiiy extend the proofoftheorem 5.3.17 (A-:-B F—K? (X tif
11(A)-1- 11(B) F-K 11(a)) in such a way as to prove that A-1-B F-D? cx iff 11(A)-1- 11(8) F-D 11(a),
where D is normal modal logic D (we have just to consider the additional axiom cx! —* cx? in D? and
C]cx — <>a in D). With this resuit, we have that H(A)-1-fl(B) F-D 11(a). Given then the known
resuit that A-1-B F-D cx iffAuZD-1-B F-Kcx (where ZD is the set ofati instances ofaxiom D)” we
have then that 11(A)uïD-1-fl(B) F-K 11(a). Since ZD = fl(D?) H(A)uD-1- 11(B) F-K 11(a) is the
same as H(A)H(D?)-1-H(B) F-K 11(a) or H(Au.D?)-1-11(B) F-K 11(a). By theorem 5.3.17
therefore, we have that AuD?-1-B F-K? cx. The right-left side of the proof folIows the same
reasoning.
Theorem 5.4.2. Let A,BcL, and Œ6L?. A-1-B D? cx if AD?-1-B =K?Œ.
Proof. The proof of this theorem is almost identical to theorem 5.4.1 ‘s. AIl we have to do is to
replace the relation of deductibility by the relation of Iogical consequence and instead of theorem
5.3.17 considertheorem 5.3.19. 0f course, we have also to take the semantic version ofthe theorem
that links D to K. R
Theorem 5.4.3. D? is sound and complete.
Proof. Theorem 5.4.3 follows immediately from theorems 5.4.1, 5.4.2 and 5.3.1.R
Theorem 5.4.4. AIl formulae of L? that satis1,’ one ofthe fo]iowing schemas of formula are D?
theorems (and consequently DTvaiid.)
See Fitting (1993).
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(a—>CL)?
((CL —>J3)! — (a! — f3!))?
Proof. We can easily extend the proof oftheorem 5.3.14 (If p—K CL, then K? (ct)) in such a way as
to prove that If H0 CL, then HKI (CL). Iherefore, since the schemas of formula above are vahd in D
if we replace I by D and ? by , ail ofthem are valid in D7.I
The proofs of theorems 5.5.5 to 5.5.19 follow the same reasoning of the proofs of theorems
5.4.1-5.4.3 we showed above. We have just to replace D and D7 by the normal and paranormal
modal logics in question.
Theorem 5.4.20. K11 is sound and complete (that is, for any A,B7 and CLE?, A-B H CL iff
A-:-B K1? CL.)
Proof. In the same way that in the proof of theorem 5.3.1 we benefited from the theorems of
soundness and completeness of propositional normal modal logic K, we can also make use of the
theorems of soundness and completeness of first-order normal modal logic K to prove the
soundness and completeness of first-order paranormal modal logic K11. If we follow this path, the
proofoftheorem 5.4.20 will have the same structure of theorem 5.3.l’s. The difference is that we
will have in addition to consider axiom Q and the rule of generalization in the corresponding
expansion oftheorems 5.3.16 and 5.3.17 and, in the expansion oftheorems 5.3.18 and 5.3.19, the
first-order way of evaluating atomic propositions and quantffied formulae. •
Iheorem 5.4.21. K?K is sound and compiete.
Proof. By following the suggestion above and considering at this time the proof of soundness and
completeness of normal 2-modal logic KK (that is, the normal muÏti-modal logic tvith two pairs of
dual modalities and the axioms []1(a. —+ f3)—> (L1CL —* Dif3) and L]2(CL —> f3)—> (Ei2CL —> D2f3)),
we can constmct the proof of soundness and completeness ofK7Ka. From a general point ofview,
this method can be used to prove the completeness and soundness of any paranormal or multi
normal modal logic: we have just to take the corresponding mono or multi-modal normal modal
logic along with its theorem of completeness and soundness and consider the steps flot taken into
account by the proofs of theorems 5.3.16 - 5.3.19. We will cail this method thefrom normal to
paranormal method of compteteness ctnd sottndness proof (or, for short, the from normal to
paranonnal method). It is worthy of mention that it vas already used in the proof oC theorem 5.4.3.
Theorem 5.4.22. PPK7K is sound and complete.
Proof. The proof of tins theorem is done by applying the from normal ta paranormal method along
with the proof of completeness and soundness of normal 2-modal logic PPKK (here, axiom PP wiIl
be simply an axiom stating the relation between the two modalities: E2u — Du, for example.)
Theorem 5.4.23. The following schemas of relations between sets of formulas and formula are
correct.
{ Du} HPPK?K u! {Uu} PPK?K u!
{u?} Ou {u?} FPK’K
Proof. {Du} HPPK?K u! follows dfrectly from the use of axiom PP. from PP and —(10) we get
—((—u)!) —÷ —(:1—u. From P2 along with NN and NP we get <>a -> —E—u. From that, along with
—((—u)!) —> —D—u and Ki and P2 we get u? —> Ou, from which {u?} H PPK9K Ou follows directly.
The other two relations follow from theorem 5.4.22 applied to the twojust proved results. I
A.3 Theorems from Chapter 6
C... Theorem 6.2.1. LP2 is sound and complete.Proof. Again here we can use the from normaI to paranormal method to prove the soundness and
completeness ofLP2. The difference is that at this time we will have to consider the normal 2-modal
logic PPK1K2D1D2B1B141, where axiom A is the axiom A written in terms ofmodality E. I
Theorem 6.2.2. The following schemas of relations between sets of formulas and formula are
correct.
{Du} HLP2 u! {Du} LP1 u!
{u!} HLP2 u? {u!} LP22 u?
{u?} H[p2 Ou (u?} LP2 Ou
Proof. The proof of the fîrst and third schemas of relation is identical to the proof of theorem
5.4.23. for the second, it follows directly from axiom D?. I
Theorem 6.2.3. Let be such that LP2 u and (*LP2 —iu. The following formulae are flot LP2
theorems:
u! v—(u!)
2 For meta-resuits on mufti-modal logios sec
\liI
Proof. Let us suppose that cx! y —1(a!) is a LP2 theorem. From theoretn 6.2.1 then, wc have that it
is LP2 vaiid. Consequently, for every first-order 2-model M and world w of M, cx! y —(cx!) is ?o
satisfied by M at w, that is to say, 1(cc! y = 1, which is equivalent to Q7oNl,(a!) 1 or
1. f2’W(cx!) 1 iff for ail w’eW such that wR?w’, Ç.(a) = Ï. In its tum,
= I iff ZioM(cx!) O iff, for ail w &W such that wRw , ZiooMe(cx) = O. We see
that these two alternatives are flot such that one of them bas necessarily to be the case. This vi1i
happen only if either LP2 cx or =LP2 —iCC, which, by theorem 6.2.1, contradicts the condition that
b’-Lp2 cx and bLLP2 —icx. Therefore, cx! y —i(cx!) is flot a LP2 theorem. The proof of the other part ofthe
theorem follows the same reasonmg.
Theorem 6.2.4. Let cxe?G be such that LP2 cx and t7-Lp7 —icx. The following formulae are flot LP2
theorems:
cx! y (—icx)! -i(cx? A (—iŒ)?)
Proof. The proof of this theorem foilows from theorem 6.2.3 along with the observation that, due
to axioms K2 and K3, HLp2 cx! y (—cx)! ÷-* cx! y —(cx!) and HLP2 —i(cx? A (—cx)?) -* —i(cx? A
-(cx?)).
Theorem 6.2.5. Let cxn?O be such that 51LP2 cx and b’-Lp2 —cx. The foliowing formulae are flot LP2
theorems:
cx! y (—cx)! —(cx? A (—cx)?)
Theorem 6.2.6. Let cxEc- be such that 7’-Lp2 cx and bLLP2 —,a. The following formulae are not LP2
theorems:
cx? y -(cx?) -(cx? A -i(cx?))
cx? y (—cx)? -i(a? A (—cx)?)
Theorem 6.2.7. Let cxe?G be such that b-Lp2 cx and F-Lp2 —cx. The foHowing formulae are flot LP2
theorems:
u? y (—cx)? —(u? A (—cx)?)
The proof oftheorerns 6.2.5, 6.2.6 and 6.2.7 follows the sarne reasoning as theorem 6.2.3’s.
Theorem 6.2.8. AIl formulae that satisfy one of the following schemas of formula are LP2-
theorems (and conse.2uentiv LP2-valid.)
(-Œ)? -(c?) (cL —> f3)! —> (CL? — f3?)
(a?vf3?)—(cLvf3)? (cLAf3)?—.(cL?Af3?)
(a — f3)? —* (cd —> f3?) cd —* a?
CL!—>CL?!
Proof. We show below the derivation of each one of the above stated schemas of formula.
(—CL)? -> -?)
1. (—(a!))? —> —i(CL!?) K3
2. (—cL)!—>--i(CL!) K2
3. (—a)!? —> (—,(a!))? K(1) 2
4. (—iCL)!?—*--i(CL!?) P(2)1,3
5. —(cjJ?) — (—(CL!))? K3
6. -(CL!)—*(-iCL)! K2
7. (—i(CL!))?—>(—iCC)!? K(1)6
8. —,(CL!?)—*(—1CL)!? P(2)5,7
With similar steps we get (—CL)!? —> —(a!?)
(a —> f3)!
—* (CL? —* f3?)
1. (CL! —÷ f3!)! —* (CL!? —> f3!?) Th. 5.3.5
2. (CL—f3)!—*(CL!-->f3!) K?
3. (CL—>f3)!!--*(Œ!—>f3!)! K(4)2
4. (a —+ f3)!! —* (a!? —* f3!?) P(2) 1,3
(a?vf3?)—>(avf3)?
1. (a!? y f3!?) —* (CL! y p!)? 1h. 5.3.5
2. CL! Vf3!—>(CLVf3)! Th.5.3.5
3. (u.! y f3!)? —> (av f3)!? K(1) 2
4. (u.!? V f3!?) — (CLV f3)!? P(2) 1,3
(CL A f3)? -÷ (a? A f3?)
1. (u.! A f3!)?—> (u.!? A f3!?) Th. 5.3.5
2. (a A f3)! —* CL! A f3! Th. 5.3.5
3. (u. , f3)!?—> (CL! A f3!)? K(l) 2
(D 4. (CLAf3)!?_>(CL!?Af3!?) P(2) 1,3(u.—*f3)?—*(cd—*f3?)
1. (u.! —> f3!)?—> (u.!! —* f3!?) 1h. 5.3.5
X2. (Œ—*3)!—(Œ!—>13!)
3. (ct (ce! K(1) 2
4. (a—*Ç3)!?—*(Œ!!—*3!?) P(2)1,3
a!
- a?
1. Œ!!—*Œ!? D?
CL! — a?!
1. Œ!—>Œ!?! B?
2. a!!—>Œ?!! K(4)1
CL? —> CL??
1. &—÷a!?! B?
2. a!?—*a!?!? K(1)1 •
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